Can William Lane Craig feel pain?

It certainly is an interesting concept excluding, of course, Billy Craig from the discussion; he's an idiot.

in a YouTube video of a panel discussion floating around Neil deGrasse Tyson observes that the brightest bonobo chimps are equivalent to a human two-year old allowing for a 1% difference in DNA. (I'm being very simplistic, here, but follow along!) So, Neil, imagines "another civilization that is 1% different from us but for whom our brightest equal their two-year old. And so it goes, turtles or aliens all the way up. His notion is that an "advanced" alien civilization might not even recognize us as "intelligent" in their terms. I once heard a similar comparison about ants to humans as humans to "the others."

And, finally, along these lines I recall a science fiction story (can't remember the title or author) where Earth is "invaded" by aliens who simply ignore us and go about their business. All attempts to communicate with them fail and ultimately the aliens prevail in colonizing the planet much as the Europeans colonized the New World which I think was the point of the story.

Anyway, good stuff, except for Craig who is still an idiot.

And if they can feel pain but do not know it is pain then it is not pain.

Any number of animals is smarter than this loser called Craig.

No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man's and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scrutinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water. With infinite complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs, serene in their assurance of their empire over matter. It is possible that the infusoria under the microscope do the same. No one gave a thought to the older worlds of space as sources of human danger, or thought of them only to dismiss the idea of life upon them as impossible or improbable. It is curious to recall some of the mental habits of those departed days. At most terrestrial men fancied there might be other men upon Mars, perhaps inferior to themselves and ready to welcome a missionary enterprise. Yet across the gulf of space, minds that are to our minds as ours are to those of the beasts that perish, intellects vast and cool and unsympathetic, regarded this earth with envious eyes, and slowly and surely drew their plans against us. And early in the twentieth century came the great disillusionment.

Might that not speak to the fallacy of the Christian's so-called philosophy of dominion over the animal kingdom? Perhaps that was simply an excuse by early Christians to justify their eating animals that do feel pain, so they can ignore it since they have dominion over those animals. Wasn't dominion intended to mean caretaker, not dominator?

It's actually kind of funny (in a sick way) to see Craig reverting to the behaviorism of the first half of the 20th century. B.F. Skinner would be proud of him.

Just Bob said:

No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man's and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scrutinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water. With infinite complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs, serene in their assurance of their empire over matter. It is possible that the infusoria under the microscope do the same. No one gave a thought to the older worlds of space as sources of human danger, or thought of them only to dismiss the idea of life upon them as impossible or improbable. It is curious to recall some of the mental habits of those departed days. At most terrestrial men fancied there might be other men upon Mars, perhaps inferior to themselves and ready to welcome a missionary enterprise. Yet across the gulf of space, minds that are to our minds as ours are to those of the beasts that perish, intellects vast and cool and unsympathetic, regarded this earth with envious eyes, and slowly and surely drew their plans against us. And early in the twentieth century came the great disillusionment.

--H. G. Wells, opening paragraph of The War of the Worlds

Once as a very little boy, whilst at the day-school, or before that time, I acted cruelly, for I beat a puppy I believe, simply from enjoying the sense of power; but the beating could not have been severe, for the puppy did not howl, of which I feel sure as the spot was near to the house. This act lay heavily on my conscience, as is shown by my remembering the exact spot where the crime was committed. It probably lay all the heavier from my love of dogs being then, and for a long time afterwards, a passion. Dogs seemed to know this, for I was an adept in robbing their love from their masters.

Don't have time to listen to the debate -- I'll assume the representations of Craig's position are fair.

Can William Lane Craig feel pain? Sure.

Empathy? Maybe not so much.

Or if they can feel pain, then they do not know it is pain.

Why do animals avoid repeating previously painful experiences when they have no awareness of having had painful experiences?

I'm reminded of what my old Marine Invertebrate Prof used to say- "No brain, no pain." Not speaking of most animals, but of the non-Cephalopod invertebrates, having only ganglia, he would argue that they probably lacked the capacity to feel pain.

Maybe he's talking about bread.

Does being an idiot hurt?

One would think that someone educated enough in a field as formally rigorous and logic-oriented as Philosophy would be resistant to this kind of thinking, but then again this is William Lane Craig.

I've heard other people express similar ideas about animals of all kinds, that "they don't REALLY feel pain, not like we do." It makes me wonder how many of them have ever owned even a dog. While you can argue that it's easy to project a humanized-view onto them, even a critical mind can observe that dogs react to pain and suffering (both physically and emotionally) in a way that's not very distinguishable from a human, especially a child. My dog seeks me out when he's feeling bored, he lays his head in my lap when he's frustrated or in pain, he enjoys spending time with me and other members of my family and visibly suffers when he can't. He also displays pangs of want or longing when deprived of play, human food, or kept away from interesting but dangerous items that catch his fancy. Dogs show reactions to these situations that are akin to our own internal experiences of pain, suffering, loss, or desire. It's even demonstrable that dogs who are deprived of happiness and mistreated or stressed show many of the same symptoms of suffering from emotional damage that humans do. Confusion, trepidation, mistrustfulness, aggression, disinterest, vocalizing as if in physical pain even if there's no physical stimulus to provoke it.

The opposite is also true: when things are good, they're happy. They show affection, elation, eagerness, etc. Their behavior is different when being put through different emotional states as we'd expect if they do indeed experience them. While this is more than enough to convince me that dogs have an awareness of their pain and suffering (and I feel they have the same states in other creatures in their "pack"), it might not convince everybody. What it should do is provoke an empathic response. Their behavior and reactions are sufficiently human-like to make you think twice before subjecting them to harm.

Dogs don't even pass the mirror test. Neither do very young children (and certainly, a fetus wouldn't). What are the implications of that for WLC's stance on other issues?

DavidK astutely observed: Wasn't dominion intended to mean caretaker, not dominator?

5 “Simeon and Levi are two of a kind; their weapons are instruments of violence. 6 May I never join in their meetings; may I never be a party to their plans. For in their anger they murdered men, and they crippled oxen just for sport. 7 A curse on their anger, for it is fierce; a curse on their wrath, for it is cruel. I will scatter them among the descendants of Jacob; I will disperse them throughout Israel. (NLT)

ksplawn said: One would think that someone educated enough in a field as formally rigorous and logic-oriented as Philosophy would be resistant to this kind of thinking, but then again this is William Lane Craig.

Richard B. Hoppe said: Who has left philosophy behind as he's become merely a high-sounding apologist. In apologetics anything goes.

Carl Drews said:

DavidK astutely observed: Wasn't dominion intended to mean caretaker, not dominator?

Yes, absolutely! Jacob/Israel is recorded in Genesis 49 cursing his sons Simeon and Levi because they maimed oxen: ... That verse doesn't quite say that animals experience no pain, but it does say that hurting animals "just for sport" is a rotten thing to do.

ksplawn said: Apologetics is literally the formalized practice of starting at the conclusion and working backwards. Once I figured that out, any respect I had for it as a field of "study" went out the window and nothing has since been able to convince me of its utility for settling anything.

Wasn’t dominion intended to mean caretaker, not dominator?

dalehusband said: Can I quote you on this?

Forgive my laziness, but I can't be bothered to weatch WLC for even a few moments, the man has to be the most overrated thinker this side of Plantinga. How does he explain my dog's howls, which sure sound like pain to me, when he is cut or otherwise injured?

I find it hard to believe that anyone would doubt animals feel pain. Pain is a source of information that some stimulus is doing damage, "stop doing that" is what it says. Any animal capable of learning in the slightest degree would need a nervous system that registered input in varying degrees and "pain" is the upper end of the scale. Do jelly fish feel pain? Can they learn from it? Without much of a nervous system or central processor I doubt it. Can lobsters feel pain when you put them in boiling water? Probably since a lobster could respond to such a stimulus and avoid it in the wild. I find the attitude that only humans feel pain to be one of those human chauvanisms that are generated by people who don't think on a biological continuum. If we feel pain why not chimps and dolphins and dogs etc?

The question he's posing is not so much whether animals sense pain signals, but whether they know what's going on enough to feel even worse for the fact that they're in pain. Whether they suffer from being in pain, or just respond by thrashing about automatically like a lightbulb glowing when you flick a switch.

If they didn't feel worse then what point would it serve? If animals don't feel pain then why do they respond positively when you aleviate that pain? When kittens get eye infections and you first begin to treat them they fight the treatment but after a few treatments they accept the medicine with little fight. I can only assume they have learned that the medicine makes their eyes feel better. If they didn't register pain as an ongoing thing they wouldn't learn to accept the treatment to fix that pain. Yes animals feel pain and dogs are smart enough to know that humans can sometime fix it. How else would you explain that? I think this whole discussion is people failing to admit that animals can feel like they do. That would make the christians not feel so superior if animals could suffer just like us "higher" creatures.

One of the unmistakable impressions I get repeatedly from the pushers of pseudoscience, such as Craig and the entire spectrum of ID/creationists and their campfollowers, is that they have no capacity for embarrassment at being completely wrong about basic facts and evidence. They simply double down on their ideology, misconceptions, and misinformation while accusing the science community of being an ideological cabal out to thwart them.

Something is missing from the “wiring” of “philosophers” like Craig that would compel other humans and non-human creatures to actually check things out. They live inside their own minds, tying themselves into epistemological and ontological knots in order to justify not looking at, even as they simultaneously deny, the facts in the world around them. If it is “logical” it is right, contrary evidence be damned.

They are never embarrassed when confronted with unequivocal evidence that what they just claimed is wrong; they just simply deny and reassert their claims. They unabashedly project their own tactics onto others, accusing others of being blind to reason and evidence, even as they themselves never look at evidence or correct their misconceptions and misrepresentations.

What kind of brain damage is that? Is it caused by total immersion in a subculture; or do people with that kind of brain damage gravitate to such subcultures?

This formalized pseudoscience has been going on since at least the 1970s. Duane Gish and Henry Morris never seemed to be embarrassed by being dead wrong. Dembski and the entire crowd at the DI are not embarrassed by being dead wrong. Ken Ham is not embarrassed by being dead wrong. Craig is not embarrassed by being dead wrong. None of their camp followers over at UD are ever embarrassed at being dead wrong.

There does not seem to be any sort of self-corrective pressures within their neurological systems that would cause any of them to reread or double check anything. It always comes down to bald assertions and “irrefutable logic” that trumps everything else. That has to be brain damage of some sort. Animals who get reality wrong in the wild don’t survive very well. We humans seem to have provided a comfortable environment in which some humans can retreat from reality and still survive and thrive on fantasy.

If they didn’t feel worse then what point would it serve? If animals don’t feel pain then why do they respond positively when you aleviate that pain?

Mary H said: If they didn't feel worse then what point would it serve? If animals don't feel pain then why do they respond positively when you aleviate that pain? When kittens get eye infections and you first begin to treat them they fight the treatment but after a few treatments they accept the medicine with little fight. I can only assume they have learned that the medicine makes their eyes feel better. If they didn't register pain as an ongoing thing they wouldn't learn to accept the treatment to fix that pain. Yes animals feel pain and dogs are smart enough to know that humans can sometime fix it. How else would you explain that? I think this whole discussion is people failing to admit that animals can feel like they do. That would make the christians not feel so superior if animals could suffer just like us "higher" creatures.

Reminds me of an advertisement placed in my university student newspaper on the last day of term.

"At 2.30 this Friday, members of the Experimental Philosophy club will be meeting to test Descartes' assertion that animals are mere automatons without any experience of pain, by nailing kittens to a wall in the Philosophy Department lecture theatre. Non-members are welcome to attend. Kittens will be provided but please bring you own hammer."

Before this thread closes I want to air a thought or two on the inadequacy of Craig's arguments. The problem of suffering never fails to inspire squirmy, slippery, weasely efforts by apologists, and this episode is no exception. Craig plays the "recent scientific discoveries" card to deflect attention from the crux of the problem of suffering toward the peripheral issue of whether humans experience pain in a completely different, more profound way than other animals. I suppose Craig has an interest in minimizing the importance of animal suffering because he can't grant god the "soul-building" excuse for the existence of animal pain, as he can for at least some human suffering. Some issues Craig leaves hanging:
1.) Craig claims that "recent scientific discoveries" prove that only humans and the higher primates have the neural architecture (i.e. a prefrontal cortex) to experience what he calls third order pain. But if we grant that premise (which we don't, actually) then Craig is left with the question whether the soul-building rationale applies equally to chimps and humans. I doubt that he wants to go there.
2.) He takes it as given that third order pain - the awareness of the awareness of pain - must be a qualitatively more profound kind of suffering than mere second order pain. But this is far from obvious. The degree of suffering associated with a painful experience can be mitigated by conscious factors. For instance, we can choose to use meditation, prayer, or distraction to lessen our awareness of pain. We can focus our minds on a loved one, on our patriotic duty, or on taking one for the team. We can keep our eyes on the prize. We can even be tricked by placebos. Isn't it possible that animals which lack these cognitive filters feel pure, unbuffered pain more sharply than we do?
3.) If the pain of animals is insignificant, thus letting god off the hook for being the author of gratuitous suffering, how can Craig condemn people who intentionally harm animals? If we are supposed to be relieved to learn that our pets don't really suffer pain, then shouldn't we be out there campaigning for the repeal of unjust laws against cruelty to animals? Free the cat torturers!
Writing this is threatening to give me a fourth-order headache - that is the unspeakable pain that results from listening to apologists use bogus hierarchy-of-pain arguments to rationalize the problem of suffering.

Has no one pointed out (or have I just missed it) that "Michael Murray", who Craig cites as his authority on neurobiology, is described on the Amazon page for his book as a "Professor in the Humanities and Philosophy".....

Authority on neurobiology my a*se

Michael J. Murray oversees the programs and evaluation departments of the John Templeton Foundation. Before joining the Foundation, he was the Arthur and Katherine Shadek Humanities Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College. Murray received his B.A. in philosophy from Franklin and Marshall and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (with Eleonore Stump), Reason for the Hope Within, Philosophy of Religion (with Michael Rea), Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion (with Jeffrey Schloss), Divine Evil?: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible (with Michael Rea and Michael Bergmann), and On Predestination and Election.

http://www.templeton.org/who-we-are/our-team/staff/michael-j-murray-phd