Still think you have free will?

Posted 10 May 2011 by Matt Young

So, apparently, do some robots. Well, simulated robots, anyway. Specifically, scientists in Lausanne, Switzerland, built some robots that were designed to seek small disks, which we will call "food." See this article and this podcast in Science magazine. The robots had wheels, a camera, and something that passed for a nervous system. The scientists devised a computer simulation of the robots, so that they could randomly vary the strengths of different connections in the nervous system. They allowed the simulated robots to compete for food and allowed those with the most successful mutations to compete in the next generation; I am sure you know the drill. Once in a while, the researchers programmed some real robots to match their simulations and found that these real robots behaved as they "should" (don't let any philosophers of science hear me say that). Somewhere along the way, the researchers allowed the robots to share food; altruism promptly evolved, and robots shared food with other robots to whom they are "related." The result is taken as support of the theory of kin selection. Martin Nowak, of all people, dismisses the result as a mere computer simulation. What interested me, though, and apparently also Science's online news editor, David Grimm, is that the robots apparently made choices and behaved precisely as if they had free will. I have elsewhere likened free will to a chess-playing computer, but this result is much more interesting. A chess-playing computer, after all, has been programmed to make decisions and only appears to have free will. It has been designed, if you will. But the robots have not been designed to make decisions. Rather, they evolved. Still, if the simulations are realistic, their decisions are based on physics and chemistry -- just like yours and mine.

61 Comments

John Kwok · 10 May 2011

I just couldn't resist:

"Stop, Dave. I'm afraid, Dave. Please . . . stop."

Paul Burnett · 10 May 2011

Just don't let them get access to parts with which they could build more robots.

SteveC · 10 May 2011

As a computer guy, I'm sort of baffled by the free will debate. It seems extremely obvious to me that free will, at least as most people think of it, cannot exist -- even granting the supernatural, it still canoot exist, as it has to work *somehow* and as soon as you posit the specifics of the "how", it disappears -- maybe I'm just too dumb to understand the debate.

Tex · 10 May 2011

Boy, is this ever bad news. Especially coupled with Skynet becoming self-aware a couple of weeks ago (April 21, 2011).

We might not even make it to the Rapture on May 21.

Ben W · 11 May 2011

The singularity happened yesterday! Hope you didn't sleep through it.

Joe Felsenstein · 11 May 2011

Not sure how having altruism means you (seem to) have free will. Slime mold cells will do that, and consciousness is not a big item for them.

Rolf Aalberg · 11 May 2011

Will is not free; it is deterministic. What else could it be? To be of any use, there's got to be some rules and a ruling mechanism to ensure a meaningful output, hopefully in the best interest of the person 'making' the decision. Which even may me the decision to commit suicide; there and then being the decision best suited to the person's interest.

Suicide may be a dramatic decision but it also solves any and all problems! The side effect may be considered undesirable but may anyway be a 'small' price to pay. It as all just a decision table, well suited to computer simulations.

But will is free with respect to the other side of the coin: The screen from which the determinants are read and onto which it's decision is projected.

Since the reader of the truth table serving as the foundation of the decision is hidden from consciousness; our awareness is limited to the outcome of the process, including it's emotional content. We are unaware of all that goes on behind the scene.

kay · 11 May 2011

Hello, and once again, welcome to the enrichment center.

Chinahand · 11 May 2011

Reading the paper I am a little confused where any choice or freewill comes into this.

As far as I can make out there is a genetic algorithm which determines the weightings in the neural network of the robots' controllers.

If these weightings are a certain amount then the robot has an output which flags that any "food" it collects will be shared with the other robots in its group.

There's no "should I" "shouldn't I" moment of decision - rather the robots are simply genetically predisposed to be either sharers or not, and then their behaviour determines the amount of food they collect. As the amount of food they obtain (either through them collecting it, or by it being shared by others) increased then their genes have a higher chance of getting passed on with a consequent change in the gene pool for either cooperation or not.

Where's the choice, or free will? Confused!

eric · 11 May 2011

SteveC said: As a computer guy, I'm sort of baffled by the free will debate. It seems extremely obvious to me that free will, at least as most people think of it, cannot exist

and Rolf Allberg said: Will is not free; it is deterministic. What else could it be?

My latest (and layman's) understanding of neuroscience is that free will enters the picture because processes do not only propagate "up" (molecular interactions determine neurons determine electrical patterns etc.), they also propagate "down" (your neural pattern can influence your neural structure, which can influence yoru brain chemistry, etc...). So in a very real, physical, and non-supernatural sense, your thought processes are not merely the end result of some deterministic brain physics and chemistry. Rather, they participate in determining how your brain physics and chemistry operates. Your conscious thought is not just an output, its also an input. This, of course, says little about robots or simulations of robots. :)

Kevin B · 11 May 2011

John Kwok said: I just couldn't resist: "Stop, Dave. I'm afraid, Dave. Please . . . stop."

I must admit that when I saw "robot" and "will", I immediately thought of this.... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RG0ochx16Dg (But was it Dr P Zachary Smith?)

harold · 11 May 2011

Well, as a non-religious skeptic, I know that I have "free will" by any meaningful definition.

Due to the way the human brain evolved, I have a strong conscious impression of making decisions, considering choices, and so on. Within tight constraints, yes, but that is still the way my life is experienced.

The question of whether or not this is an "illusion" is, to me, exactly as interesting as the question of whether or not the universe was magically created "Last Thursday".

I have to behave exactly as if I have some free will. To try to do otherwise would be silly and impossible.

This does imply the existence of emergent properties, but not of anything magical.

DS · 11 May 2011

Well one thing is for sure, creobots don't have free will. They absolutely cannot believe in evolution, no matter what. So they automatically must reject all of science, no matter what. And they must automatically claim that they love science and get all of the benefits of science at the same time, no matter what. No free will, no logic, no consistency involved.

Flint · 11 May 2011

At the very least, they don't seem predestined to change their minds in the face of mere reality.

Glen Davidson · 11 May 2011

Of course I think I have free will.

I have no choice but to do so.

Glen Davidson

Rolf Aalberg · 11 May 2011

So in a very real, physical, and non-supernatural sense, your thought processes are not merely the end result of some deterministic brain physics and chemistry.

I wasn't thinking in terms of physics and chemistry; I was thinking within the concept of a psyche with its foundation in brain tissue. In the same way that we are not expecting computer chips to make decisions; the decisions are not merely the end result of some deterministic chip physics/electronics. The decisions are made by the program, in reality they express the programmer's ideas about what decisions should me made based on the input. Physical brains or physical computers, they are both tools for processing of data. Although the complexity of the brain goes a bit farther than the computer's.

eric · 11 May 2011

Rolf Aalberg said: The decisions are made by the program, in reality they express the programmer's ideas about what decisions should me made based on the input.

Yes, but I think you've gotten to the point where brain-computer analogies fail. In human-designed computers, we try and make the hardware as stable as possible and run the software "on" it. In the brain, the outcome of a software run (which includes environmental inputs etc...) can result in a hardware rewire. In computers, engineers call this a short and work to prevent them from ever happening...and when they do, they try and return the computer to its earlier state. In humans, AFAIK its just part of the regular process of building and repairing neural pathways. Its a feature, not a bug! :) This is much more likely over time to lead to a form of chaotic development or behavior which won't be predictable based on the initial state, except in general terms (none of our brains forget how to breathe). IOW, what you say about computers may be true, but does not apply to us since in important ways, brains aren't computers.

Mike Elzinga · 11 May 2011

eric said:
SteveC said: As a computer guy, I'm sort of baffled by the free will debate. It seems extremely obvious to me that free will, at least as most people think of it, cannot exist

and Rolf Allberg said: Will is not free; it is deterministic. What else could it be?
My latest (and layman's) understanding of neuroscience is that free will enters the picture because processes do not only propagate "up" (molecular interactions determine neurons determine electrical patterns etc.), they also propagate "down" (your neural pattern can influence your neural structure, which can influence yoru brain chemistry, etc...). So in a very real, physical, and non-supernatural sense, your thought processes are not merely the end result of some deterministic brain physics and chemistry. Rather, they participate in determining how your brain physics and chemistry operates. Your conscious thought is not just an output, its also an input. This, of course, says little about robots or simulations of robots. :)

Indeed this is an excellent point; and it is a phenomenon that can be observed at nearly every level of complexity. Emergent properties of complex systems are not generally predictable from “bottom up” analyses of lower level behaviors of system constituents. The more usual case is that emergent phenomena start to become the dominate influences in further evolution and system behavior. If the underlying “building blocks” (i.e., the fundamental constituents of the system) achieve a rather long-term stability, then these can be treated as fundamental even if they are extremely complex. It then becomes the interactions among these complex building blocks that set the stage for higher levels of complexity and organization. At even higher levels of complexity involving complex mixtures of already complex systems behaving in complex ways, the interactions and behaviors involve outputs that become inputs as well as determiners of behavior. This is not limited to brains and complex nervous systems; it happens at much lower levels of complexity in systems that don’t even come close to what we would classify as living organisms.

John Kwok · 11 May 2011

Kevin B said:
John Kwok said: I just couldn't resist: "Stop, Dave. I'm afraid, Dave. Please . . . stop."
I must admit that when I saw "robot" and "will", I immediately thought of this.... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RG0ochx16Dg (But was it Dr P Zachary Smith?)

I thought of young Will and the robot too, but I opted instead to quote from Hal.

harold · 11 May 2011

Not only do humans make plans, restrain instinctive and emotional behaviors, weigh decisions, and so on, but relatively unique brain structures, for example the frontal cortex, are involved in our ability to do so. These brain structures appear to have been strongly selected for in our lineage's history. Certainly, relative to our primate ancestors and relatives, these anatomic structures are more developed in humans.

Other terrestrial lineages with high "intelligence" and flexible behavior, such as canines and bears, show parallel evolution, but to nowhere the same degree.

We see traits of "intelligence" in less closely related lineages such as some birds, octopi, and marine mammals as well. We do not know whether these types of animals experience a mental state, and currently have no possible means of knowing.

Not only is it the normal human experience to be aware of capacities such as self-restraint and planning, but specific types of brain injuries markedly reduce these capacities. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dysexecutive_syndrome

I honestly don't know what "free will" is supposed to mean if it does not mean the accurate perception of being able to modify voluntary behavior on the basis of environmental cues or stored memories.

Anyway, the "free will" issue is probably one of many that is best addressed by using specific language.

stephen · 12 May 2011

great representation of compatibilism. (sarcasm)

best leave the free will debate to those qualified to tackle it. determinism does not mean no freedom or no moral responsibility... the lack of rigor in this response is just awful. I agree with PZ Myers when he defended elitism in academia :)

william e emba · 12 May 2011

And the literary allusion I think of when it comes to free will is Douglas Adams Hitchhiker's Guide.

The full passage is at the link, the short summary: After realizing the that Ultimate Question is possibly stored in Arthur's brain, Frankie mouse and Benjy mouse try and negotiate the purchase of said brain. Arthur objects, and they offer to replace it with an electronic one. They guarantee no one would ever notice the difference. Arthur objects--he would notice. They explain, no, he'd be programmed not to notice!

mrg · 12 May 2011

stephen said: best leave the free will debate to those qualified to tackle it.

Or maybe best just to leave it alone.

harold · 12 May 2011

stephen said: great representation of compatibilism. (sarcasm) best leave the free will debate to those qualified to tackle it. determinism does not mean no freedom or no moral responsibility... the lack of rigor in this response is just awful. I agree with PZ Myers when he defended elitism in academia :)

Your comment has no apparent meaning and does not address anything that anyone else has said.

wamba · 12 May 2011

... is that the robots apparently made choices and behaved precisely as if they had free will.

1) Which definition of free will are you using? 2) What do you mean by: to behave "as if one has free will"? It is clear from reading the comments that not everyone is using the same definition, and some participants are very confused as to what the debate is even about. It is pointless to get involved in a back-and-forth argument until definitions have been established. Until there are definitions, the debate isn't "about" anything meaningful.

wamba · 12 May 2011

eric said: My latest (and layman's) understanding of neuroscience is that free will enters the picture because processes do not only propagate "up" (molecular interactions determine neurons determine electrical patterns etc.), they also propagate "down" (your neural pattern can influence your neural structure, which can influence your brain chemistry, etc...). So in a very real, physical, and non-supernatural sense, your thought processes are not merely the end result of some deterministic brain physics and chemistry. Rather, they participate in determining how your brain physics and chemistry operates. Your conscious thought is not just an output, its also an input.

Now here's an example. What does eric mean by free will? Does he mean lack of determinism or does he mean lack of predictability? If the former, I think he is wrong. At what point during that up-propagation and down-propagation is causal determinism violated? The laws of physics and chemistry are being followed at every step. The systems which do the up- and down-propagation are certainly, in the views of a naturalist/materialist, just part of the material world.

grasshopper · 12 May 2011

A test for free will: choose not to have your next thought.

eric · 12 May 2011

wamba said: What does eric mean by free will? Does he mean lack of determinism or does he mean lack of predictability?

Neither is exactly right. I mean the pattern(s) that make up your consciousness actively participates in determining what you do next. I think we get too easily stuck in simplistic philosophical models of things where arrows go one way; A leads to B leads to C, and boostrapping is nonsensical; A must have a non-A cause. But that is not how the real world works. Sometimes A leads to B and B leads to A, and they do iteratively bootstrap. Sometimes, its even more complicated than that. In these sorts of cases, asking whether A is a "cause" or "effect" becomes meaningless. It becomes a chicken and egg joke routine. If electrical patterns of activity (consciousness and subconsciousness) influence brain strucutre and vice versa, we have a chicken-and-egg routine. There is no longer any real point in asking which is the true cause and which is merely the deterministic effect; both are both.

The laws of physics and chemistry are being followed at every step. The systems which do the up- and down-propagation are certainly, in the views of a naturalist/materialist, just part of the material world.

I agree wholeheartedly.

Matt Young · 12 May 2011

Does he mean lack of determinism or does he mean lack of predictability?

People often confuse determinism and predictability; they are not the same. When I said free will, I meant lack of determinism. That is, it is hard to see where free will comes from, unless humans are somehow immune to the laws of physics and chemistry.

Mike Elzinga · 12 May 2011

wamba said: Now here's an example. What does eric mean by free will? Does he mean lack of determinism or does he mean lack of predictability? If the former, I think he is wrong. At what point during that up-propagation and down-propagation is causal determinism violated? The laws of physics and chemistry are being followed at every step. The systems which do the up- and down-propagation are certainly, in the views of a naturalist/materialist, just part of the material world.

If by “determinism” you are referring to the laws of chemistry and physics, there is no evidence whatsoever that the laws of chemistry and physics are being violated in any way. In fact, things like the autonomic nervous system, and the fact that taking the nervous system out of a very narrow temperature range shuts it down at low temperatures and sends it into chaos at high temperatures, is a pretty good indication that physics and chemistry are working just fine. So it has to be connected to the complexity and organization within the system. An approach to this problem would start with extremely simple nervous and sensory systems that simply orient an organism toward food or energy. Such systems are fairly easy to understand; and humans have been building such things in the way of mechanical and electromechanical systems for a very long time now. Now add rudimentary memory that stores previous “successes” at finding “food” or energy. In such cases, the sensory and nervous systems are now augmented with a means of operating passed long delays between the acquisitions of enough sensory stimuli for the nervous system to use. Expand the memory to include “meta-memory,” i.e., memories of memories. Somewhere in this process the sense of time evolves within the system because such memories can now have memories of events that are NOT followed by other events along with memories of those same events followed by “later” events, and finally by memories that include whole sequences of events and how such sequences relate to other sequences and “when” they appeared in memory relative to those other sequences. Much of the problem in analyzing the behaviors of such complexity is that there is so much “parallelism” in the activities going on within. Trying to make comparisons between systems like this and the sequentially operating configurations of today’s computers is not going to be very helpful. We really need more experience with complex parallel computers that actually function with suitable “inhibitors” that prevent clashes of instructions at any given node. Nervous systems appear to be highly and delicately coordinated systems operating as a unified whole. That’s part of what is currently under study; we don’t yet understand how such systems behave. But somewhere out of that coordinated “mess” must emerge the notion of consciousness and the feeling of willing things to happen within the limitations of the system.

harold · 12 May 2011

grasshopper said: A test for free will: choose not to have your next thought.

Did you choose to make this comment?

Mike Elzinga · 12 May 2011

“I wonder why, I wonder why, I wonder why, I wonder.”

“I wonder why I wonder why I wonder why I wonder.”

Richard P. Feynman

JT · 13 May 2011

Chinahand said: Reading the paper I am a little confused where any choice or freewill comes into this. As far as I can make out there is a genetic algorithm which determines the weightings in the neural network of the robots' controllers. If these weightings are a certain amount then the robot has an output which flags that any "food" it collects will be shared with the other robots in its group. There's no "should I" "shouldn't I" moment of decision - rather the robots are simply genetically predisposed to be either sharers or not, and then their behaviour determines the amount of food they collect. As the amount of food they obtain (either through them collecting it, or by it being shared by others) increased then their genes have a higher chance of getting passed on with a consequent change in the gene pool for either cooperation or not. Where's the choice, or free will? Confused!

There is none. However, with only the slightest of modification your statement applies equally well to organic machines, including humans. There's no hint of choice or free will there either, even if the machines protest otherwise.

The Tim Channel · 13 May 2011

The claim: We have no free will because it's against the laws of chemistry and physics.

Problem with claim: The laws of chemistry and physics are not complete at the level of basic understanding to say one way or the other.

I was forced to add this to the comment section. If it is incorrect you can blame it on nature.

Enjoy.

Kent · 13 May 2011

I, for one, welcome our new small disk-seeking overlords.

Science Avenger · 13 May 2011

Of what is this "will" supposedly "free" of? It seems all answers ultimately become word salad.

harold · 13 May 2011

The Tim Channel said: The claim: We have no free will because it's against the laws of chemistry and physics. Problem with claim: The laws of chemistry and physics are not complete at the level of basic understanding to say one way or the other. I was forced to add this to the comment section. If it is incorrect you can blame it on nature. Enjoy.

That is one of the problems. The other problem - here's a definition of free will (from Wikipedia) - "Free will is the apparent ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints" Humans experience the sensation of making choices. Not only do humans experience this sensation, but it is related to well-defined parts of our nervous system. Not only do we have brain regions that are strongly associated with planning, resisting impulses, and so on, but we have a large voluntary component to our neuromuscular system. While I may not be able to choose not to have my next thought, I can choose with ease to pause or continue my typing, or to type the letter "z". Arguments that "free will" is impossible must therefore either 1) define free will as something other than mental sensation of an ability to choose between various physical and mental behaviors or 2) be trivially false. I am deliberately not a philosopher (I took one course in it and decided not to pursue it further), it strikes me that option "1)" is largely an exercise in semantics. There are many paradoxes in science - "paradoxes" in the sense that they are things which humans can find to be true through empirical research, even though they "don't seem to make sense". Free will seems to be impossible, yet we have to make decisions all the time.

Mike Elzinga · 13 May 2011

Science Avenger said: Of what is this "will" supposedly "free" of? It seems all answers ultimately become word salad.

That’s a neat way to look at it. It focuses the question on just what “will” is. Is it something that exists independently over and above the natural phenomena and the chemistry and physics that govern the behaviors of a complex nervous system? Or does it emerge from the memories of the past, from the array of choices now residing in memory, and from imagined futures to be attained from implementing some of those choices?

wamba · 13 May 2011

Science Avenger: Of what is this “will” supposedly “free” of? It seems all answers ultimately become word salad.

Right. You can see that most of the commenters, being materialist/naturalists, agree that "free will as a violation of causal determinism" is an obvious non-starter. (e.g eric May 12 3:58 PM; Matt Young May 12, 4:00 PM). "Free will as freedom from theological determinism" is of no interest unless all participants have agreed beforehand to assume the existence of an all-knowing God; which I would never do except arguendo. And yet, there is all of this hullaballoo and free will is supposed to be a difficult concept. Therefore people must mean something else when they talk about "free will." I.e. the problem is too easy, and therefore people end up working too hard to make the concept into something that is worthy of the controversy. Take a look at what harold is doing:

Humans experience the sensation of making choices... While I may not be able to choose not to have my next thought, I can choose with ease to pause or continue my typing, or to type the letter “z”. Arguments that “free will” is impossible must therefore either 1) define free will as something other than mental sensation of an ability to choose between various physical and mental behaviors or 2) be trivially false.

Harold, I define "free will" as human decision-making being free from causal determinism. As for your scenario, the "I" making those choices, to us materialist/naturalists, is part of the material world, and is subject to causality. I.e. we do not believe there is any supernatural component to the "I." Therefore, to materialist/naturalists, any argument that "free will = freedom from causal determinism is possible" is trivially false. "Free will" is the last vestige of duality which materialist/naturalists think they have discarded. As for "compatibilist free will," I see it as an attempt to do an end-around by re-defining the key terms, rather than take the straightforward course of rejection the original definitions. Therefore, it does not interest me. All of which goes to my original argument that most of us are not disagreeing, but are simply taking past each other due to a failure to define key terms and concepts beforehand.

wamba · 13 May 2011

The Tim Channel: Problem with claim: The laws of chemistry and physics are not complete at the level of basic understanding to say one way or the other.

Classic! Classic argument from ignorance , that is. All of the data we have is consistent with animal minds, including human minds, obeying the laws of chemistry and physics. Consider where the burden of proof lies.

wamba · 13 May 2011

harold May 11, 9:41 AM: Well, as a non-religious skeptic, I know that I have “free will” by any meaningful definition. . harold May 11 3:12 PM: I honestly don’t know what “free will” is supposed to mean if it does not mean the accurate perception of being able to modify voluntary behavior on the basis of environmental cues or stored memories.

Have you considered looking up "free will" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or even Wikipedia, to see how it is usually defined? That seems more responsible, and more useful, than just making up your own definition and then being baffled that everyone else is not on the same wavelength.

Science Avenger · 13 May 2011

harold said: I am deliberately not a philosopher (I took one course in it and decided not to pursue it further)...

Interesting. I deliberately attempted to be one, and yet ended up in a similar place (with apologies to Sr. Wilkins).

Matt Young · 13 May 2011

Regarding some remarks by Mr. wamba: The question whether we have free will if God knows everything that will happen is actually not so different from whether we have free will if strict materialism pertains. People may find the theological version of the question easier to understand, but in a way they are really the same question: How can we have free will if everything is determined?

What I do not understand is why people are so threatened by the materialism answer - we feel as if we have free will and still have to behave accordingly.

Mike Elzinga · 13 May 2011

Matt Young said: Regarding some remarks by Mr. wamba: The question whether we have free will if God knows everything that will happen is actually not so different from whether we have free will if strict materialism pertains. People may find the theological version of the question easier to understand, but in a way they are really the same question: How can we have free will if everything is determined? What I do not understand is why people are so threatened by the materialism answer - we feel as if we have free will and still have to behave accordingly.

I agree. After centuries of attempts at “theological determinism,” we have thousands of “theologies” and sectarian opinions and speculations that have grown out of bloodbaths and pure meanness. The “materialist” approach is far more interesting and we have a far better chance of discovering how consciousness emerges from complexity and organization. What could possibly be so objectionable about that? Misrepresenting what we already know and how we can find out is not an argument against "materialism."

harold · 13 May 2011

wamba said:
harold May 11, 9:41 AM: Well, as a non-religious skeptic, I know that I have “free will” by any meaningful definition. . harold May 11 3:12 PM: I honestly don’t know what “free will” is supposed to mean if it does not mean the accurate perception of being able to modify voluntary behavior on the basis of environmental cues or stored memories.
Have you considered looking up "free will" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or even Wikipedia, to see how it is usually defined? That seems more responsible, and more useful, than just making up your own definition and then being baffled that everyone else is not on the same wavelength.

Whoops, I did mention the Wikipedia definition. Before you made this comment. Therefore your entire comment is moot by definition. To bring this to a close, I freely concede your superior philosophical ability to delve into the arcane metaphysical conundrum of free will. I am interested in human cognition, awareness, decision making, and so on. Although I don't self-define as a "materialist" (I "believe in" irrational and imaginary numbers, for example), I must concede that my interest in these human psychological traits is entirely from a scientific and medical perspective. I find the scientific understanding of these things to be a fascinating and rapidly expanding field. I do see these studies as giving insights into what ordinary people might take to be the human psychological experience of "free will", but I use that term only in the crude way that any native speaker of the English language would intuitively understand it based on the well-established cormmon definitions of the words. I fully understand that there may be other ways to understand those words, in combination. Indeed, I can think of another example of such a combination of common words that radically changes meaning, at for some users - "Intelligent Design". By no means do I seek to compete with sophisticated theologians and philosophers in their various mutually competitive and contradictory efforts to be "the one authority who truly understands free will". They have more than enough on their plates competing with one another.

Science Avenger · 13 May 2011

Matt Young said: What I do not understand is why people are so threatened by the materialism answer - we feel as if we have free will and still have to behave accordingly.

Indeed. Does the movie become less interesting when you learn that someone else already knows how it ends?

wamba · 13 May 2011

Mike Elzinga: ... and we have a far better chance of discovering how consciousness emerges from complexity and organization.

O Noez! Before you open any discussion of 'consciousness,' be sure to post a definition. Same for intelligence.

Mike Elzinga · 14 May 2011

wamba said:
Mike Elzinga: ... and we have a far better chance of discovering how consciousness emerges from complexity and organization.
O Noez! Before you open any discussion of 'consciousness,' be sure to post a definition. Same for intelligence.

Yep; good point. I was still thinking about those layers of meta-memory attached to that interconnected sensory network that I mentioned in a previous comment. “Consciousness” might then emerge along with the “sense of time” as memories of memories of memories, etc., began to juxtapose sequences of events with other sequences of events. So there has to be enough layers of memory in order for some level to be tracking developing sequences of events taking place within the sensory and neural network and in other levels of memory. Some of those sequences of events would in fact have to be roughly periodic processes taking place within the organism itself (e.g., pulsating muscles); and the memory records of these become somewhat like “fiducial markers” against which to compare other sequences. “Consciousness” without layers of memory doesn’t seem any more possible than would a “sense of time.” In fact layers of meta-memory seem to be required for both. But the ongoing sense of time does seem to require memories of ongoing internal periodic states. I’m sure most of us have had experiences - with the onset of illness, fever, or other disorienting trauma - of loosing nearly all sense of time. I recall an incident many years ago when coming down with the flu during which I could cure my nausea by resting my head on a pillow with my mechanical wristwatch right up against my ear. Without it there, I was extremely nauseous and dizzy, and had almost no sense of time. Just putting my ear on the watch stopped it immediately. My guess is that somewhere in my nervous system, the record of periodic activity in my body was being lost or disrupted. Similar kinds of disorientation happen with hypothermia or hyperthermia. Severe sleep deprivation can give the illusion of the rigid walls of the room becoming fluid and waving. It also disrupts the sense of time. I might mention another example of how our sensory systems can distort information. If you happen to have a pretty good sense of pitch, as I do, yawning can make a sustained note on a musical instrument you are listening to seem to go flat. I think the reason for this has to do with the cochlea in the ear. Yawning stresses the nerve cells that are sensitive to various pitches. This makes a nerve that is normally resonant to a given pitch now resonate at a slightly higher pitch. However, its connection to the rest of the nervous system forces it to retain its identity as a lower pitch simply because of its “hard-wiring” that associates a strong signal in the particular nerve with that particular pitch. So any frequency entering the ear seems to be shifted down slightly in frequency. There are many other kinds of illusions – visual, tactile, taste, kinesthetic, etc. – in which the nervous system can be “fooled,” and a different reality or sense of time and space can be generated. So what we refer to as “consciousness” really does depend on what might be termed as a “standard operating configuration” within the nervous system. Anesthetics can profoundly affect communication among parts of the nervous systems and with memory. The sense of pain can be eliminated by blocking signals to higher levels of memory; yet the same electrical activity can be taking place within the parts of the network connected to sensory structures. So it appears that consciousness depends on more than just neural networks; it requires hierarchies of memory connected to those networks. Disruptions to any of these destroys or seriously distorts one’s “sense of reality.”

harold · 14 May 2011

wamba -

Do you have definitions of free will, intelligence, or consciousness (beyond the ones that would be available at Wikipedia or SEP, which are pretty much identical with the way the term has been used here) that you are holding back, or is your point merely that no-one should ever use those terms?

Do you have some kind of opinion about any of these subjects?

Mike Elzinga · 14 May 2011

harold said: wamba - Do you have definitions of free will, intelligence, or consciousness (beyond the ones that would be available at Wikipedia or SEP, which are pretty much identical with the way the term has been used here) that you are holding back, or is your point merely that no-one should ever use those terms? Do you have some kind of opinion about any of these subjects?

Indeed; I would second harold’s questions.

Matt Young · 14 May 2011

... be sure to post a definition.

Odd you should ask that question -- just yesterday I asked a physics professor how we defined energy in Physics 100. We don't. I asked him because of the common definition that energy is the ability to do work. That definition may work in some sense in (conservative?) mechanical systems, but in thermodynamics we encounter energy that cannot do work. So what is energy? We do not really know, except that we know that, whatever it is, it is conserved. (There is a nice article about energy here.) So we can't define energy, yet we talk about it all the time. I think we may have to treat consciousness in much the same way -- not be able to define it but understand much about it.

mrg · 14 May 2011

Matt Young said: I think we may have to treat consciousness in much the same way -- not be able to define it but understand much about it.

I think I can loosely think of it as what's going on in my head when I'm awake as opposed to what's going when I'm sound asleep. Yeah, that's not great, but who's got better? One interesting consequence of this is that if we ever come up with a machine that truly seemed intelligent in its actions, we could test whether it was conscious or not by simply asking it. If it said: "Yes." -- what could we say to profitably contradict it? If somebody asked me if I was conscious and I said: "Yes." -- what could they say to contradict me?

Mike Elzinga · 14 May 2011

Matt Young said: So we can't define energy, yet we talk about it all the time. I think we may have to treat consciousness in much the same way -- not be able to define it but understand much about it.

The same can be said for mass. The best we can say for energy is that it is expressed in terms of mathematical relationships involving measurable quantities such as mass, distance, frequencies, velocities. And we discover that the values calculated for such relationships remains constant in the very general sense that it can all be accounted for in complex interactions. But mass, even with a Higgs mechanism to explain it, does not tell us why things like photons – which carry energy and momentum – do not have mass while things like electrons and quarks do acquire mass. We know about masses and forces by way of the interactions among the constituents that make up us and our universe. That means we don’t know yet if there are heretofore unobserved interactions that would indicate the existence of other “parallel” universes or higher dimensions of which our observed universe is but a projection. And, by the way, we know about interactions and “time” because of matter interactions that produce the structures we call memory. Time and motion are measured by the interrelationships of matter with other matter. The only way we appear to know about the passage of time is that we are systems of matter containing structures that produce memories. With that kind of structure, we keep track of changing sequences of material relationships. When we build systems that keep track of time and motion, we implicitly build in record-keeping (memory).

Matt Young · 14 May 2011

Mass, length, and charge (not to mention time) are quantities that we also do not understand and cannot define but rather have to accept intuitively. But they are fundamental, inherent properties, whereas energy is not. A fundamental particle can acquire kinetic energy, for example, but it cannot acquire mass or charge. Likewise, energy can flow from 1 particle to another, whereas mass and charge cannot (unless you count nuclear decays, I suppose, but then it is not the same particle any more). So energy is a property of matter. Probably like consciousness, which is a property of some matter, but not an inherent property of matter. That is all I know about either energy or consciousness.

wamba · 16 May 2011

harold said: wamba - Do you have definitions of free will, intelligence, or consciousness ..., or is your point merely that no-one should ever use those terms? Do you have some kind of opinion about any of these subjects?

My point, in case you were not paying attention, is that discussion of those topics is useless and unproductive unless the definitions are agreed on in advance. So if someone wanted to discuss free will, I would expect them to first state which definition of free will they were supporting or attacking. Yes, I have opinions, some of which I have expressed above. I consider contracausal free will to be false, and think that any materialist/naturalist who thinks otherwise is being inconsistent. I consider most versions compatibilist free will to be a cop-out of redefinition, and therefore not worthy of discussion. Whenever a discussion of artificial intelligence comes up, I usually post a link to They're Made Out of Meat. I didn't start this discussion, so the responsibility to set definitions is not mine, and as I have already explained several times, I would consider it a waste of time to spend much time laying out opinions without the definitions being set. I think I have successfully demonstrated that several of the participants in this thread are indeed using different definitions, and that most of them are in fairly close agreement on positions, so that their apparent disagreement is merely an artifact of their using different definitions. Deal with it. Goodbye.

harold · 16 May 2011

wamba -

My point, in case you were not paying attention, is that discussion of those topics is useless and unproductive unless the definitions are agreed on in advance. So if someone wanted to discuss free will, I would expect them to first state which definition of free will they were supporting or attacking.

So what you're saying is that you found someone else's discussion to be useless and unproductive, and chose to join it, for the sole reason of telling them that you found it useless and unproductive.

Yes, I have opinions, some of which I have expressed above. I consider contracausal free will to be false, and think that any materialist/naturalist who thinks otherwise is being inconsistent. I consider most versions compatibilist free will to be a cop-out of redefinition, and therefore not worthy of discussion. Whenever a discussion of artificial intelligence comes up, I usually post a link to They’re Made Out of Meat.

You forgot to state the definitions of all of those terms. Of course, it isn't very difficult to google them. Incidentally, this is a common tactic of creationist trolls - firing out technical sounding language in a non-helpful way, in the hopes of creating an impression of expertise (often a false one) and intimidating. My point, which you very clearly didn't pay attention to, is that I find all of this useless. You're free not to. Obsessing over free will used to make sense for theologians who presupposed divine punishment for sins, because it was a dilemma to some, but not all, of them, if predestined sins were subsequently punished and so on. I don't care about any of that - not don't believe in it, although I don't, but more powerfully, "don't care". I have a conscious experience of voluntary control over some limited aspects of my behavior, I have to deal with that, and the neuroscience of how I have that is quite interesting.

I didn’t start this discussion, so the responsibility to set definitions is not mine, and as I have already explained several times, I would consider it a waste of time to spend much time laying out opinions without the definitions being set.

We'll have to agree to disagree here. To me this is lame, and another overlap with creationist behavior. "I don't have to answer questions". Well, you don't, but why bother with snarky little comments if you don't want to actually join the discussion? You could have actually said something about how you define free will, why you accept that definition, and how the experiment related to it. Or you could have ignored the whole thing.

I think I have successfully demonstrated that several of the participants in this thread are indeed using different definitions,

You clearly haven't done this. You haven't commented on anyone else's implied definition at all. Where is there a comment from you like that?

and that most of them are in fairly close agreement on positions, so that their apparent disagreement is merely an artifact of their using different definitions.

Most of them are in fairly close agreement, yes.

Deal with it. Goodbye.

Deal with what?

gregwrld · 16 May 2011

harold said:
grasshopper said: A test for free will: choose not to have your next thought.
Did you choose to make this comment?

A Buddhist might say we cannot choose our next thought but we can choose not to be influenced by it. Whether that has anything to do with something as nebulous as free will is a whole 'nuther nut to crack.

Mike Elzinga · 16 May 2011

wamba said: I didn't start this discussion, so the responsibility to set definitions is not mine, and as I have already explained several times, I would consider it a waste of time to spend much time laying out opinions without the definitions being set. I think I have successfully demonstrated that several of the participants in this thread are indeed using different definitions, and that most of them are in fairly close agreement on positions, so that their apparent disagreement is merely an artifact of their using different definitions. Deal with it. Goodbye.

Well I guess you have made it abundantly clear that you don’t have the adequate amount of expertise and professionalism to help others learn. There are varied skills and expertise among many of the people posting here; and most of us try to learn from each other as well as contribute our expertise to the discussion. As to definitions first and then discussion, that is not how it generally works in science. One attempts to understand a phenomenon first, come up with concepts that accurately characterize the phenomenon, and then attach a word or phrase to the concepts that brings to mind the phenomenon and the concepts used to articulate it. In the case of dogma – especially sectarian dogma such as ID/creationism – it is always definitions first and then everything else bent to fit. That is not science. We expect that our understanding of the natural world is provisional; hence definitions evolve to fit our growing understanding. Sectarian dogmatists, on the other hand, demand that their world be immutable. Hence they define things the way they want them to be. That is why the “scientific” creationists started redefining thermodynamics, species, evolution, natural selection, and nearly every scientific concept to fit sectarian dogma in order to lend “scientific” support to dogma already defined and cast in stone.

N.Wells · 23 May 2011

[QUOTE]why bother with snarky little comments if you don’t want to actually join the discussion?[/QUOTE] Because he was unable to stop himself from doing so? :)

herve leger · 30 May 2011

In fact, things like the autonomic nervous system, and the fact that taking the nervous system out of a very narrow temperature range shuts it down at low temperatures and sends it into chaos at high temperatures, is a pretty good indication that physics and chemistry are working just fine.

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