John Lynch on the DI's purported history of ID

Posted 2 June 2009 by

John Lynch, an evolutionary morphologist and historian of anti-evolutionism, dissects the selective history of ID propounded by the Disco 'Tute's new faith and evolution site. The pull quote:
If I engaged in such non-contextualized presentation in my classroom, I would rightly be accused of being a bad teacher. More importantly, the audience would receive no indication of how the argument ceased to be scientifically and philosophically tenable and instead became an issue of interest solely to apologists and theologians.
Read the whole thing.

179 Comments

John Kwok · 2 June 2009

Lynch's succinct summary and analysis does an admirable job stressing not only the Christian, but especially, the Classical Graeco - Roman roots of Intelligent Design. After taking a brief look at the Disco Tute's .pdf file, I couldn't help but wonder whether the actual author of that file could have been the same fellow who has created this:

http://www.designinference.com/teaching/teaching.htm

(In plain English, none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski.)

Paul Burnett · 3 June 2009

John Kwok said: ...none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski
Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.

Stanton · 3 June 2009

Paul Burnett said: ...it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.
It never was anything about actual science in the first place. Next, you'll be telling me that water is wet because of hydrogen-bonding.

DavidK · 3 June 2009

Paul Burnett said:
John Kwok said: ...none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski
Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.
From Dembski's paper: "Science is supposed to show that any God or intelligence or purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment to reason. Yet evidence from science shows the opposite. The case for a designing intelligence producing life and the cosmos is now on solid ground, as can be seen from such books as The Design of Life and The Privileged Planet." Damn, we've been wrong all these years about what science was about. Thanks for the clarification, Bill. And now we have concrete proof of Intelligent Design as well. Gosh, gee willikers Radioactive Man.

J-Dog · 3 June 2009

An excellent, well-written and researched take-down of the usual DI Dishonesty. Well worth the effort to save and site in the future as needed.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

The key problem with my "buddy" Bill's observation is that we know that "design" is an emergent property that can arise throught natural means - such as for example, natural selection - which is a point that's been emphasized by biologists Francisco J. Ayala and Ken Miller (which is a key point in Ken's "Only A Theory"):
DavidK said:
Paul Burnett said:
John Kwok said: ...none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski
Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.
From Dembski's paper: "Science is supposed to show that any God or intelligence or purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment to reason. Yet evidence from science shows the opposite. The case for a designing intelligence producing life and the cosmos is now on solid ground, as can be seen from such books as The Design of Life and The Privileged Planet." Damn, we've been wrong all these years about what science was about. Thanks for the clarification, Bill. And now we have concrete proof of Intelligent Design as well. Gosh, gee willikers Radioactive Man.
Bill has "blinded" himself so much by his strict adherence to his Xian faith that he is incapable of thinking of design as an emergent property. Moreover, by employing his inane logic, it is really impossible for him to reject - which he has done - my own "assertion" that there is indeed more proof for Klingon Cosmology than there is for ID cretinism (e. g. must be real since we see Klingongs on TV and the movies, since an official Klingon language institute exists, since people speak and hold religious ceremonies in Klingon, and because the Bible and Shakespeare's plays have been translated in Klingon).

Frank J · 3 June 2009

Paul Burnett said:
John Kwok said: ...none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski
Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.
Didn't it become 100% obvious - not just to critics but to anyone who can spell "obvious" - with 2008's "Expelled"?

DS · 3 June 2009

History has shown that assuming that there is any God or intelligence or purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment to reason. And evidence from science shows that no such assumptions are necessary or justified. However, you are still completely free to believe in whatever God you like in this country. You just aren't free to use your beliefs as a substitute for science or to force your religious beliefs on others in public funded schools. That would be the best way to lose the religious freedom you enjoy in this country since the benefits of science are obvious and shared by all. The case for a designing intelligence producing life and the cosmos by divince intervention in the natural world is now regarded as unsupported and unnecessary, as can be seen from such books as The Design of Life and The Privileged Planet. These present no convincing evidence at all but instead depend on unsound reasoning, wishful thinking and the need for people to feel special.

There all fixed.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

Brilliant. Now send him a copy by e-mailing him at the e-mail address indicated on his online CV (which you can link to courtesy of my previous comment - the very first one - on this thread):
DS said: History has shown that assuming that there is any God or intelligence or purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment to reason. And evidence from science shows that no such assumptions are necessary or justified. However, you are still completely free to believe in whatever God you like in this country. You just aren't free to use your beliefs as a substitute for science or to force your religious beliefs on others in public funded schools. That would be the best way to lose the religious freedom you enjoy in this country since the benefits of science are obvious and shared by all. The case for a designing intelligence producing life and the cosmos by divince intervention in the natural world is now regarded as unsupported and unnecessary, as can be seen from such books as The Design of Life and The Privileged Planet. These present no convincing evidence at all but instead depend on unsound reasoning, wishful thinking and the need for people to feel special. There all fixed.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

This is nothing new. If you check Dembski's website (which you can link via the link provided by me at the first comment in this thread) he's been reassuring his fellow Xians that ID creationism is religiously-derived from their Xian faith for years:
Paul Burnett said:
John Kwok said: ...none other than my "favorite" Dishonesty Institute mendacious intellectual pornographer, one Bill Dembski
Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.

eric · 3 June 2009

I have my own answers to the "Roots" questions:
What do these readings show you about the origins of intelligent design as an idea?
Not much. However, they tell me that the person who selected the readings is strongly biased and intent that you, the reader, get only one side of the argument.
Is intelligent design a response to modern court rulings or an outgrowth of “Christian fundamentalism”?
Court rulings; there is no other rational explanation for "cdesign propentists." There is no other rational explanation why the definition of "design" used in the primary ID textbook is identical - verabatim - to earlier definitions of special creation.
Is it dependent on the authority of the Bible rather than the observations of nature and the inferences drawn from those inferences [sic]?
Regardless of where it comes from, the fact that it is directly refuted by all natural observations in the last 150 years is enough to disqualify it as "science."
How long have people been debating about whether there is evidence of design in nature?
Probably longer than young earth creationists believe the earth has existed.

Mike Elzinga · 3 June 2009

Psychologists have discovered that humans in general – and children in particular – exhibit three innate biases: • Essentialist bias: all natural kinds have and immutable essence • Teleological bias: what they see must be purposeful and goal-orientated • Intentionality bias: actions and outcomes must be the work of an intentional agent These biases are actually useful for children to make predictions in the world and are defaults that adults revert to at times. We clearly see all three at work in the design argument.

— John Lynch
One of the peculiarities of some of these biases among the various fundamentalist groups I can observe on the religion channels on TV or in their “reasoned arguments” against evolution is their overall childishness. It is as though these people are stuck in early adolescence; and a very immature adolescence at that. Their so-called attempts at humor, their use of language, their reverence for authority (mommy/daddy figures), their fear of “strangers” (“evil ones”), and just their general intellectual level all point to a frozen-in early adolescence. There is another interesting observation made by psychologists about certain forms of mental illness (obsessive/compulsive disorders, anorexia, some types of anxiety disorders, paranoia, etc.); often the people suffering from these illnesses exhibit many of these early adolescent characteristics in their thinking and outlook. The fact that these “Discovery” Institution “Fellows” can’t let go of childish thinking and move on with the rest of the learning world seems to be evidence of something similar going on within the walls of that institution. They aren't discovering; they are reverting.

Frank J · 3 June 2009

You just aren’t free to use your beliefs as a substitute for science or to force your religious beliefs on others in public funded schools.

— DS
But they are free to flood bookstores, the Internet and the rest of the media with material dedicated to that goal. Which they do anyway. Maybe if that material wasn't mostly whining and tantrums about being "expelled" from public schools (& from the science arena, where they flunk) they might find more a more sympathetic audience. Oops, I hope I haven't given them any ideas. ;-)

Mike · 3 June 2009

DavidK said: From Dembski's paper: "Science is supposed to show that any God or intelligence or purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment to reason." Damn, we've been wrong all these years about what science was about.
Yes, Dembski lies about what science is. Science simply has nothing to say about the supernatural. If it can't be observed you can't do science. Please note though that Dembski's misrepresentation of science is exactly the same as that of the "new atheists". If you hadn't attributed the quote I would have thought that it came from Coyne, Dawkins, or Myers, et al. Both groups are screwing over science education for the sake of what they believe to be a greater agenda.

Mike · 3 June 2009

DS said: There all fixed.
There, all broken. I've got a simpler solution. Its still the majority understanding within the scientific community that science has nothing to say about religion, despite anything the "new atheists" claim. The courts and the law also understand this. Therefore teaching religion in a public school science class is against the law. It doesn't need fixing. Its obvious misrepresentation to claim that science can make conclusions about something that can't be observed. But the new atheists need to do this in order to claim that science negates religion. That opens up, what for them is, a tiny problem with applying the establishment clause. If science really can study the existance of God then religion in public school science classes becomes valid.

eric · 3 June 2009

Mike said: Its obvious misrepresentation to claim that science can make conclusions about something that can't be observed.
I agree with the gist of your comment, however what scientists can often say is that under the set of experimental conditions X we appear to understand all the relevant variables. Which implies that any other nonobservables have no effect. For instance: you roll a ball down a slope; in assessing the acceleration, the slope's angle matters. Friction matters. Shape (sphericity) matters. The phase of the moon does not matter. The number of prayers offered to Jo-Bu does not matter. While this does not logically rule out the existence of Jo-Bu, or his intervention in junior high physics experiments at some future time, it does say something about him; specifically, that balls rolling down slopes appear to behave as if his presence is irrelevant.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

Mike, Agreed:
Yes, Dembski lies about what science is. Science simply has nothing to say about the supernatural. If it can't be observed you can't do science. Please note though that Dembski's misrepresentation of science is exactly the same as that of the "new atheists". If you hadn't attributed the quote I would have thought that it came from Coyne, Dawkins, or Myers, et al. Both groups are screwing over science education for the sake of what they believe to be a greater agenda.
Moreover, Dembski has been lying since the early 1990s - if not before - when he joined Philip Johnson by being the key philosophical guru of the Intelligent Design movement. As for the refusal of "New Atheists" to admit that they are really trying - like the creos - to insert their own religious values into science classrooms, both they and their acolytes - like a few posting here - would support a statement like this (posted earlier today by someone else at a different PT thread): "The scientific minded, like PZ, have Francis Collins correct - they acknowledge his scientific expertise but also his religiosity and think he’s a philosophical moron and dangerous due to the latter." To say that only militant atheist scientists like Coyne, Dawkins and Myers are "the scientific minded" ignores the fact - noted again and again in polls - that most scientists are religiously devout. It also ignores that there are many prominent theologians and scientists who think that religion and science represent separate, but equal, spheres of human intellectual activity that can be complementary to each other. But sadly, it also reinforces the conceptions of religiously-motivated evolution denialists who contend that to "believe" in evolution means "denial of GOD(s)". Appreciatively yours, John

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

Again I agree. Your analysis is dead on. But unfortunately, militant atheists seem to be as dogmatic in their thinking as delusional militant Xians like Dembski, Ham, Luskin, Nelson or West:
Mike said:
DS said: There all fixed.
There, all broken. I've got a simpler solution. Its still the majority understanding within the scientific community that science has nothing to say about religion, despite anything the "new atheists" claim. The courts and the law also understand this. Therefore teaching religion in a public school science class is against the law. It doesn't need fixing. Its obvious misrepresentation to claim that science can make conclusions about something that can't be observed. But the new atheists need to do this in order to claim that science negates religion. That opens up, what for them is, a tiny problem with applying the establishment clause. If science really can study the existance of God then religion in public school science classes becomes valid.

Mike · 3 June 2009

eric said: ... what scientists can often say is that under the set of experimental conditions X we appear to understand all the relevant variables. Which implies that any other nonobservables have no effect.
There is nothing in science that is understood so well that we can pack up the lab and move to Fiji. Any conclusion is reached only with what can be observed at the moment, and always produces new unknowns. Now, if some ghost hunter is claiming that something spooky is happening in some old house, then instruments can be setup, conclusions reached, and the shmuck run off cable TV. Ditto faith healing, bending spoons, etc. The certainty of the "new atheists" is as worrisome as fundamentalist certainty. Science has to be approached with humility. It is self-limited. We didn't even have a clue about dark matter till very recently, and it makes up most of the universe. What we don't know is always going to be much larger than what we know, yet we always seem to have some who fervently believe that they hold absolute knowledge upon which lives can be judged and executed.

Anthony · 3 June 2009

Between this and Dembski's latest book, The End of Christianity ( http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf ) it's just becoming more and more obvious that intelligent design creationism is all about religion and has nothing whatsoever to do with actual science.
Paul, thank you for the link. I for one have never doubted that Intelligent Design is all about religion. The arguments put forward to support Intelligent Design have no relationship to biological systems. Additionally, supports of ID suggest that the agent in ID is supernatural. With both these weaknesses they want to include this in teaching school children, without risking it being rejected by the scientific method. This makes it obvious that ID is religious in nature. What has been missing is that the ID proponents being honest and admitting that they real intention is religious. It is ironic that creationist lie that scientists have heated arguments over evolution. When the true is that ID creationists talk about how ID puts God back into science.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

This extended excerpt from Chapter One of Dembski’s forthcoming book is rather revealing with respect to Dembski’s current thought and why he has decided to challenge “New Atheists” such as Dawkins, Hitchens and others:

I finished what I thought would be my last graduate degree in 1988, a
doctorate in mathematics from the University of Chicago. On completing
that degree, I began a postdoctoral fellowship at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). There I was struck by how readily my
colleagues regarded Christianity as passé. They did not think that
Christianity was dangerous and had to be stamped out. They thought that
Christianity lacked intellectual vitality and deserved to be ignored. Its
stamping out was, in their minds, a long-accomplished fact—the war was
over and Christianity had lost.
In the mental environment of my MIT colleagues, Christianity carried
no weight. As a Christian who believed then (and still does now) that the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ is humanity’s chief truth, I found this
light dismissal of Christianity troubling. How could my colleagues so
easily reject the Christian faith? I had to get to the bottom of this question
and therefore set aside a promising career as a research mathematician to
pursue further studies in philosophy and theology.
Much has happened in our culture in the twenty years since my time at
MIT. Notably, the intelligent design movement has grown internationally
and pressed Western intellectuals to take seriously the claim that life and
the cosmos are the product of intelligence. To be sure, many of them
emphatically reject this claim. But their need to confront and refute it
suggests that our mental environment is no longer stagnating in the
atheistic materialism that for so long has dominated Western intellectual
life. That atheistic worldview, supposedly buttressed by science, has
constituted a major obstacle, at least in the West, to taking Christianity
seriously. With atheistic materialism now itself in question, Christianity is
again on the table for discussion.
This is not to say that the discussion is friendly or that Christianity is
about to find widespread acceptance at places like MIT. Instead of
routinely ignoring Christianity as they did twenty years ago, many
Western intellectuals now treat it with open contempt, expending a great
many words to denounce it. But this is progress. The dead are ignored and
forgotten. The living are scorned and reviled. I was therefore gratified to
see the recent rash of books by the “neo-atheists” such as Richard
Dawkins’s The God Delusion, Christopher Hitchens’s god Is Not Great
(Hitchens insists on not capitalizing references to the deity), and Sam
Harris’s The End of Faith. These books would be unnecessary if
Christianity, and theism generally, were not again a live issue.
The neo-atheists’ first line of attack in challenging religious belief, and
Christianity in particular, is to invoke science as the principal debunker of
religion. Science is supposed to show that any God or intelligence or
purpose behind the universe is not merely superfluous but an impediment
to reason. Yet evidence from science shows the opposite. The case for a
designing intelligence producing life and the cosmos is now on solid
ground, as can be seen from such books as The Design of Life and The
Privileged Planet. Indeed, the neo-atheists are not having a good time of
it when they attempt to disprove Christian faith simply by appealing to
science. True, their denunciations of Christianity contain many references
to “science.” But the denunciations are ritualistic, with “science” used as a
conjuring word (like “abracadabra”). One finds little actual science in their
denunciations.
Instead of presenting scientific evidence that shows atheism to be true
(or probable), the neo-atheists moralize about how much better the world
would be if only atheism were true. Far from demonstrating that God does
not exist, the neo-atheists merely demonstrate how earnestly they desire
that God not exist. The God of Christianity is, in their view, the worst
thing that could befall reality. According to Richard Dawkins, for
instance, the Judeo-Christian God “is arguably the most unpleasant
character in all of fiction. Jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust
unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic-cleanser; a
misogynistic homophobic racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal,
pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent
bully.”
Dawkins’s obsession with the Christian God borders on the
pathological. Yet, he underscores what has always been the main reason
people reject God: they cannot believe that God is good. Eve, in the
Garden of Eden, rejected God because she thought he had denied her some
benefit that she should have, namely, the fruit from the Tree of the
Knowledge of Good and Evil.10 Clearly, a God who denies creatures
benefits that they think they deserve cannot be good. Indeed, a mark of our
fallenness is that we fail to see the irony in thus faulting God. Should we
not rather trust that the things God denies us are denied precisely for our
benefit? Likewise, the neo-atheists find lots of faults with God, their list of
denied benefits being much longer than Eve’s—no surprise here since
they’ve had a lot longer to compile such a list!

For the rest, you can read it here:

http://www.designinference.com/documents/2009.05.end_of_xty.pdf

But let me conclude by observing that, in light of his past, often quite repugnant, devious behavior, Dembski’s own “obsession with the Christian God” also “borders on the pathological”. In criticizing Dawkins, I strongly suspect that Dembski sees a kindred spirit working directly opposite from his end of the philosophical/theological spectrum. And, ironically, he sets out the same challenge - that atheism can be "proven" scientifically - which many in the scientific community - including those who are religiously devout - have demanded of religion, especially of fundamentalist faiths like Dembski's peculiar Xian brand.

eric · 3 June 2009

Mike said: There is nothing in science that is understood so well that we can pack up the lab and move to Fiji.
At some point an experiment is repeated so many times and under such varied circumstances that we are very, very confident about which variables matter and which don't. After millions of airplane flights, we can say with some confidence that prayers to Jo-Bu are irrelevant to lift even if no one's done that specific experiment. How can we rule out an untested variable? Because models of lift that don't include Jo-Bu prayers provide highly accurate predictions.
The certainty of the "new atheists" is as worrisome as fundamentalist certainty.
I generally agree. But there's a difference. The new atheists typically argue for non-existence (of God), not irrelevance (of God). Science certainly does have something to say about irrelevance; about what variables matter in predicting the behavior of some physical phenomena. If a scientist can say with confidence that the phase of moon is irrelevant to how fast a ball rolls down an incline, or to the aerodynamic lift of a wing, then they should have no problem conceding the many other things that are irrelevant to those phenomena. Including prayers to Jo-Bu.

Dean Wentworth · 3 June 2009

eric said: The new atheists typically argue for non-existence (of God), not irrelevance (of God). Science certainly does have something to say about irrelevance; about what variables matter in predicting the behavior of some physical phenomena. If a scientist can say with confidence that the phase of moon is irrelevant to how fast a ball rolls down an incline, or to the aerodynamic lift of a wing, then they should have no problem conceding the many other things that are irrelevant to those phenomena. Including prayers to Jo-Bu.
I don't disagree with your statement, but do you think a theistic scientist like Collins or Miller would? Specifically, do you think they would agree that science consigns their deity to irrelevance?

eric · 3 June 2009

Dean Wentworth said: I don't disagree with your statement, but do you think a theistic scientist like Collins or Miller would? Specifically, do you think they would agree that science consigns their deity to irrelevance?
They may not agree with my word choice, but I don't think I'm saying anything substantively different from mainstream religion says now. Angels are not needed to keep the planets in their orbits; gravity (and general relativity) do just fine. Sin is not needed to explain the spread of cholera; germ theory does just fine at that. Miller would probably agree with both of those statements. Another, perhaps more confrontational way of putting them is: God is irrelevant to orbital mechanics and cholera.

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

eric and Dean,

Am reasonably certain that Ken would agree with both statements. Moreover, I heard him say two weeks ago (at a private talk he gave to our fellow college alumni here in NYC) that anyone who belongs to a faith that is intolerant of modern science should think seriously of leaving that faith.

Regards,

John

Mike Elzinga · 3 June 2009

eric said: Another, perhaps more confrontational way of putting them is: God is irrelevant to orbital mechanics and cholera.
There are other obvious questions that anti-science and anti-evolution sectarians never appear to ask themselves. Why does their god allow others, in other words those who don’t belong to the specific sectarian belief system, make so many important discoveries about the universe? Even as these sectarians sit at their computers kvetching about “godless science”, they never seem to appreciate the irony of their own existence in a secular society that feeds and protects them and supplies them with many scientific/technological conveniences which they use without the slightest gratitude to the people who gave it to them or to the god who permitted these infidels to discover these things.

Dan · 3 June 2009

Dean Wentworth said:
eric said: The new atheists typically argue for non-existence (of God), not irrelevance (of God). Science certainly does have something to say about irrelevance; about what variables matter in predicting the behavior of some physical phenomena. If a scientist can say with confidence that the phase of moon is irrelevant to how fast a ball rolls down an incline, or to the aerodynamic lift of a wing, then they should have no problem conceding the many other things that are irrelevant to those phenomena. Including prayers to Jo-Bu.
I don't disagree with your statement, but do you think a theistic scientist like Collins or Miller would? Specifically, do you think they would agree that science consigns their deity to irrelevance?
I haven't spoken with or read Collins, but I have spoken with and read Miller, and I'm certain that Miller would say God is "irrelevant to how fast a ball rolls down an incline, or to the aerodynamic lift of a wing". This does not, however, consign the deity to irrelevance, because there are many things other than rolling balls and lifting wings. In particular, Miller argues that the deity is relevant to interpersonal relationships, to human motivation, etc. "A Christian sees his life, his family, and his small place in history as parts of God's plan. He has faith that God expects him to use his talents and abilities in God's name. He accepts the adversity that comes into this life as a challenge from God, and he sees apparent misfortune as an opportunity to do good in the service of both God and man." (Finding Darwin's God, page 236.) Many would argue that such things are of greater significance than rolling balls and lifting wings.

raven · 3 June 2009

Dembski delusional xian Dominionist: (MIT). There I was struck by how readily my colleagues regarded Christianity as passé. They did not think that Christianity was dangerous and had to be stamped out.
Got to hand it to Dembski. In the last 20 years he/they sure showed those MIT eggheads they were incredibly wrong. Some xian cults are extremely dangerous and malevolent. 1. Two days ago, one xian fanatic killed an MD xian at his church, described by some as the Church of Molech and known by others as the "Lutherans". This sort of murder comes and goes but they are up to 25 attemps, 8 "wins". Plus 200 wounded in collateral damage. This is just pure terrorism. 2. Many from the Death Cults openly hate the US and want to overthrow the government. They aren't subtle about this. Most of them are xian Doms. 3. Somehow the US left a huge pile of bodies in Iraq and rivers of blood. Two of them were friends of mine. 4. It's often been stated that the most successful war in the last 8 years was the, "War on Science" and "Battle to destroy kid's science education." PT wouldn't exist, nor would the Militant Atheism without Death Cultists. 5. The FBI identified the number 1 domestic terrorist threat as....lunatic fringe fascists, most of them xians, the so called "xian patriots". I could go on but enough is enough, we all read the news. To be fair, the targets of the dangerous, malevolent cults are often.....OTHER XIANS. But atheists and other religions are fair targets as well.

Glen Davidson · 3 June 2009

I didn't hear them complaining when the movie with which they were closely associated claimed that ID was a new idea. Expelled's tagline:

Big science has expelled smart new ideas from the classroom...What they forgot is that every generation has its Rebel!

Yeah, right, we were pointing out that it's Paley warmed over, only with great effort made to avoid making ID falsifiable. Here is an excerpt from an article that the DI put on their site, apparently without any concern that it portrays ID as a "new theory":

Intelligent design, which holds that only an unspecified superior intellect can account for the complexity of life forms, is increasingly appearing in science forums and journals as an alternative to evolution theory. Evolution has been widely accepted in scientific circles ever since Charles Darwin's Origin of Species revolutionised biological sciences 145 years ago. But the new theory's support by a handful of biologists and non-scientists has put Darwinists on the defensive, while encouraging groups who consider evolution hostile to their religious beliefs. Pro-evolutionists brand the new idea an unscientific melange of politics and religion. [emphases supplied] www.discovery.org/a/2445

IOW, they're pushing the idea that it is a new idea, a new theory. Here's what used to be on the DI's website:

Design Theory: A New Science for a New Century Materialistic thinking dominated Western culture during the 20th century in large part because of the authority of science. The Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture seeks, therefore, to challenge materialism on specifically scientific grounds. Yet Center Fellows do more than critique theories that have materialistic implications. They have also pioneered alternative scientific theories and research methods that recognize the reality of design and the need for intelligent agency to explain it. This new research program-called "design theory"-is based upon recent developments in the information sciences and many new evidences of design. Design theory promises to revitalize many long-stagnant disciplines by recognizing mind, as well as matter, as a causal influence in the world. It also promises, by implication, to promote a more holistic view of reality and humanity, thus helping to reverse some of materialism's destructive cultural consequences.

There they don't really say that ID is a totally new idea, but they're pushing the claim that it's a "new science," a "new research program" (Biologic Institute? I don't think it counts), and that they have "pioneered alternative scientific theories." IOW, they're certainly suggesting that it's new, not the old junk that so long ago was shown to be scientifically useless. Here's "Overwhelming Evidence" claiming that ID is a "new science"

There is much work still to do, but as yet mainstream science has not yet managed to argue away this new science. www.overwhelmingevidence.com/oe/blog/sbwillie/evolution_an_idea_on_the_verge_of_extinction

Well, it isn't new, and it isn't science. And legitimate science standards do indeed indicate that ID is bunk. On Evolution News and Views:

Although I served at an institution supporting scientific research into the new theory of intelligent design and consider myself a proponent of the same, in all my time at Discovery Institute I consistently held to our public policy position that public schools should not mandate the teaching of the theory of intelligent design. www.evolutionnews.org/2005/12/statement_by_seth_l_cooper_con.html

At Kitzmiller the fact that ID is old hat was mentioned, arguing that its ancient history shows it to be religious in nature:

Q. In your opinion, is intelligent design a religious proposition or a scientific proposition? A. It's essentially a religious proposition. Q. We're going to spend the rest of our time together exploring your reasons for that opinion. What do you understand intelligent design to be? A. I understand it to be a reformulation of an old theological argument for the existence of God, an argument that unfolds in the form of a syllogism, the major premise of which is wherever there is complex design, there has to be some intelligent designer. The minor premise is that nature exhibits complex design. The conclusion, therefore, nature must have an intelligent designer. Q. You said this is an old tradition. Can you trace the antecedence for us? A. Well, two landmarks are Thomas Aquinas and William Paley. Thomas Aquinas was a famous theologian/philosopher who lived in the 13th Century. And one of his claims to fame is that he formulated what are called the five ways to prove the existence of God, one of which was to argue from the design and complexity and order and pattern in the universe to the existence of an ultimate intelligent designer. The second landmark -- incidentally, Thomas Aquinas ended every one of his five arguments by saying that this being, this ultimate, everyone understands to be God. And William Paley, in the late 18th and early 19th Century, is famous for formulating the famous watchmaker argument, according to which, just as you open up a watch and find there intricate design and that should lead you to postulate the existence of a watchmaker, so also the intricate design and pattern in nature should lead one to posit the existence of an intelligent being that's responsible for the existence of design and pattern in nature. And like Aquinas, William Paley also said to the effect that everyone understands this to be the God of biblical theism, the creator God of biblical religion. Q. How does intelligent design build upon or modernize this old tradition of natural theology? A. Well, it simply appeals to more recent findings about the complexity of the world by contemporary science, for example, what are called irreducible complexity and specified informational complexity. www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day5pm.html

Uncommon Descent claims that "Darwinism" is the new idea, but forgets that it said that, and states:

Now, in our day, a new idea has indeed come along, and it is embodied in the information found in a DNA molecule. It is beyond ridiculous, then, to suggest that men like Francis Bacon, Galileo, Sir Isaac Newton, Faraday, Maxwell or Lord Kelvin — all of whom were in part motivated by religion and whose religion gave meaning to their science — would ignore or dismiss such evidence of design because of its possible religious implications. www.uncommondescent.com/faq/

Of course they're speaking out of both sides of their mouths, as usual. We know very well that ID is not a new idea, it's a pre-scientific idea that can only win if science standards are essentially destroyed. Glen Davidson http://tinyurl.com/6mb592

raven · 3 June 2009

I can summarize Dembski's arguments easily.

Science proves god exists and his name is Yahweh, the xian god.

There is absolutely no proof of this so everyone will have to take Dembski's word on it. As to why anyone much less everyone would take Dembski's word about anything, it s complete mystery much more unsolvable than what came before the Big Bang.

This is claimed to be sophisticated philosophy, science, and theology.

Shorter Dembski, "I know everything, so shut up and believe."

John Kwok · 3 June 2009

That sums it up quite nicely, as both his point of view and the underlying principle between his devious modus operandi:
raven said: I can summarize Dembski's arguments easily. Science proves god exists and his name is Yahweh, the xian god. There is absolutely no proof of this so everyone will have to take Dembski's word on it. As to why anyone much less everyone would take Dembski's word about anything, it s complete mystery much more unsolvable than what came before the Big Bang. This is claimed to be sophisticated philosophy, science, and theology. Shorter Dembski, "I know everything, so shut up and believe."
No wonder why he accused me of being childish when, in reply to an unsolicited e-mail I received from him, I asserted that there is more proof for Klingon Cosmology than there will ever be for his favorite mendacious intellectual pornography, Intelligent Design cretinism.

raven · 3 June 2009

Not going to read first hand anything by Dembski. Not worth spending a valuable resource, lifespan.

How does science prove that the Intelligent Designer is a xian god, Yahweh?

Why not Zeus, Brahma, Buddha, Allah, or Bob the Rain God? Why is there only one Intelligent Designer. Lots of religions have fleets of gods.

Not asking why Dembski names the god he does. I know why. Why does science prove it is Yahweh?

Frank J · 4 June 2009

Not asking why Dembski names the god he does. I know why. Why does science prove it is Yahweh?

— raven
Dembski and other DI folk often admit that they hope that the hapless designer they claim to have caught in Dembski's filter (or Behe's mousetrap, take your pick) is the Judeo-Christian God. But to my knowledge none have objected to Behe's admission (under oath at Dover) that the designer could be deceased. That is what the rubes need to have drummed into them. Implying that the scam artists "know" that the designer is Judeo-Christian God will only be greeted with rubes' reaction of "well, duh!" BTW, back in 2001 I wrote a letter to Senator Santorum warning him that he had been scammed by the DI when he parroted their misleading line about ID beginning with the ancient Greeks.

eric · 4 June 2009

raven said: How does science prove that the Intelligent Designer is a xian god, Yahweh?
I think in most cases they fall back on the ontological argument. That gets them to monotheism and traits like omniscence, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc... I'm not defending that argument, just telling you how I think they get there. I agree with Glenn D.'s argument that the ID crowd is speaking out both sides of their mouths. But to be honest, I don't see anything particularly nefarious about this. Turn on the TV and half the advertising out there will use the same strategy. One day Ginsu knives are best because they have a solid performance record. The next day, they have an all-new steel formula that makes them even sharper. That religious folks use standard advertising techniques doesn't bother me. What bothers me is when people fall for such transparent marketing strategies.

John Kwok · 4 June 2009

eric and Frank J, To be more precisely, we should refer to - as Jerry Coyne has done - the "soft" and "hard" versions of ID. The soft version is of course the more "scientific" version that the DI's mendacious intellectual pornographers have been trying to push through county and state school boards of education for years, claiming that it is science and thus, a "viable alternative" to evolution. However, not once, have any of them - including Behe and Dembski - demonstrated how and why Intelligent Design does a better job than evolution in explaining the origin, history and current structure of Earth's biodiversity. The "hard" version of course is the religiously-inspired version aimed at the Xian faithful which Dembski, Luskin, Nelson, West, and now, most recently, Behe, have been promoting to the Xian faithful for years:
eric said:
raven said: How does science prove that the Intelligent Designer is a xian god, Yahweh?
I think in most cases they fall back on the ontological argument. That gets them to monotheism and traits like omniscence, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc... I'm not defending that argument, just telling you how I think they get there. I agree with Glenn D.'s argument that the ID crowd is speaking out both sides of their mouths. But to be honest, I don't see anything particularly nefarious about this. Turn on the TV and half the advertising out there will use the same strategy. One day Ginsu knives are best because they have a solid performance record. The next day, they have an all-new steel formula that makes them even sharper. That religious folks use standard advertising techniques doesn't bother me. What bothers me is when people fall for such transparent marketing strategies.
Appreciatively yours, John

eric · 4 June 2009

Dan said: In particular, Miller argues that the deity is relevant to interpersonal relationships, to human motivation, etc. "A Christian sees his life, his family, and his small place in history as parts of God's plan. He has faith that God expects him to use his talents and abilities in God's name. He accepts the adversity that comes into this life as a challenge from God, and he sees apparent misfortune as an opportunity to do good in the service of both God and man." (Finding Darwin's God, page 236.)
I'd argue that Miller's point is really about belief in God. He's making a statement about faith's impact on the world, not God's impact on the world. Faith can be relevant while at the same time the object of that faith is not. Given that there are many mutually exclusive religions in the world, that statement almost has to be true. :) Kids produce pressure waves in the air when they clap their hands. And they may clap long and hard to bring tinkerbell back. This does not make tinkerbell "relevant" to science. At best, it makes belief in tinkerbell relevant, but you have to have a very broad, squishy definition of relvancy to even say that.

Dan · 4 June 2009

eric said:
Dan said: In particular, Miller argues that the deity is relevant to interpersonal relationships, to human motivation, etc. "A Christian sees his life, his family, and his small place in history as parts of God's plan. He has faith that God expects him to use his talents and abilities in God's name. He accepts the adversity that comes into this life as a challenge from God, and he sees apparent misfortune as an opportunity to do good in the service of both God and man." (Finding Darwin's God, page 236.)
I'd argue that Miller's point is really about belief in God. He's making a statement about faith's impact on the world, not God's impact on the world. Faith can be relevant while at the same time the object of that faith is not. Given that there are many mutually exclusive religions in the world, that statement almost has to be true. :) Kids produce pressure waves in the air when they clap their hands. And they may clap long and hard to bring tinkerbell back. This does not make tinkerbell "relevant" to science. At best, it makes belief in tinkerbell relevant, but you have to have a very broad, squishy definition of relvancy to even say that.
The original question was whether Ken Miller would find a deity relevant, not whether he would find a deity relevant to science. I think Ken Miller would reply that the deity is relevant to many things, but not to science. As a scientist, I have to say that many things in my life, even in my professional life (e.g. College committee meetings, grant reviews, etc. Gee, I've just finished the assessment report for my department), are not science. Lots of things are irrelevant to science but are relevant to life: art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity, beauty. Fine dining that provides the same nutrition as poorly cooked food is relevant to daily life, even if it's irrelevant to nutritional science.

DavidK · 4 June 2009

Glen Davidson said: Here is an excerpt from an article that the DI put on their site, apparently without any concern that it portrays ID as a "new theory":

Intelligent design, which holds that only an unspecified superior intellect can account for the complexity of life forms, is increasingly appearing in science forums and journals as an alternative to evolution theory. ... www.discovery.org/a/2445

IOW, they're pushing the idea that it is a new idea, a new theory. Here's what used to be on the DI's website: ...

Design Theory: A New Science for a New Century We know very well that ID is not a new idea, it's a pre-scientific idea that can only win if science standards are essentially destroyed.

Glen Davidson http://tinyurl.com/6mb592
What is most interesting in all of this "New Theory" stuff is how the Dishonesty Institute itself and it's 'genetic components' display the propensity to literally "evolve" before our very eyes. As the DI organism meets new obstacles, it mutates itself to meet those obstacles with evermore meaningless arguments that continue to sustain it and give it and its adherents breathing space, yet deny the mechanism of evolution. Because it is inherently based on the religious beliefs of its followers, it will not go away, but it's just a question of how much damage they will inflict.

Chip Poirot · 4 June 2009

I find it interesting how the arguments in the pdf from the faith and evolutions site presents us with one great big giant red herring.

Who has ever denied that there is a multi-religion or theistic world view argument from design? Who has ever said that the argument from design was of logical necessity specifically Christian?

In addition, the pdf confuses multiple positions: rational deists and theistic evolutionists and others with similar views can accept the idea that reflection on the grandeur of natural law, leads to the inference of a designer of natural law. That's not the same as saying that the evidence for a designer has to be found in areas where we cannot find an explanation based on natural law.

The pdf also ignores that over time, the philosophical underpinnings of science have changed.

But why have they changed? At one point in time we can point to respected scientists of their era who believed in natural theology, lamarckism, vitalism, teleology (note the latter three don't necessarily imply natural theology) but over time the need for some "third force"-be it a designer, magic, vitalism, etc. has been rejected because those explanations simply didn't work out.

People are free to try and reconsider discredited arguments, but they have an obligation to present new evidence as to why those arguments should be reconsidered.

The modern proponents of the ID movement do not do so.

Also, I liked how this post distinguished between a generic argument from or to design, and the modern ID movement. I've had this very same discussion with a colleague of mine. In a very abstract way, there is nothing wrong with academic discussions about arguments to or from design, though I think they are vulnerable to critique. But just because something is worth discussing in a philosophy or intellectual history class does not make it good science.

Chip Poirot · 4 June 2009

Dan Said:
As a scientist, I have to say that many things in my life, even in my professional life (e.g. College committee meetings, grant reviews, etc. Gee, I've just finished the assessment report for my department), are not science.
Well, obviously, one can make a common sense distinction between doing a lab experiment and engaging in the actual practice of biology and attending a committee meeting. But I can still maintain my critical faculties during a committee meeting (if I take enough deep breaths). So I can approach committee business in a scientific fashion and thus in a sense, be doing science, or at least be doing things scientifically. So I don't buy that "science" is something I do in one area and don't apply in other areas.
Lots of things are irrelevant to science but are relevant to life: art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity, beauty. Fine dining that provides the same nutrition as poorly cooked food is relevant to daily life, even if it's irrelevant to nutritional science.
Again, the same principle applies. I may not be able to arrive at precise, quantifiable rules for art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity and beauty. But I can judge warrant of belief and discuss these matters in terms of evidence and reason.

John Kwok · 4 June 2009

Without speaking personally on Ken's behalf, I would say that he agrees with you on this:

"The original question was whether Ken Miller would find a deity relevant, not whether he would find a deity relevant to science."

"I think Ken Miller would reply that the deity is relevant to many things, but not to science."

In fact, it was one of the points he stressed in a private talk he gave to our fellow university alumni here in New York City two weeks ago.

eric · 4 June 2009

Dan said: I think Ken Miller would reply that the deity is relevant to many things, but not to science.
I would agree with that. This sub-thread started with me responding to Mike about how and when we can make conclusions about scientific unobservables, and how (warning: generalization occuring) the new atheists generally come to unwarranted conclusions about God's non-existence. I think we are in violent agreement, and would agree with Miller, on the statement that God is irrelevant to science but not disproven by science.
Lots of things are irrelevant to science but are relevant to life: art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity, beauty. Fine dining that provides the same nutrition as poorly cooked food is relevant to daily life, even if it's irrelevant to nutritional science.
I completely agree. Your point is what makes creationists' "science envy" so perplexing.

Dan · 4 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Dan Said:
As a scientist, I have to say that many things in my life, even in my professional life (e.g. College committee meetings, grant reviews, etc. Gee, I've just finished the assessment report for my department), are not science.
Well, obviously, one can make a common sense distinction between doing a lab experiment and engaging in the actual practice of biology and attending a committee meeting. But I can still maintain my critical faculties during a committee meeting (if I take enough deep breaths). So I can approach committee business in a scientific fashion and thus in a sense, be doing science, or at least be doing things scientifically. So I don't buy that "science" is something I do in one area and don't apply in other areas.
Lots of things are irrelevant to science but are relevant to life: art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity, beauty. Fine dining that provides the same nutrition as poorly cooked food is relevant to daily life, even if it's irrelevant to nutritional science.
Again, the same principle applies. I may not be able to arrive at precise, quantifiable rules for art, justice, love, politics, spiritual affinity and beauty. But I can judge warrant of belief and discuss these matters in terms of evidence and reason.
I commend Chip for maintaining his critical faculties during committee meetings. Personally, I tend to nod off. I think we can all agree that critical thinking is good in all aspects of thought: thought about nature, thought about marriage and other interpersonal relationships, thought about love and beauty and cooking and justice. Critical thinking is good in thought about religion. But that doesn't mean that marriage, love, beauty, cooking, justice, and religion are part of science.

Chip Poirot · 4 June 2009

Dan Said


think we can all agree that critical thinking is good in all aspects of thought: thought about nature, thought about marriage and other interpersonal relationships, thought about love and beauty and cooking and justice. Critical thinking is good in thought about religion.

But that doesn’t mean that marriage, love, beauty, cooking, justice, and religion are part of science

But is science just a subject area (the study of the physical and natural world)? If so, then obviously, the common sense distinction of studying plants and deciding who is going to take the Vet or do the cooking or how to arrange the family finances is pretty clear.

Or, is science a general approach to knowledge and if so, how do we distinguish that approach from other approaches?

IMO, what we have come to call a scientific approach to thinking in our era is the systematic application of reason and experience to knowledge. And that in my opinion makes the natural sciences one aspect of science and it so happens that more precise answers are obtainable in the natural world than in other areas of our lives.

But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science.

We can still make a common sense distinction perhaps between the study of knowledge motivated just by idle curiousity and the application of knowledge to many areas of our life (I would call the application of knowledge technology).

Now, knowing human beings, I would not expect people to always approach marriage or committee meetings with the same spirit they might approach the study of amoebas. But on the other hand, I would expect a marriage counselor to help me apply valid and warranted knowledge about family dynamics to marital issues. I wouldn't go to a marriage counselor who was steeped in pseudo science (which I actually suspect most marriage counselors are) and told me the answer to marital problems was to pray and read the Bible or to follow Bill Gothard's principles of patriarchal authority. Nor would i go to a marriage counselor who came at issues from feminist view point theory.

So, long story short-I wouldn't put even my marriage outside of science.

Dan · 4 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: So, long story short-I wouldn't put even my marriage outside of science.
All right, by your definition you're correct. But by your definition science is the same as "everything". I would just use the word everything.

Bill Gascoyne · 4 June 2009

John Kwok said: eric and Dean, Am reasonably certain that Ken would agree with both statements. Moreover, I heard him say two weeks ago (at a private talk he gave to our fellow college alumni here in NYC) that anyone who belongs to a faith that is intolerant of modern science should think seriously of leaving that faith. Regards, John
"The religion that is afraid of science dishonors God and commits suicide."
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882)

Chip Poirot · 4 June 2009

Dan Said:
But by your definition science is the same as “everything”. I would just use the word everything.
No-everything isn't science. Science is an approach to knowledge. If you make a claim to knowledge I will ask you on what basis you make that claim and what your warrant is. If you answer me: "It is written in the Bible" I would then ask, "what is your warrant for believing that something is true if it is written in the Bible?". You might reply that you believe the Bible is true because you feel the Holy Ghost move you as you read it. So you are making a claim to truth based on revelation. I would say that making a truth claim based on revelation is definitely not science. My argument about science in this instance is that if we want to have valid claims to knowledge and a sufficient warrant to act with confidence then we should use the method of science (systematc application of reason and experience). Granted, different kinds of claims to knowledge require different ways of applying the method. We can't study economics using microscopes and slides and test tubes. And it's more difficult to have a decisive test in economics. But I can still evaluate a theory in economics by the same criteria as a theory in biology or physics. And I can do the same to marriage counseling (which is actually just applied psychology and sociology). So, as it turns out, a lot of people do a lot of things unscientifically. I know some people who are really good scientists in the natural sciences, and then all of a sudden if they confront an issue about collective bargaining or public policy they stop thinking scientifically. So, when you say that there are many areas in your life that our "outside science" you are doing one or both of the following: 1. You are simply distinguishing your job from your family life or looking at art from testing a sample in a test tube (a valid distinction) or; 2. You are saying that there are areas x, y, z where you choose to think in non-scientific ways. What is the justification for two? What properties does marriage, art, etc. have that make it unamenable to applying scientific methods? I find that 2 is often a staple of the NOMA advocates. IMO-NOMA is a copout.

DavidK · 4 June 2009

raven said: Not going to read first hand anything by Dembski. Not worth spending a valuable resource, lifespan. How does science prove that the Intelligent Designer is a xian god, Yahweh? Why not Zeus, Brahma, Buddha, Allah, or Bob the Rain God? Why is there only one Intelligent Designer. Lots of religions have fleets of gods. Not asking why Dembski names the god he does. I know why. Why does science prove it is Yahweh?
That is precisely the question I directly asked the DI creationist John West after a talk he'd made. He hemmed & hawed & started talking about historical precedences and ... well, he never did/could answer the question. It's a good one to ask any creationist/IDer, even someone like Hovind from a previous PT entry. These are questions that stump them and they'll do everything possible to avoid answering them rather than give some blatantly asinine answer.

eric · 4 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: My argument about science in this instance is that if we want to have valid claims to knowledge and a sufficient warrant to act with confidence then we should use the method of science (systematc application of reason and experience).
You are forgetting or leaving out one big part of what is typically called science: the reliance on empirical, objective evidence. I can systematically apply reason and experience to the study of musical taste (your definition of science). But I can't measure music's inherent "goodness" because it has none. Musical quality is not an independent, objective, empirical quantity. Your brain's reaction to music can be measured. But it has no objective quality of goodness outside of your brain. One of the incredibly powerful things about science is that I can write up an experiment, hand that write-up to someone of a comepletely different cultural background, and assuming they can read and follow the instructions, they can do the experiment and end up with the exact same result. To use an earlier example, a ball will always roll down an incline at the same acceleration, whether you're a chanting Chinese buddhist or punk rocker from New York. But I can't write up a musical score that everyone agrees has exactly 10 units of musical quality in it. No matter how much reason and experience I put into it.
What properties does marriage, art, etc. have that make it unamenable to applying scientific methods?
This: the quantities you are concerned about (love, aesthetics) are not objectively measureable. You cannot build a lovemeter the same way you can build a spectrometer. There is more to science than just application of reason and experience; there is also a very limited definition as to what counts as evidence. That definition excludes many fields of study from being "scientific." Now, as a second and very practical question, I would ask that if you really believe this:
But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science.
Then what do you propose we teach in JHS science classes? Everything?

H.H. · 4 June 2009

Would Collins and Miller both agree that god is irrelevant to the outcome of evolution? As far as I know, both would not. So then how is that different than saying angels are needed to explain the orbits or the planets?

And while everyone loves to opine on the "limits" of science, I've heard little about the limits of faith. Oh, sure, many agree that it's not appropriate to use faith when addressing empirical questions, but I've never heard a good explanation for why it's appropriate to inform any question. When is faith ever valid? Can faith inform morality, say, in any defensible manner? There's this idea that any question that science can't directly address must somehow be "faith's domain." But has faith ever actually earned that spot? How can faith ever be depended upon to give a non-arbitrary answer on any question imaginable? If it can't, then why would anyone expect to their faith to be given any credence whatsoever?

John Kwok · 4 June 2009

I'm not familiar with Collins's thought, however, from a scientific perspective, Ken would admit that God is irrelevant. Where he runs into trouble is when he mixes his scientific and religious views, of which one prominent recent example is his chapter devoted to his personal take on the anthropic principle in "Only A Theory":
H.H. said: Would Collins and Miller both agree that god is irrelevant to the outcome of evolution? As far as I know, both would not. So then how is that different than saying angels are needed to explain the orbits or the planets? And while everyone loves to opine on the "limits" of science, I've heard little about the limits of faith. Oh, sure, many agree that it's not appropriate to use faith when addressing empirical questions, but I've never heard a good explanation for why it's appropriate to inform any question. When is faith ever valid? Can faith inform morality, say, in any defensible manner? There's this idea that any question that science can't directly address must somehow be "faith's domain." But has faith ever actually earned that spot? How can faith ever be depended upon to give a non-arbitrary answer on any question imaginable? If it can't, then why would anyone expect to their faith to be given any credence whatsoever?

Chio Poirot · 4 June 2009

eric said:
Chip Poirot said: My argument about science in this instance is that if we want to have valid claims to knowledge and a sufficient warrant to act with confidence then we should use the method of science (systematc application of reason and experience).
You are forgetting or leaving out one big part of what is typically called science: the reliance on empirical, objective evidence. I can systematically apply reason and experience to the study of musical taste (your definition of science). But I can't measure music's inherent "goodness" because it has none. Musical quality is not an independent, objective, empirical quantity. Your brain's reaction to music can be measured. But it has no objective quality of goodness outside of your brain.
It would take a long time to unpack this, but you are begging significant questions. In short, you seem to be adopting something along the lines of the logical positivist/Wittgensteinian view of scientific knowledge as empirically verifiable, quantifiable sentences/theories that can be expressed via formal logic or mathematics. I agree that much of the natural and physical sciences lends itself to greater rigor and precision and more exact testing than the social sciences. In turn, some parts of the social sciences at least can be more exact, etc. than the humanities. But I think that if you are arguing the position I think you are arguing you are engaging in fallacy: either we have precise, quantifiable, predictable knowledge or we have nothing at all. It echoes Wittgenstein's dictum that on matters about which we can speak, we should speak clearly and on all others remain silent. I disagree and follow philosophers like Susan Haack and Larry Laudan who point out that we can have degrees of warrant of belief, and that the best warrant of belief is to systematically apply the method of reason and experience. I may not be able to derive a statistical test of what makes good music or good art, or a valid ethical proposition, but I can still have cognitively rational conversations about them. In a sense, I can test these areas by their consequences. Dewey addresses this in several places. Hilary Putnam recently made a similar argument in Ethics Without Ontology , though I wouldn't necessarily adopt everything Putnam says there. But long story short, your definition of science is one that is not particularly well accepted amongst modern epistemologists.
One of the incredibly powerful things about science is that I can write up an experiment, hand that write-up to someone of a comepletely different cultural background, and assuming they can read and follow the instructions, they can do the experiment and end up with the exact same result. To use an earlier example, a ball will always roll down an incline at the same acceleration, whether you're a chanting Chinese buddhist or punk rocker from New York. But I can't write up a musical score that everyone agrees has exactly 10 units of musical quality in it. No matter how much reason and experience I put into it.
OK, but again, it is degrees-not absolutes. And even so, we can compare music and art across cultures and find common elements such as symmetry, order, complexity, etc. that serve to make art or music great. Some Cultural Anthropologists insist that cultural variation is so great and so vast that I can never arrive at such a conclusion. Others (especially the ones I agree with) focus on how there are Universal cultural patterns. This also follows to some degree from cognitive and evolutionary psychology.
What properties does marriage, art, etc. have that make it unamenable to applying scientific methods?
This: the quantities you are concerned about (love, aesthetics) are not objectively measureable. You cannot build a lovemeter the same way you can build a spectrometer. There is more to science than just application of reason and experience; there is also a very limited definition as to what counts as evidence. That definition excludes many fields of study from being "scientific."
So how do you propose to study the social sciences and Humanities? Deep breathing exercises?
Now, as a second and very practical question, I would ask that if you really believe this:
But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science.
Then what do you propose we teach in JHS science classes? Everything?
You really have an incredible talent for the absolutely ridiculous. What did I say: I said that Science is fundamentally and intrinsically bound up with both an ontology and an epistemology that descends to us with modification from the Enlightenment. Science is a worldview. So, IMO, there is no field that can claim exemption from applying the method of reason and experience and resort to knowledge based on deep breathing exercises. But I also said that we could make a common sense distinction between the subject matters of the different specific sciences and the Humanities. As I said several times already I can make a common sense distinction between physics and molecular biology. I can make a common sense distinction between biology and economics. So when you teach a subject area, you need to teach so that students can acquire what is widely accepted as competence in that subject area. So in a class on population genetics for example, you need to spend time on Hardy-Castle-Weinberg. In economics, you spend time teaching supply and demand, and so on. There are occasions when knowledge spills over from one area to the other. If you teach a general survey course in European History for example, you would cover the respective contributions of Newton and Einstein (or at least you should, IMO). Likewise in a physics course you might spend some time on the history of physics. My concern is demarcating valid claims to knowledge from bogus claims to knowledge. As it turns out, when we start specifying what kinds of things constitute valid claims to knowledge, we tend to arrive at a position that is broadly and philosophically speaking scientific. The physical and natural sciences are a specific application of the method of reason and experience-what Susan Haack calls "More so". Susan Haack also notes that the social sciences are in this respect "the same but different." I would extend this to the humanities. Knowledge should be continuous. That doesn't mean we can't make common sense distinctions about what we teach in first period and what we teach in third period.

John Kwok · 4 June 2009

eric and Chip,

While this is a little bit off topic, it may be relevant to your interesting discussion. In his book "Only A Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul", Ken Miller has made the fascinating observation that the logical reasoning of DI advocates is too reminiscient of the moral relativism that is popular in the humanities and social sciences. By adopting such a stance, ID advocates are threatening the very survival of science itself, by implying that science could be done via such a methodology.

Appreciatively yours,

John

Henry J · 4 June 2009

Dembski and other DI folk often admit that they hope that the hapless designer they claim to have caught in Dembski’s filter (or Behe’s mousetrap, take your pick) is the Judeo-Christian God.

One wonders what they used for bait in that "mouse" trap... Henry

Mike · 4 June 2009

I don't believe I have the skill, knowledge, or time to do this justice, but I'm certain its important. As most readers here probably know better than I, the question of what science "is" is of central importance to countering the anti-science education movement. I'm encouraged in the validity of my own pessimistic view of the failure to teach the general public what science is by the various recent studies that show US science scores dropping, the failure of the education community to grasp the importance of teaching crucial aspects of the process of doing science, and popular misconception that science is whatever sounds "sciency". This allows AIG, DI, et al., to confuse science with religion, but they aren't alone.

I'm sorry, but the idea that any experiment in any branch of science tests a God variable shows a large amount of confusion. Like I said, not enough time.

Chip Poirot · 4 June 2009

John Kwok said: eric and Chip, While this is a little bit off topic, it may be relevant to your interesting discussion. In his book "Only A Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul", Ken Miller has made the fascinating observation that the logical reasoning of DI advocates is too reminiscient of the moral relativism that is popular in the humanities and social sciences. By adopting such a stance, ID advocates are threatening the very survival of science itself, by implying that science could be done via such a methodology. Appreciatively yours, John
Quite correct-though I think he should have said epistemological relativism rather than moral relativism. I haven't read this particular contribution by Miller but I have noted it myself. The ID advocates on many occasions have adopted and adapted the rhetoric and style of various viewpoint epistemologies, post-modernism and other related approaches. In other instances they simply mis-cite somewhat less relativistic approaches. This is part of my point: DI advocates are in fact correct when they argue that the reliance of modern science on naturalism is an epistemological and ontological assumption. They are wrong however to argue that contemporary standards of science can support other approaches. Modern science is in point of fact co-terminous with a particular world view. So the question arises-why should we have confidence in that world view. My answer simply is that it works and supernaturalism or religio-magical world views have simply not worked. It may have been cognitively rational in 1840 to have been a natural theologian. It may have been cognitively rational in 1900 to still believe in vitalism or teleology. Such beliefs are not cognitively rational today.

John Kwok · 4 June 2009

I believe he was actually referring more to epistemological relativism, since he was drawing comparisons between what the IDiots wish to accomplish with respect to "overthrowing" scientific methodology and what Harold Bloom had criticized with regards to the humanities and social sciences in his seminal work, "The Closing of the American Mind". It is the very revolutionary nature of this aspect of the ID movement that Ken regards as especially dangerous.

raven · 5 June 2009

I think you are making a somewhat erroneous comparison between the creationists wanting to broaden science from methodological naturalism to humanities relativism e.g. Postmodernism.

It is more like heading back to another and very old worldview. The title of a recent book, The Rise of Idiot America captures the essence of what they want.

Presupposialism and Postmoderism would be enough to destroy science. But why stop there when you can go back to the Dark Ages or further?

This would be a recipe for national suicide but they don't care about that either.

Mike Elzinga · 5 June 2009

Mike said: I'm encouraged in the validity of my own pessimistic view of the failure to teach the general public what science is by the various recent studies that show US science scores dropping, the failure of the education community to grasp the importance of teaching crucial aspects of the process of doing science, and popular misconception that science is whatever sounds "sciency". This allows AIG, DI, et al., to confuse science with religion, but they aren't alone. I'm sorry, but the idea that any experiment in any branch of science tests a God variable shows a large amount of confusion. Like I said, not enough time.
I don’t know if creationism, intelligent design and other pseudo-sciences are the sole cause, but I have been around long enough to have seen the formation of the Institute for Creation “Research”, the “Discovery” Institute, Answers in Genesis, L. Ron Hubbard’s spoof, New Age woo-woo, the founding of a “university” by mystic quantum mechanics/Hinduism pseudo-science and a number of other well-funded scams. Since the 1960s, and progressing into the 1970s and 80s, these organizations ramped up and used technology to flood this society with memes, misconceptions, misinformation and pseudo-science crap all of which have a characteristic flavor that tells anyone knowledgeable about science just where this junk comes from. Some of it got rolling in response to the attempts at revising the national science curriculum after Sputnik. These anti-science and anti-evolution campaigns are well-organized and well-funded, and they have now been in operation for decades while disseminating this trash more efficiently each year. The science curriculum in the public schools has always lagged far behind the established results of science even when science in this country shot ahead of much of the rest of the world after World War II. Good science didn’t stop the Nazis in Germany, and it hasn’t stopped right-wing fundamentalist groups in this country from quietly sabotaging the public school curriculum in this country. Now there is an additional awareness of the problem because of better and more instantaneous communications and the Internet in recent years. We have the additional pressures of population and stressed resources contributing to the already overburdened school systems, even as technological development has accelerated. And there has been plenty of evidence that disruptive fundamentalist groups don’t hesitate to exploit overextended school systems and governmental bodies to try to slip their crap in under the radar. During much of this time, the scientific community was complacent and too busy with the press of research to take the threat seriously. I hope that has changed, but the science community’s counter-effort is still getting off the ground with decades of damage to undo and some well-designed curricula yet to be built up and tested.

Frank J · 5 June 2009

To be more precisely, we should refer to - as Jerry Coyne has done - the “soft” and “hard” versions of ID. The soft version is of course the more “scientific” version that the DI’s mendacious intellectual pornographers have been trying to push through county and state school boards of education for years, claiming that it is science and thus, a “viable alternative” to evolution. However, not once, have any of them - including Behe and Dembski - demonstrated how and why Intelligent Design does a better job than evolution in explaining the origin, history and current structure of Earth’s biodiversity. The “hard” version of course is the religiously-inspired version aimed at the Xian faithful which Dembski, Luskin, Nelson, West, and now, most recently, Behe, have been promoting to the Xian faithful for years:

— John Kwok
That’s exactly why I keep referring to it as the “ID strategy” or “ID scam.” Much too often ID (& creationism) are (mis)characterized by critics as beliefs. The ID scam is not itself either the hard or soft version, or the crude-but-honest attempts of the ancient Greeks at “design science,” but rather a bait-and-switch scam to mislead the rubes. Rubes that famously include Senator Santorum - if he’s not in on the scam, that is. ID’s connections to classic creationism (YEC and OEC) and fundamentalism are real, and a still-mostly-confused public needs to be alerted to that. But it drives me nuts when that’s the only aspect of ID that’s mentioned. The ID scam is, in a way, the “central pseudoscience,” because it’s a one-size-fits-all pseudoscience that, regardless of what the majority of rubes infer, accommodates everything from Bigfoot to “virtual evolution.” So naturally, it pleases me to occasionally read something like:

I don’t know if creationism, intelligent design and other pseudo-sciences are the sole cause, but I have been around long enough to have seen the formation of the Institute for Creation “Research”, the “Discovery” Institute, Answers in Genesis, L. Ron Hubbard’s spoof, New Age woo-woo, the founding of a “university” by mystic quantum mechanics/Hinduism pseudo-science and a number of other well-funded scams. Since the 1960s, and progressing into the 1970s and 80s, these organizations ramped up and used technology to flood this society with memes, misconceptions, misinformation and pseudo-science crap all of which have a characteristic flavor that tells anyone knowledgeable about science just where this junk comes from. Some of it got rolling in response to the attempts at revising the national science curriculum after Sputnik. These anti-science and anti-evolution campaigns are well-organized and well-funded, and they have now been in operation for decades while disseminating this trash more efficiently each year.

— Mike Elzinga
What’s especially interesting to me is how these pseudosciences have all been learning to say less and less about their own testable claims (the “what happened when”, which in ID’s case is ”don’t ask, don’t tell.”), downplay any irreconcilable differences with competing pseudosciences, and unite against mainstream science. The trend is clear: As the evidence accumulates for mainstream science, detractors increasingly resort to cherry-picking, quote mining, defining terms to suit the argument. And as those tactics get stale (slowly, though, as suckers are born every minute) there’s always the trusty conspiracy “theories” and Godwin’s Law, e.g. as with “Expelled.”

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

Frank J,

Once more you've made some excellent points, but again, I have to concur with Jerry Coyne in recognizing that ID does come in two versions; "soft" and "hard". As for Mkie's recollection, I agree it is quite useful, but, I might add, with some slight sarcasm, "So what"? All creationists - at least since the early 1960s - have been engaged in some form of dodging and weaving, in which one of their classic methods has been "quote mining", so that they could substantiate - to themselves, their acolytes and those who are either ignorant of science (or quite simply too stubborn to recognize the difference between real science and pseudoscience) - the "strengths and weaknesses" of modern evolutionary theory.

I think it's useful for those who are unfamiliar with creationism to read either Ronald Numbers's "The Creationists" (which I haven't, but which Genie Scott strongly recommends as the best book of its kind. However, I have heard Numbers speak and spoken to him and found him quite interesting, simply as someone who grew up in a Fundamentalist Protestant home in Canada, and learned evolution only in graduate school) or Robert Pennock's "Tower of Babel".

Appreciatively yours,

John

eric · 5 June 2009

Chio Poirot said: you seem to be adopting something along the lines of the logical positivist/Wittgensteinian view of scientific knowledge as empirically verifiable, quantifiable sentences/theories that can be expressed via formal logic or mathematics.
If I remember my undergrad philosophy of science, the positivists were making a claim about all knowledge. Or what counts as "knowledge." I'm making a much more limited claim about what counts as science. I am perfectly happy, for argument's sake, to concede the point that there may be types of knowledge not captured by the scientific method. You are the one that said everything counts as science. I am disagreeing with that claim. I am not attempting to create a definition of knowledge in general.
I disagree and follow philosophers like Susan Haack and Larry Laudan
That does not surprise me at all. Laudan has published his opinion that McClean vs Arkansas was decided wrongly because creationism counts as science. And he took the same basic approach you do: epsitemologists have never agreed upon any hard boundaries or specific rules as to what counts as science, its pretty much just the systematic and rational study of a(ny) subject, so creationism counts.
I think that if you are arguing the position I think you are arguing you are engaging in fallacy: either we have precise, quantifiable, predictable knowledge or we have nothing at all.
Nope. I'm saying science has rules of evidence that exclude subjective experiences. This is a limitation on what counts as science, not what counts as knowledge.
I may not be able to derive a statistical test of what makes good music or good art, or a valid ethical proposition, but I can still have cognitively rational conversations about them.
I wholeheartedly agree. Where I disagree is when you call such conversations "science."
So how do you propose to study the social sciences and Humanities? Deep breathing exercises?
I agree that you can use rationality & experience to study humanities and thus arrive at valuable conclusions. What I disagree with, if it isn't obvious already, is you calling that science. You seem to be using the word as a synonym for "rational."

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

If I'm reading you correctly, raven, then perhaps you ought to aim your criticism at Ken Miller, since that is one of the major points that he makes in his book, "Only A Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul". But he has made it simply because he recognizes that only Intelligent Design creationists wish to "overthrow" methodological naturalism - in other words, the scientific method - by embracing a more expansive - and more relativistic - definition of science. According to Ken, those who adhere to the other flavors of creationism do support adherence to the scientific method:
raven said: I think you are making a somewhat erroneous comparison between the creationists wanting to broaden science from methodological naturalism to humanities relativism e.g. Postmodernism. It is more like heading back to another and very old worldview. The title of a recent book, The Rise of Idiot America captures the essence of what they want. Presupposialism and Postmoderism would be enough to destroy science. But why stop there when you can go back to the Dark Ages or further? This would be a recipe for national suicide but they don't care about that either.

Mike · 5 June 2009

Rubes that famously include Senator Santorum - if he’s not in on the scam, that is.
They're all "in on the scam" in that their actual objective is to push back at what they perceive (love the spell check) as an atheistic agenda in science education. I could call it delusional paranoia if there wasn't actually a minority of the scientific community that has an atheistic social agenda in education. As it is, they're able to justify injecting pseudoscience into education by rejecting the science out of hand due to their political/social bias.

raven · 5 June 2009

According to Ken, those who adhere to the other flavors of creationism do support adherence to the scientific method:
Those few are just pretending. It is cargo cult science. Most of the YECs don't even bother to pretend. They just quote bible verses and tell eveyone else they are going to hell. A few toss in some death threats and call it done. About as far away from science as one can get this side of the Taliban.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

No argument with you there, raven, but, as it has been noted here at PT and elsewhere, some YECs and OECs claim to be doing "science" via the scientific method, and have their own "creation research" journals. The DI and its fellow IDiots insist on changing the "goalposts" by clamoring for a new, more expansive, definition of science, which, as you may recall, Behe tried to rationalize and to advocate for under oath during the 2005 Kitzmiller vs. Dover trial:
raven said:
According to Ken, those who adhere to the other flavors of creationism do support adherence to the scientific method:
Those few are just pretending. It is cargo cult science. Most of the YECs don't even bother to pretend. They just quote bible verses and tell eveyone else they are going to hell. A few toss in some death threats and call it done. About as far away from science as one can get this side of the Taliban.

eric · 5 June 2009

OT, here is a link to Eugenie Scott's interiew in this week's Science.

Subscription required:

http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/324/5932/1250-b

Frank J · 5 June 2009

They’re all “in on the scam” in that their actual objective is to push back at what they perceive (love the spell check) as an atheistic agenda in science education.

— Mike
Certainly everyone from the slickest scammer to the most clueless rube wants to eliminate the "atheistic agenda" in science education. But what I mean by "in on the scam" is not that. Rather it refers to those who know (1) that ID has no science to offer, (2) that evolution, despite any perceived "weaknesses", is still the only explanation that fits the evidence (note how they "religiously" refer to a "Darwinism" caricature instead of evolution), (3) that YE and OE models that deny common descent do not fit the evidence - unless of course one cherry-picks, quote mines, defines terms to suit the argument, etc. In that sense, the rubes who parrot ID's feel-good anti-"Darwinism" sound bites, then infer that they validate their particular childhood fairy tale, are definitely not in on the scam, but scammed. Of course there's no hard line between scammed and scammer, but it's a safe bet that nearly all ID activists are in on the scam. With politicians like Santorum, it's especially hard to tell. In one of his articles he hinted that he did not necessarily agree with the DI's "science", but defended their right to have it taught.

Once more you’ve made some excellent points, but again, I have to concur with Jerry Coyne in recognizing that ID does come in two versions; “soft” and “hard”.

— John Kwok
Yes, but not in the same sense that classic creationism comes in various versions, with adherents occasionally challenging each other as to which is the "correct" one. IDers all want both hard and soft versions, so they can bait-and-switch them at their convenience.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

eric, Thanks:
eric said: OT, here is a link to Eugenie Scott's interiew in this week's Science. Subscription required: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/324/5932/1250-b
Of course NCSE has a brief summary: http://ncseweb.org/news/2009/06/eugenie-c-scott-interviewed-science-004823 Genie gives a brief overview of the current battle against the anti-evolution movement. She recommends - and I agree with her completely - that evolution should be mentioned in every college course in the biological sciences, not "tacked on" as an afterthought. I suppose that if it were so, then you wouldn't have a situation such as this: an Obama supporter - a Hollywood actor trained in molecular biochemistry - insists that humans did not evolve, during an on-flight conversation that he had, shortly after Obama's inauguration, with Harvard University physicist Lisa Randall (Randall recounted this online soon thereafter.). Appreciatively yours, John

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

Well put, Frank J:

"Yes, but not in the same sense that classic creationism comes in various versions, with adherents occasionally challenging each other as to which is the “correct” one. IDers all want both hard and soft versions, so they can bait-and-switch them at their convenience."

Dean Wentworth · 5 June 2009

In his paper Naturalism is Today an Essential Part of Science, originally presented at the Conference on Naturalism, Theism and the Scientific Enterprise in 1997, Steven Schafersman wrote:
Theistic naturalists must believe in naturalism to methodologically assume or adopt it in science, and they cannot logically maintain a belief in supernaturalism at the same time unless they maintain that there is absolutely no connection at all between the natural and supernatural worlds. But this is something no supernaturalist maintains. Even the most naturalistic theistic naturalist--a deist who claims that God is the ultimate Creator of the universe, but that everything after that singular event is natural and operates by natural causes--believes in a supernatural origin of the universe. But ontological naturalism makes no exception for the origin of the universe. It must have been natural, too. For supernaturalists who believe in miracles or the dogmas of Christianity, the hurdle is even higher. It is not logically possible for them to describe nature naturalistically when, in fact, they believe in supernatural violations of natural law, i.e. the manifestation of miracles. These arguments suggest to me that methodological naturalism, itself alone required by science, is logically untenable for humans unless one is simultaneously an ontological naturalist.
Since the compatibility of science and religion is being discussed here, does anyone know if a theistic scientist (e.g. Collins or Miller) has ever directly responded to Schafersman's thoughts on the subject?

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

This sounds again too much like the "all or nothing" approach advocated by Coyne and Myers:
Dean Wentworth said: In his paper Naturalism is Today an Essential Part of Science, originally presented at the Conference on Naturalism, Theism and the Scientific Enterprise in 1997, Steven Schafersman wrote:
Theistic naturalists must believe in naturalism to methodologically assume or adopt it in science, and they cannot logically maintain a belief in supernaturalism at the same time unless they maintain that there is absolutely no connection at all between the natural and supernatural worlds. But this is something no supernaturalist maintains. Even the most naturalistic theistic naturalist--a deist who claims that God is the ultimate Creator of the universe, but that everything after that singular event is natural and operates by natural causes--believes in a supernatural origin of the universe. But ontological naturalism makes no exception for the origin of the universe. It must have been natural, too. For supernaturalists who believe in miracles or the dogmas of Christianity, the hurdle is even higher. It is not logically possible for them to describe nature naturalistically when, in fact, they believe in supernatural violations of natural law, i.e. the manifestation of miracles. These arguments suggest to me that methodological naturalism, itself alone required by science, is logically untenable for humans unless one is simultaneously an ontological naturalist.
Since the compatibility of science and religion is being discussed here, does anyone know if a theistic scientist (e.g. Collins or Miller) has ever directly responded to Schafersman's thoughts on the subject?
Again, while I can't speak on behalf of Collins, I believe Ken would insist on applying a strict adherence to methodological naturalism with respect to science (Moreover, I also suspect that Ken is familiar with Schafersman's line of reasoning.). Unfortunately, I will concede that Ken has opened himself to criticism from the likes of Coyne and Myers (and others), simply for espousing his own unique take on the anthropic principle, which, I presume is informed by his Roman Catholic Christian belief.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

I would be interested too in your thoughts with regards to Genie Scott's observations. Am not sure if it's useful to keep fighting the same battle with regards to Coyne and Myers's inane criticism of NCSE's "accomodationist" stance with respect to religion (A stance that they claim NCSE does have, but which they DO NOT possess at all, according to what they have told me in private.).

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

Just to clarify. I will admit to only being told by NCSE - and I won't say who it was, though you can guess - that NCSE does not have an official "accomodationist" stance with respect to the relationship between science and religion:
John Kwok said: I would be interested too in your thoughts with regards to Genie Scott's observations. Am not sure if it's useful to keep fighting the same battle with regards to Coyne and Myers's inane criticism of NCSE's "accomodationist" stance with respect to religion (A stance that they claim NCSE does have, but which they DO NOT possess at all, according to what they have told me in private.).

eric · 5 June 2009

Dean Wentworth said: ...Steven Schafersman wrote:
Theistic naturalists must believe in naturalism to methodologically assume or adopt it in science, and they cannot logically maintain a belief in supernaturalism at the same time unless they maintain that there is absolutely no connection at all between the natural and supernatural worlds...
Since the compatibility of science and religion is being discussed here, does anyone know if a theistic scientist (e.g. Collins or Miller) has ever directly responded to Schafersman's thoughts on the subject?
Good quote Dean. I can only give you my thoughts, not those of Collins or Miller, but I think Dr. Schafersman has made an error. Let us say that as a supernaturalist I maintain that phenomena X is the result of the supernatural. And as a methodolical naturalist I maintain that science only considers natural explanations. What is the conclusion of holding those two beliefs? Its: science will never find the correct explanation for X. This is a far cry from being logically forced to believe there is no connection between the natural and the supernatural. Now, people who make the claims in my example are vulnerable to the God of the Gaps problem: when science explains X, the role of God shrinks. But Schafersman is wrong in implying that methodolgical naturalism + supernaturalist necessarily requires a belief that the supernatural is impotent. It doesn't. It only requires the belief that science will not be able to explain that which is (believed to be) caused by the supernatural. Perhaps he is introducing some confusion into his own argument with the term "theistic naturalist." I am not sure from his description whether such a person is supposed to be a "supernaturalist" (i.e. believe in a supernatural explanation for at least one phenomenon) or not.

Kevin B · 5 June 2009

John Kwok said: This sounds again too much like the "all or nothing" approach advocated by Coyne and Myers:
I was thinking that it bears a distinct resemblance to Dembski's multiplying up the probabilities and announcing that it couldn't possibly have happened by chance. Schafersman needs to be careful about the distinction "miracles can't happen" and "miracles are not amenable to being measured." He appears to be arguing the former, which is effectively an inverse form of the creationist position, and which is equally open to criticism. While science has to rely on models with statements of statistical probabilities of events, supernatural interference can't be ruled out simply by assertion.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

I was thinking in the mode of "to be a true accepter of evolution, then you must accept the 'truth' of militant atheism":
Kevin B said:
John Kwok said: This sounds again too much like the "all or nothing" approach advocated by Coyne and Myers:
I was thinking that it bears a distinct resemblance to Dembski's multiplying up the probabilities and announcing that it couldn't possibly have happened by chance. Schafersman needs to be careful about the distinction "miracles can't happen" and "miracles are not amenable to being measured." He appears to be arguing the former, which is effectively an inverse form of the creationist position, and which is equally open to criticism. While science has to rely on models with statements of statistical probabilities of events, supernatural interference can't be ruled out simply by assertion.
I think I see why you see Schafersman's argument as one similar to Dembski's. In both instances, their notion of reality relies on this argument, "If A is true, then B is false. Conversely, if B is true, then A must be false".

Dean Wentworth · 5 June 2009

John,

Thanks for your thoughts. The evidence that professed theists can accept evolution and function as exemplary scientists is unassailable. The logic they use to reconcile theism and science is not, apparently. Having one's logic be less than convincing to everybody is hardly an insult.

I have no beef with the NCSE's stance on the matter. If difficulty accepting the arguments of theists puts me in the camp of Dawkins, Coyne, Myers, et al., so be it.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

Dean, Thanks for your comments too. I've known another theistic evolutionist, evolutionary ecologist Michael Rosenzweig, who definitely saw no contradiction between his devout Conservative Judaism and his steadfast devotion to excellent research in evolutionary biology (IMHO one of the most insightful, most brilliant thinkers, in evolutionary biology that I've come across.). Trying to reconcile his religious beliefs with his interest in science never became an issue for me, because we probably spent a lot more time discussing science than faith. However, I have heard elsewhere online from someone commenting at Jason Rosenhouse's blog on this very issue a few months back, and he had noted that a relative of his who had been a graduate student of Mike's, never understood from Mike why he was such a devout Jew:
Dean Wentworth said: John, Thanks for your thoughts. The evidence that professed theists can accept evolution and function as exemplary scientists is unassailable. The logic they use to reconcile theism and science is not, apparently. Having one's logic be less than convincing to everybody is hardly an insult. I have no beef with the NCSE's stance on the matter. If difficulty accepting the arguments of theists puts me in the camp of Dawkins, Coyne, Myers, et al., so be it.
You certainly don't sound as though you're in the New Atheist camp. What Coyne, Dawkins, and Myers have been contending is the following proposition, "That to be a good supporter and practitioner of evolutionary biology, then you must be a good Atheist too", and that is their view, and not necessarily, the scientific community's. In fact, I heard from vertebrate paleobiologist Donald Prothero - whom I would classify as a secular humanist - during a talk he gave her in New York City back in January that a recent poll showed that 56% of evolutionary biologists consider themselves religious. Appreciatively yours, John

Dean Wentworth · 5 June 2009

eric said: Let us say that as a supernaturalist I maintain that phenomena X is the result of the supernatural. And as a methodolical naturalist I maintain that science only considers natural explanations. What is the conclusion of holding those two beliefs? Its: science will never find the correct explanation for X. This is a far cry from being logically forced to believe there is no connection between the natural and the supernatural. Now, people who make the claims in my example are vulnerable to the God of the Gaps problem: when science explains X, the role of God shrinks. But Schafersman is wrong in implying that methodolgical naturalism + supernaturalist necessarily requires a belief that the supernatural is impotent. It doesn’t. It only requires the belief that science will not be able to explain that which is (believed to be) caused by the supernatural.
Your line of reasoning here seems solid enough. It does seem to imply that the only philosophical difference between a Miller and a Dembski is quantitative rather than qualitative (i.e., Miller’s God fills smaller gaps than Dembski’s). Please note, I am comparing philosophical views only, not their actual practice of science, or lack thereof in Dembski’s case.
eric also said: Perhaps he [Schafersman] is introducing some confusion into his own argument with the term “theistic naturalist.” I am not sure from his description whether such a person is supposed to be a “supernaturalist” (i.e. believe in a supernatural explanation for at least one phenomenon) or not.
I had not considered the possibility that one could be a theist without being a supernaturalist. Assuming they exist, aren’t gods by definition supernatural? Unless, of course, they have never taken any action whatsoever in the natural world.

Dean Wentworth · 5 June 2009

eric,

Judging from his paper, I take Schafersman's "theistic naturalist" to be synonymous with "theist who practices methodological naturalism."

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

That's how I read it too:
Dean Wentworth said: eric, Judging from his paper, I take Schafersman's "theistic naturalist" to be synonymous with "theist who practices methodological naturalism."
In plain English, then a "theistic naturalist" would be a religiously devout scientist who, while professing a belief in GOD(s), recognizes that, as a scientist, he (or she) can only examine phenomena that can be studied only via the scientific method. Again, that is in sharp contrast to a Discovery Institute Center for (the Renewal of) Science and Culture "scientist" such as Behe or Dembski who contend that "methodological naturalism" should be overthrown and replaced by something else that accepts a more expansive definition of science (Incidentally this is an issue which Ken Miller recognizes clearly and cites as a major reason as to why he regards Intelligent Design creationism to be a major threat, not just to American scientific education, but indeed, to America's economic future, in his book, "Only A Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America's Soul".).

TomS · 5 June 2009

I don't understand what there is special about evolutionary biology, what makes it more significant than many other areas of science, as far as being in conflict with religion - unless we're talking about YEC-Noah's Flood-type Biblical literalism. ISTM that reproduction, development, genetics, or even atomic theory or the germ theory of disease would have more potential problems. What is there about variations in populations?

Chip Poirot · 5 June 2009

eric said: If I remember my undergrad philosophy of science, the positivists were making a claim about all knowledge. Or what counts as "knowledge." I'm making a much more limited claim about what counts as science. I am perfectly happy, for argument's sake, to concede the point that there may be types of knowledge not captured by the scientific method.
Correct (at least as far as I understand it). A valid knowledge claim by the logical positivists is a scientific claim, and a scientific claim is one that has been sanitized of all subjective biases. So your position would seem to be half positivist: you agree with their definition of science, but seem to posit some other kind of knowledge. But then you deny that that method is "scientific". So I'm curious: where would you draw the line at "Science"? Does it stop with biology? With ethology? Where would you draw the line in Anthropology-at 60,000 B.C.? Can Psychology be scientific?
You are the one that said everything counts as science. I am disagreeing with that claim. I am not attempting to create a definition of knowledge in general.
Again, your ability to misunderstand and misstate simply boggles the mind. I said that science is a way of making claims to knowledge that can be distinguished from other ways of staking claim to knowledge. Science as I use it is more or less co-terminous with the Enlightenment. The demarcation criterion I want is Enlightenment vs. Counter-Enlightenment and good vs. bogus claims to knowledge. It just so happens that the claims to knowledge that have worked out are in essence co-terminous with how we understand the methods of modern science. Just because I can't have decisive tests in economics for example, is no excuse to abandon testability in economics. And if I have reason, experience and testability and theory revision, then I have science-or at least a scientific method. You simply equate scientific knowledge with "precise" knowledge.
I disagree and follow philosophers like Susan Haack and Larry Laudan
That does not surprise me at all. Laudan has published his opinion that McClean vs Arkansas was decided wrongly because creationism counts as science. And he took the same basic approach you do: epsitemologists have never agreed upon any hard boundaries or specific rules as to what counts as science, its pretty much just the systematic and rational study of a(ny) subject, so creationism counts.
I don't know if you are simply ignorant or just plain mendacious. Either way, you seem to have swallowed Creationist quote mining of Laudan hook line and sinker. This sentence is either gravely erroneous or an outright lie. So are you the kind of person who simply spouts ignorance or are you just a plain liar? Laudan has been one of the foremost critics of epistemological relativism. What Laudan said was that Ruse's testimony in McClean posited an unworkable demarcation criterion of science: i.e. Popper's falsification criterion. Laudan said that YEC did in fact make falsifiable predictions and that those predictions had in fact been falsified. What he was arguing was that in actuality, if you apply Popper's criterion, it doesn't do the work we want it to do. And then he went on to say that YEC was Science but that it was Science done very, very badly that reached erroneous conclusions and that therefore teaching YEC served no secular purpose , thus arriving at the same conclusion as the Court in McClean but by a different route. I am in fact arguing a significant point of disagreement with Laudan (though I agree with him in general). My argument is that to say that something is Science done badly, is to call it in effect pseudo-science (bad or false science). And that when we look at the characteristics of good science those characteristics are in essence descended to us from the enlightenment and much of bad science pretends to meet the epistemic criteria of the Enlightenment, but fails: it has the form of Enlightenment but denies the power thereof.
Nope. I'm saying science has rules of evidence that exclude subjective experiences. This is a limitation on what counts as science, not what counts as knowledge.
And I am saying that as early as Pierre Duhem it was shown convincingly that any theory testing depends critically on the acceptance of a whole range of background beliefs. This argument is furthered in 1951 by Quine in "Two Dogmas", though the arguments of Quine and Duhem differ in significant ways. Late 20th century epistemology has tried repeatedly and failed to articulate a foundation for pure objective knowledge and failed. but this does not justify a turn to relativism. If we allow truth to be an absolute predicate we can have degrees of warrant to believe that something is true or false. Then we can ask what kinds of practices allow us to reduce subjective biases and gain warrant for our belief that our theories are true or false.
I may not be able to derive a statistical test of what makes good music or good art, or a valid ethical proposition, but I can still have cognitively rational conversations about them.
I wholeheartedly agree. Where I disagree is when you call such conversations "science."
I didn't say I would call those conversations science or that I would confuse them with the natural sciences. I said that they could be approached in a scientific spirit-seeking the truth through the method of reason and experience.
So how do you propose to study the social sciences and Humanities? Deep breathing exercises?
I agree that you can use rationality & experience to study humanities and thus arrive at valuable conclusions. What I disagree with, if it isn't obvious already, is you calling that science. You seem to be using the word as a synonym for "rational."
No-I am using the word as a synonym for good inquiry, focused on a genuine desire to know truth and systematically applying the method of reason and experience to find truth. Rationality has so many confused uses I won't even attempt to unpack it here.

Brian P · 5 June 2009

@TomS:
There are a few issues here. The first is that the fundamentalists have to start somewhere, and in their minds if they can beat evolution then they can start on geology and astronomy, etc...
Connected to this is the fact that the average person doesn't understand evolutionary theory very well. Add the increasing coverage and tolerance of pseudo-science in the media and it becomes easy to throw doubt on established facts.

Don't forget that evolution includes reproduction, development, genetics and disease resistance. That's kind of the point, evolution is the Rosetta Stone of biology if you will. And it doesn't require the notion of divine intervention, nor does it place us above all other living things, which are common themes in most religions.

Frank J · 5 June 2009

Brian P said: @TomS: There are a few issues here. The first is that the fundamentalists have to start somewhere, and in their minds if they can beat evolution then they can start on geology and astronomy, etc... Connected to this is the fact that the average person doesn't understand evolutionary theory very well. Add the increasing coverage and tolerance of pseudo-science in the media and it becomes easy to throw doubt on established facts. Don't forget that evolution includes reproduction, development, genetics and disease resistance. That's kind of the point, evolution is the Rosetta Stone of biology if you will. And it doesn't require the notion of divine intervention, nor does it place us above all other living things, which are common themes in most religions.
If that's the "TomS" I have been communicating with for years, I think he means "I don't understand" in the sense of being amazed how so many people fall for the singling out of evolution. I too have been scratching my head about that for years, especially since at least half of those who fall for it are not fundamentalists. Nevertheless they never think of asking the right questions. The answer is of course that most people get their "science" from misleading feel-good sound bites that pervade the media and out culture. And the scam artists play them like a Stradivarius.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

Frank J,

No, they may not be fundamentalists, but people have been persuaded by the notion that evolution must still be "only a theory", as stated not only by creos, but also some on the left who are hostile to modern science. But I think too a fundamental reason is that evolution threatens their notions of "security" in the universe, by rendering humanity almost as though it was an "accident" brought forth by natural law, not via the deliberate plan of some Divine Providence.

John

Stanton · 5 June 2009

TomS said: I don't understand what there is special about evolutionary biology, what makes it more significant than many other areas of science, as far as being in conflict with religion - unless we're talking about YEC-Noah's Flood-type Biblical literalism. ISTM that reproduction, development, genetics, or even atomic theory or the germ theory of disease would have more potential problems. What is there about variations in populations?
It's because some people, namely, Creationists, and the people who listen to them, insist that the Bible's description of humans, who are God's special, beloved treasures whom God cursed with death, suffering and lower back pain (and that God allegedly annihilated all terrestrial life once in order to punish a second time), is accurate, and these same people take extreme, unreasonable offense at not only the idea that humans are merely sophisticated apes-cum-superpredators, but also take extreme, unreasonable offense at the idea that physical evidence demonstrates that the Book of Genesis is not an accurate, or even correct description of the history of life on Earth.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

At this point, it might be useful to repost these comments from part of a reply I had posted on an earlier PT thread a month ago:

There are also many moderates and liberals who are Evolution Denialists. Here’s the link to the conversation that physicist Lisa Randall had with the liberal Obama supporter who rejects the evidence for the evolution of Homo sapiens:

http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/coyne09/coyne09_index.html#randall

And here’s some relevant excerpts recounting her conversation:

“By sheer coincidence the day I read this Edge question, a charming young actor sat next to me on my plane to LA and without any prompting answered it for me. He had just returned from the inauguration and was filled with enthusiasm and optimism. Like so many young people today, he wants to leave the world a better place. Prior to his acting career he had studied molecular biology and after graduating coordinated science teaching for three middle schools in an urban school system. He described how along with his acting career he would ultimately like to build on his training to start schools worldwide where students can get good science training.”

“But at this point the conversation rounded a bend. His proposed curriculum would include at least one course on religion. I was surprised—this bright young man had studied biology and in all other respects seemed to have opinions and attitudes grounded in the type of education everyone responding to this question is familiar with. But religion has been a big part of his life and he sensibly said the worst thing that happens in his schools would be that people learn about religion and make their own judgements. But he himself believes in Man descending from Adam as opposed to ascending from apes. I didn’t get how someone trained as a biologist could not believe in evolution. He explained how he could learn the science and understand the logic but that it is simply how Man puts things together. In his mind that’s just not the way it is.”

TomS · 5 June 2009

Frank J said: If that's the "TomS" I have been communicating with for years, I think he means "I don't understand" in the sense of being amazed how so many people fall for the singling out of evolution. I too have been scratching my head about that for years, especially since at least half of those who fall for it are not fundamentalists. Nevertheless they never think of asking the right questions. The answer is of course that most people get their "science" from misleading feel-good sound bites that pervade the media and out culture. And the scam artists play them like a Stradivarius.
Yes, Frank, it's me. And yes, I intend to explicitly exclude the fundamentalists. But I also "don't understand" why so many on the pro-science side single out evolution. It isn't evolution that tells us that our bodies are so very similar to those of chimps and other apes. That is simply an observation which nobody can deny. We can explain how that came about by invoking common descent with modification. Or we can just give up and say that we don't know - or, equivalently, by saying that God or designer(s) did it somehow that's beyond our ken, or that it's just a matter of chance. So, it isn't as if there was anything "important" to argue about. Everybody agrees that we are very similar to chimps and other apes. Everybody agrees that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.

John Kwok · 5 June 2009

TomS,

I hope you recognize that modern evolutionary theory is the single unifying theory for all of biology, whether it is population genetics, evolutionary developmental biology, biochemistry, molecular biology, ecology, biogeography, systematics, functional morphology, anatomy, paleobiology, and even, epidemiology.
That is why those one the pro-science side "single" out evolution. What Dobzhansky wrote back in 1973 is truer now than it ever was before, "Nothing in Biology makes sense except in the light of evolution".

You may find useful this summary of an interview which Science had recently with NCSE's executive director, Dr. Eugenie Scott:

http://ncseweb.org/news/2009/06/eugenie-c-scott-interviewed-science-004823

In that interview Genie stressed that all college biology courses should be taught from an evolutionary perspective from the onset, so that students would understand that evolution is the key underlying set of principles for all of biology. I think once you read that, I hope you realize why those of us who are in favor of valid science only being taught in science classrooms have been stressing the importance of evolution.

Sincerely yours,

John

TomS · 5 June 2009

Did I suggest that there was anything lacking in evolutionary biology? No, rather I pointed out quite emphatically that evolution was an essential part of explanations in biology.

Michael J · 5 June 2009

DavidK said:
raven said: Not going to read first hand anything by Dembski. Not worth spending a valuable resource, lifespan. How does science prove that the Intelligent Designer is a xian god, Yahweh? Why not Zeus, Brahma, Buddha, Allah, or Bob the Rain God? Why is there only one Intelligent Designer. Lots of religions have fleets of gods. Not asking why Dembski names the god he does. I know why. Why does science prove it is Yahweh?
That is precisely the question I directly asked the DI creationist John West after a talk he'd made. He hemmed & hawed & started talking about historical precedences and ... well, he never did/could answer the question. It's a good one to ask any creationist/IDer, even someone like Hovind from a previous PT entry. These are questions that stump them and they'll do everything possible to avoid answering them rather than give some blatantly asinine answer.
The standard answer that I have from creationists on this point is that Christianity is different from all of the other religions and that the resurrection is historical fact blah blah 400 predictions that came true blah blah which brings on a whole other debate

Rilke's granddaughter · 6 June 2009

So, it isn't as if there was anything "important" to argue about. Everybody agrees that we are very similar to chimps and other apes. Everybody agrees that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.
And this is where you are completely wrong - or at least haven't been paying much attention to the religious right. Everybody does NOT agree that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.

TomS · 6 June 2009

Give me an explanation that does not involve evolution.

As I pointed out, saying "it just happened to be that way" does not count as an explanation.

TomS

Frank J · 6 June 2009

Yes, Frank, it’s me. And yes, I intend to explicitly exclude the fundamentalists. But I also “don’t understand” why so many on the pro-science side single out evolution.

— TomS
Good point. I attribute it to the usual "taking the bait." And it frusrtates me to no end that the anti-evolution activists - and even many of their trained parrots - are better at avoiding the bait (e.g. avoiding the "what happened when" questions - if they even get them) than most pro-science people. In fact one "bait" that is increasingly tossed out by anti-evolution activists is the implication that the alternative to evolution is "I don't know." People who don't care how old life is or whether humans share common ancestors with dogs and cats often brag about how little science they know. And it boosts their egos even further if someone suggests (wrongly) that the scientists don't know either.

Stanton · 6 June 2009

TomS said: Give me an explanation that does not involve evolution. As I pointed out, saying "it just happened to be that way" does not count as an explanation. TomS
You mean like how Creationists feel that "GODDIDIT" is so perfectly valid an answer and description that it should be taught, instead of actual, godless, heathen, pagan, evil, Biblical-contradicting science, in science classes, under pain of death by stoning and or burning, followed immediately by eternal damnation? Or how Darwinism (sic) is a rival religion that gets Creationists' collective goat by (allegedly) claiming that humans are a bunch of shiftless, tailless monkeys, instead of reaffirming the fact that humans are God's immaculate treasures, descended from a pair of incompetent ne'erdowells who screwed up the Universe?

John Kwok · 6 June 2009

While your points are excellent, you err in assuming that the problem of evolution denial is confined only to the religious right:
Rilke's granddaughter said:
So, it isn't as if there was anything "important" to argue about. Everybody agrees that we are very similar to chimps and other apes. Everybody agrees that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.
And this is where you are completely wrong - or at least haven't been paying much attention to the religious right. Everybody does NOT agree that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.
It's also an issue with many moderates and even liberals, like the following actor, an Obama supporter, who spoke to Harvard University physicist Lisa Randall on an Los Angeles-bound airplane flight soon after Obama's inauguration: “By sheer coincidence the day I read this Edge question, a charming young actor sat next to me on my plane to LA and without any prompting answered it for me. He had just returned from the inauguration and was filled with enthusiasm and optimism. Like so many young people today, he wants to leave the world a better place. Prior to his acting career he had studied molecular biology and after graduating coordinated science teaching for three middle schools in an urban school system. He described how along with his acting career he would ultimately like to build on his training to start schools worldwide where students can get good science training.” “But at this point the conversation rounded a bend. His proposed curriculum would include at least one course on religion. I was surprised—this bright young man had studied biology and in all other respects seemed to have opinions and attitudes grounded in the type of education everyone responding to this question is familiar with. But religion has been a big part of his life and he sensibly said the worst thing that happens in his schools would be that people learn about religion and make their own judgements. But he himself believes in Man descending from Adam as opposed to ascending from apes. I didn’t get how someone trained as a biologist could not believe in evolution. He explained how he could learn the science and understand the logic but that it is simply how Man puts things together. In his mind that’s just not the way it is.”

John Kwok · 6 June 2009

If you did, apparently not only I missed it:
TomS said: Did I suggest that there was anything lacking in evolutionary biology? No, rather I pointed out quite emphatically that evolution was an essential part of explanations in biology.
Had you stated explicitly that evolution is the underlying, unifying theory or concept or principle that unites all of biology, I wouldn't have felt compelled to have written such a reminder.

raven · 6 June 2009

The standard answer that I have from creationists on this point is that Christianity is different from all of the other religions and that the resurrection is historical fact blah blah 400 predictions that came true blah blah which brings on a whole other debate.
I suppose they want to teach this in kid's science classes as well. All of which is lies and nonsense. If the life, death, and resurrection of jesus was historical fact, the entire world would be xian. It is less than 1/3. All the other religions would have long ago joined xianity. The 400 prophecies from the bible that came true is a common lie among fundies. If you start looking at their list closely, most of them are wrong and many didn't come true. Ironically, AFAIK, that Mohammed lived is indisputable historical fact. So is the life of jesus II (Rev. Sun Myung Moon), L. Ron Hubbard, and Joseph Smith.

TomS · 6 June 2009

For one thing, I tried to exclude the YEC-Noah's Ark-literalists from my point. They do, I concede, have something like an "explanation" for the Grand Canyon (it was carved by Noah's Flood) and a few things like that. But even they don't have an explanation for - to take one example - why humans are primates. With the understanding that an explanation should at least attempt to explain something, not just say "that's the way it happens to be", even if put in the form of "God, in His inscrutable wisdom and His unlimited power decided to make the human body on the same pattern as that of chimps and other apes." Nor do they have an explanation for the vertebrate eye or the bacterial flagellum. After all, God could give us vision without giving us eyes (Archdeacon Paley recognized that).

Creationism - and most especially in its recent forms, such as ID and "teach the strengths and weaknesses of evolution" - has never been interested in explanations.

eric · 6 June 2009

Dean Wentworth said: eric, Judging from his paper, I take Schafersman's "theistic naturalist" to be synonymous with "theist who practices methodological naturalism."
Dean and John, In that case I guess my reply to Schafersman would be: such a person is not required to believe the supernatural is impotent. Their beliefs merely require them to look for natural explanations when doing science.

John Kwok · 6 June 2009

Which is exactly what religiously devout biologists such as Francisco J. Ayala, Michael L. Rosenzweig and Kenneth R. Miller have been saying for years:
eric said:
Dean Wentworth said: eric, Judging from his paper, I take Schafersman's "theistic naturalist" to be synonymous with "theist who practices methodological naturalism."
Dean and John, In that case I guess my reply to Schafersman would be: such a person is not required to believe the supernatural is impotent. Their beliefs merely require them to look for natural explanations when doing science.

Henry J · 6 June 2009

They do, I concede, have something like an “explanation” for the Grand Canyon (it was carved by Noah’s Flood) and a few things like that.

Except that that "explanation" implies that there should be several very similar such canyons scattered around the world that all formed at about the same time. I would add that if formed by a Flood at least some of them wouldn't be along the course of a river, but the YEC's would probably say that the Flood also caused the river courses to be what they are. Oh well. Henry

eric · 6 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: So I'm curious: where would you draw the line at "Science"? Does it stop with biology? With ethology? Where would you draw the line in Anthropology-at 60,000 B.C.? Can Psychology be scientific?
I'd say it involves objective evidence. And rather than try and come up with a philosophical definition of objective where philosophers have failed for hundreds of years, I'll fall back on the example I gave earlier. If you can describe how to measure it, and hundreds of people following your procedure get the same result, its probably objective. When people following the exact same procedure come up with different measurements, its probably subjective.
You are the one that said everything counts as science. I am disagreeing with that claim. I am not attempting to create a definition of knowledge in general.
Again, your ability to misunderstand and misstate simply boggles the mind.
Chip, you said this: "But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science." Then you went on to explain how you think science is an approach to knowledge. So, lets cut to the chase. If nothing lies outside the realm of science, does creationism lie outside the realm of science? ***** Then when I say this: "Laudan has published his opinion that McClean vs Arkansas was decided wrongly because creationism counts as science." You hurl insults, and end with "And then he [Laudan] went on to say that YEC was Science but that it was Science done very, very badly." So we agree, but you insult me. Not only that, but Laudan has also said "Once the dust has settled, however, the trial in general and Judge William R. Overton's ruling in particular may come back to haunt us; for, although the verdict itself is probably to be commended, it was reached for all the wrong reasons and by a chain of arugument which is hopelessly suspect." Lets put aside the question of whether one reads this quote to say that Laudan supports mainstream science, or whether one thinks this is a classic example of the rhetorical strategy of damning one's opponent with faint praise (I suspect I disagree with you about this). As far as I can tell, you are basically insulting me for being correct when I said that Laudan thinks the case was decided wrongly, because he does.
My argument is that to say that something is Science done badly, is to call it in effect pseudo-science (bad or false science).
I disagree. To me there is a difference in that science done badly generally accepts the cumulative nature of science and prior observations. Bad science is a result of a poorly designed experiment. Pseudoscience goes beyond that; it is a result of refusing to accept documented scientific observations that run contrary to the result the pseudoscientist believes to be true. The initial Pons and Fleishman experiment was science done badly. Blondlot's N-rays are an example of science done badly. When a creationist claims that the decomposition of the earth's magnetic field proves its only 6000 years old, they are practicing pseudoscience, because they are ignoring the cumulative evidence of field measurements in favor of one single study performed in what, the 1950's.
I didn't say I would call those conversations science
Okay, what you said was: "But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science." So, do conversations of musical quality lie outside of science?
No-I am using the word [science] as a synonym for good inquiry
I think we are going to have to agree to disagree about that. Go into any laboratory in the world and actually watch what they do, it involves more than "good inquiry." It also includes a focus on objective quantities and variables. In an olympic ice skating event there is a genuine desire to know the truth about who is the best. There is a systematic method of applying reason and experience to find that out: the judges have rules that they follow; certain manouvers count for certain points; there are metrics for deducting points. But one's score in an ice skating competition is not the same as the measured half-life of U-235. They are qualitatively different. Judging ice skating is not science, because the quality of a skating routine is ultimately a subjective quantity. If, according to your rules, 'nothing really lies outside of science,' then the judging of an ice skating competition is science. Creationism is science. Intelligent design is science. I disagree with you about that.

Dean Wentworth · 6 June 2009

eric said: ...In that case I guess my reply to Schafersman would be: such a person is not required to believe the supernatural is impotent. Their beliefs merely require them to look for natural explanations when doing science.
eric, That suggests to me the following: Faced with a tough nut to crack, the theistic methodological naturalist thinks, "I believe phenomenon X could be the result of supernatural intervention but I'm going to search for a natural explanation anyway." Faced with the same tough nut, the ontological naturalist thinks, "I don't believe phenomenon X could be the result of supernatural intervention so I'm going to search for a natural explanation." From a functional standpoint, there isn't a scrap of difference between them. Both know from the outset that their search for a natural explanation may prove fruitless, so there's no reason to question the drive of either one. Nevertheless, I find one of those lines of reasoning more straightforwardly logical than the other.

Chip Poirot · 6 June 2009

eric said: Chip Poirot said: So I'm curious: where would you draw the line at "Science"? Does it stop with biology? With ethology? Where would you draw the line in Anthropology-at 60,000 B.C.? Can Psychology be scientific?
Eric said: I'd say it involves objective evidence. And rather than try and come up with a philosophical definition of objective where philosophers have failed for hundreds of years, I'll fall back on the example I gave earlier. If you can describe how to measure it, and hundreds of people following your procedure get the same result, its probably objective. When people following the exact same procedure come up with different measurements, its probably subjective.
In what area of inquiry can you not have objective evidence as you define it-if objective means that other people can replicate your evidence. You can replicate studies in sociology, economics, psychology and even literature. And yet again, even in the hardest of sciences there is still the remnant of subjectivity because we must interpret results and we must rely on our instruments and on and on and on. So "subjectivity" and "objectivity" cannot be defended as radical duals but as degrees of continuity.
Chip, you said this: "But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science." Then you went on to explain how you think science is an approach to knowledge. So, lets cut to the chase. If nothing lies outside the realm of science, does creationism lie outside the realm of science?
So effectively, you are quote mining me to make it appear that I am a YEC supporter or apologist. So your tactics are no different from the tactics of YEC'ers and ID'ers who like to find some nitpick point where some scientist like say Stephen J. Gould criticizes Dawkins and try to use that as evidence that evolution is a theory in crisis. Let's go back to the context in which I said that and we can see what I clearly meant. The context was someone else said that many areas of his life lie outside of science for him. What I was criticizing was the view that some areas of inquiry-be it sitting on a faculty committee or marriage counseling should be exempt from scientific scrutiny. After extensive discussion I had clarified the context and meaning several times and indicated that my point was that I am not willing to draw a line of demarcation and say "when I write an academic paper I will do it scientifically" but when I sit on a committee I'll engage in deep breathing exercises to arrive at a decision. One might engage in deep breathing exercises during a committee meeting to reduce stress-but not as a decision making tool. So committee work and marriage counseling both need to be subject to good scientific methods. Science does not mean "error free" or "bias free". It means finding ways to reduce error and bias over time. But since Science is a human endeavor, there is no pure neutral foundation. *****
Then when I say this: "Laudan has published his opinion that McClean vs Arkansas was decided wrongly because creationism counts as science." You hurl insults, and end with "And then he [Laudan] went on to say that YEC was Science but that it was Science done very, very badly." So we agree, but you insult me.
No-we didn't agree. You quote mined and smeared Larry Laudan. Now, when corrected, you continue the smear and the quote mine. YEC'ers like to quote mine Larry Laudan as well. You said that Laudan had said that McClean was decided wrongly. And now, you directly quote Laudan where he says MClean was decided correctly, but on the wrong basis.
Not only that, but Laudan has also said "Once the dust has settled, however, the trial in general and Judge William R. Overton's ruling in particular may come back to haunt us; for, although the verdict itself is probably to be commended , (my emphasis) it was reached for all the wrong reasons and by a chain of arugument which is hopelessly suspect."
how do you turn someone saying the verdict is to be commended into someone saying the case was wrongly decided? That's either laziness, a lack of reading comprehension or outright dishonesty. And you repeat this same tactic with me over and over and over again. First you quote me out of context, try to make me sound like I am someone and something I am not. Then when I point out to you how **most** (not some-but in fact most) philosophers of biology-including Elliott Sober, Michael Ruse, Ernst Mayr and on and on have acknowledged the important role of framing and background belief, you refuse to accept the conclusion. Ruse knows very well that Popper provides an untenable demarcation criterion. Yet he relied on Popper in his testimony. Laudan criticized the Court's reliance on Popper.
Lets put aside the question of whether one reads this quote to say that Laudan supports mainstream science, or whether one thinks this is a classic example of the rhetorical strategy of damning one's opponent with faint praise (I suspect I disagree with you about this). As far as I can tell, you are basically insulting me for being correct when I said that Laudan thinks the case was decided wrongly, because he does.
More smear by innuendo. Because Larry Laudan does not accept your view of science, which is apparently held in near total ignorance of 20th century epistemological debates, you insinuate that he does not support "mainstream science" when his life work has been directed against relativist abuses of 20th century epistemology and Creationist quote mining. And again, it is very clear from your own quote that Laudan **did not** say the Court had decided wrongly. He said it had reached a good decision on a bad basis-and that that bad basis could somewhere down the road hurt us in areas outside this case.
My argument is that to say that something is Science done badly, is to call it in effect pseudo-science (bad or false science).
I disagree. To me there is a difference in that science done badly generally accepts the cumulative nature of science and prior observations. Bad science is a result of a poorly designed experiment. Pseudoscience goes beyond that; it is a result of refusing to accept documented scientific observations that run contrary to the result the pseudoscientist believes to be true. The initial Pons and Fleishman experiment was science done badly. Blondlot's N-rays are an example of science done badly. When a creationist claims that the decomposition of the earth's magnetic field proves its only 6000 years old, they are practicing pseudoscience, because they are ignoring the cumulative evidence of field measurements in favor of one single study performed in what, the 1950's.
So again, it is a continuum. I will however rephrase to be more precise: pseudo-science is science done consistently badly (not one single error made in good faith). But again, you seem to deliberately ignore the context and quote me out of context.
I didn't say I would call those conversations science
Okay, what you said was: "But if science is an approach to knowledge, then strictly speaking, **nothing** really lies outside of science."
Right, there is no area of inquiry I will put out of the application of scientific method. As I said over and over and over again, there are relevant common sense distinctions to be made between physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, economics, etc. but I'm not going to go to a marriage counselor who says she believes in repressed memory, feminist viewpoint theory, that all women are victims and that she doesn't have to use good scientific methodology in research. I'm not going to accept studies as valid in psychology that are badly done, or accept counseling practices that rely on badly done psychology. If I have to go to a psychologist I'm going to go to one who takes the time and effort to ground their practice in good scientific method. People like Ken Miller have done a lot of good and I respect him individually. But Miller seems to think that he can fly to mysticism and separate his science from his religion. I think NOMA is a copout. So, do conversations of musical quality lie outside of science?
No-I am using the word [science] as a synonym for good inquiry
I think we are going to have to agree to disagree about that. Go into any laboratory in the world and actually watch what they do, it involves more than "good inquiry." It also includes a focus on objective quantities and variables.
Any good inquiry tries to focus on objective quantities and variables. There are cases when the subject matter means that we arrive a less precise conclusion, but there are always degrees of warrant.
In an olympic ice skating event there is a genuine desire to know the truth about who is the best. There is a systematic method of applying reason and experience to find that out: the judges have rules that they follow; certain manouvers count for certain points; there are metrics for deducting points. But one's score in an ice skating competition is not the same as the measured half-life of U-235. They are qualitatively different. Judging ice skating is not science, because the quality of a skating routine is ultimately a subjective quantity.
Nope-it is just harder to decide. Granted, judges may be incompetent or on the take, or find it difficult to separate their own biases. And like the natural sciences, they have background assumptions and standards. So judging is an area that is prone to being done badly because it is particularly subject to political pressure. But when we think a judge yields to political pressure, we call it bad judging.
If, according to your rules, 'nothing really lies outside of science,' then the judging of an ice skating competition is science. Creationism is science. Intelligent design is science. I disagree with you about that.
Well, you smear me and insinuate and put words in my mouth and then wonder why I insult you back. The mystery is why I bother. I am saying that there was a time when Creationism and Natural Theology were Science. Btw, this point is acknowledged by many, including Michael Ruse and Ernsty Mayr. However, and let me be clear-hence the bold: the definition of Science has changed. We reject Creationism and Natural Theology as psuedo-science today. But why? My argument is that they should be rejected a posteriori They were subjected to rigorous testing and counterargumentation and failed. The focus on eliminating "magic" or "mystery" as valid scientific explanations and instead focusing on causal mechanisms descends to us from the Enlightenment. My position is that the natural sciences are critical thinking narrowly applied. The Humanities should be critical thinking broadly applied, with the social sciences in the middle. Science is IMO in essence co-terminous with critical thinking. The demarcation is between inquiry conducted poorly and inquiry conducted well. Now if you continue to twist this into portraying me as a YEC or ID supporter or apologist, then you are no longer engaging in error and misinterpretation, but in outright smear. I respond to you hostilely because you and many others continually quote me out of context and misrepresent me.

Chip Poirot · 6 June 2009

If people are going to smear Larry Laudan on this forum and follow the YEC example of quote mining him, then they ought to at least take the time to read the PT archives.

http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/06/laudan-demarcat.html#more

eric · 6 June 2009

So effectively, you are quote mining me to make it appear that I am a YEC supporter or apologist.
Okay, I'll try again. I don't think you are a YEC apologist. You have said pretty clearly that you think its bad science or pseudo-science. But you have also said that science is the same as good inquiry. I don't see how you can dismiss creationism as unscientific under your definition without using a No Good Scotsman argument (i.e. define creationism as not good inquiry). There are many sincere, thoughtful, and honest christian apologists that use their reason to attempt to make sense of the bible. I do not think what they are doing is science simply because their research applies reason, and is honest scholarship.
What I was criticizing was the view that some areas of inquiry-be it sitting on a faculty committee or marriage counseling should be exempt from scientific scrutiny.
Well you keep accusing me of quote mining, so rather than attribute any opinion to you whatsoever I will retreat to asking questions about what you mean, so that I don't unfairly characterize you. I claim there is an invisible, immaterial, undetectable dragon in my garage. Does he lie inside the realm of scientific scrutiny? Can one study him scientifically if I insist that the dragon is, by his very nature, undetectable by the instruments of science?
how do you turn someone saying the verdict is to be commended into someone saying the case was wrongly decided? That's either laziness, a lack of reading comprehension or outright dishonesty.
Ah, no, but I will admit to miscommunication. When I said [Laudan thinks it was] decided wrongly, I meant [Laudan thinks the] decision-making process was wrong. Not the result. I HOPE that we can agree that Laudan's opinion is that Overton did not use solid argument in his ruling.
Right, there is no area of inquiry I will put out of the application of scientific method.
Okay, please describe to me how you would apply the scientific method to the question "who is the most beautiful woman on earth" or the proposition that "Led Zeppelin rocks."
My position is that the natural sciences are critical thinking narrowly applied. The Humanities should be critical thinking broadly applied, with the social sciences in the middle. Science is IMO in essence co-terminous with critical thinking.
Well, as I said, I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I can think critically about whether rape deserves a death sentence. I can think critically about whether the higher risk of riding a motorcycle (vs a car) is worth the enjoyment I may get. I can think critically as to whether Led Zeppelin or the Rolling Stones were a greater musical influence on rock and roll. I can think critically about whether a slate blue or navy blue shirt best shows off my eyes. But I consider none of these things to be science.
I respond to you hostilely because you and many others continually quote me out of context and misrepresent me.
Just to be clear then. I don't think you're a YECer. But I do think that you have an overbroad definition of science that would permit creationism to be taught as science. The courts have stated that nothing prevents a school district from teaching bad science. As far as I can tell (and if I'm wrong I don't mean this as a smear or a quote mine), that is what you seem to be saying creationism is; bad science.

Rilke's granddaughter · 6 June 2009

TomS said: Give me an explanation that does not involve evolution. As I pointed out, saying "it just happened to be that way" does not count as an explanation. TomS
"God did it like it says in the Bible." Seriously, dude - you need to get out more. Creationists have LOTS of explanations that don't involve evolution; to claim that no such explanation exists is just dopey.

Rilke's granddaughter · 6 June 2009

Well, yes - there are nutters on both sides of the aisle. But the most prominent anti-evolution folks are to be found on the religious right. In fact, speakin' psychologically, it's hard to understand areligious counter-explanations that don't involve a religious substitute philosophy.
John Kwok said: While your points are excellent, you err in assuming that the problem of evolution denial is confined only to the religious right:
Rilke's granddaughter said:
So, it isn't as if there was anything "important" to argue about. Everybody agrees that we are very similar to chimps and other apes. Everybody agrees that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.
And this is where you are completely wrong - or at least haven't been paying much attention to the religious right. Everybody does NOT agree that the only explanation that is at all satisfying involves evolution.
It's also an issue with many moderates and even liberals, like the following actor, an Obama supporter, who spoke to Harvard University physicist Lisa Randall on an Los Angeles-bound airplane flight soon after Obama's inauguration: “By sheer coincidence the day I read this Edge question, a charming young actor sat next to me on my plane to LA and without any prompting answered it for me. He had just returned from the inauguration and was filled with enthusiasm and optimism. Like so many young people today, he wants to leave the world a better place. Prior to his acting career he had studied molecular biology and after graduating coordinated science teaching for three middle schools in an urban school system. He described how along with his acting career he would ultimately like to build on his training to start schools worldwide where students can get good science training.” “But at this point the conversation rounded a bend. His proposed curriculum would include at least one course on religion. I was surprised—this bright young man had studied biology and in all other respects seemed to have opinions and attitudes grounded in the type of education everyone responding to this question is familiar with. But religion has been a big part of his life and he sensibly said the worst thing that happens in his schools would be that people learn about religion and make their own judgements. But he himself believes in Man descending from Adam as opposed to ascending from apes. I didn’t get how someone trained as a biologist could not believe in evolution. He explained how he could learn the science and understand the logic but that it is simply how Man puts things together. In his mind that’s just not the way it is.”

Chip Poirot · 6 June 2009

Eric,

Thank you for clarifying. I think the distance between us is less than we may think.

I think that by contemporary standards of good scientific inquiry, Creationism and/or ID are pseudo-science or science badly done-and done consistently badly.

In applying the Lemon Test to whether or not YEC, ID, or inaccurate criticisms of contemporary Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory may be taught as science in U.S. K-12 curricula, I do not think that it serves a secular purpose. The Lemon Test allows one to test for motivation. And the motivation is clear: people want to introduce psuedo-science because it contradicts religious beliefs.

As a very, very, abstract proposition, I don't think there is a Constitutional test to teaching psuedo-science or bad science. But in this instance, there is.

I agree that there are some areas of human existence that deal in issues of meaning and valuation to a degree that make empirical confirmation or disconfirmation extremely difficult, if not impossible.

I do think that there are cognitively rational criteria by which to judge aesthetic arguments. For example, I think C.S. Lewis pulls a huge bait and switch in most of his books. Philosophically, I'm more disposed to the Golden Compass. But I think on the whole, C.S. Lewis is the better writer.

The sentence "Led Zeppelin Rocks" is in fact subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, if we agree on the definition of "rocks". I think that "rocks" has a pretty clear meaning to speakers of the English language who live in the late 20th century U.S. So yes, the sentence "Led Zeppelin rocks" is true as is the sentence, "Abba was a mediocre band that did some mildly entertaining pop schlock" or the sentence" "Abba was a mediocre band with some occasionally interesting harmonies."

eric · 7 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: I think that by contemporary standards of good scientific inquiry, Creationism and/or ID are pseudo-science or science badly done-and done consistently badly. In applying the Lemon Test to whether or not YEC, ID, or inaccurate criticisms of contemporary Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory may be taught as science in U.S. K-12 curricula, I do not think that it serves a secular purpose. The Lemon Test allows one to test for motivation. And the motivation is clear: people want to introduce psuedo-science because it contradicts religious beliefs.
Here is the problem: science classes discuss old, bad science all the time. Doing so certainly does have a secular purpose. How many of us remember the plum putting model of the atom from HS chemistry class? And Lemon only requires an activity have a secular purpose. If a teacher has a religious purpose in introducing ID but can show there's a secular reason for doing so, it passes. So I think your definition of science allows creationism to be taught. And as I said, the only way out of this result is to invoke a No True Scotsman argument, to state that Creationism just doesn't count even if it fulfills the critical thinking requirement. In my opinion this is intellectually unappealing, and legally weak.
The sentence "Led Zeppelin Rocks" is in fact subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, if we agree on the definition of "rocks". I think that "rocks" has a pretty clear meaning to speakers of the English language who live in the late 20th century U.S. So yes, the sentence "Led Zeppelin rocks" is true as is the sentence, "Abba was a mediocre band that did some mildly entertaining pop schlock" or the sentence" "Abba was a mediocre band with some occasionally interesting harmonies."
Everyone can agree on the meaning of "rocks" and yet disagree significantly over whether one band or another does so. If everyone agrees on the meaning of "meter," you will find no major disagreement about my height. And that is the difference. It comes back to reproducibility. Scientists want each other's experiments to be reproducible. If you publish an experiment and tell me how to do it, I should get the same result. If I don't, that's a signal that one of us did something wrong. But this type of reproducibility is simply not the case for many other fields. Lawyers spend a lot of time and effort on jury selection because not every group of 12 people will arrive at the same conclusion from the same facts. When they don't, the law does not necessarily consider the difference to be an "error." We elect our politicians because if you give rational, mature, intelligent people the exact same facts about a situation, they can legitimately come to different conclusions about the best public policy. X tons of CO2 will increase the temperature of the earth by Y degrees. It is worth Z dollars to prevent this increase. Get 5 honest, smart, critically thinking people in a room, give them all the exact same numbers for X and Y, and they will arrive at dramatically different values for Z. That is why law is not scientific. That is why public policy is not scientific. Or art, or musical taste, or any number of important, worthy and noble subjects. Science can inform them. It may clarify them by getting everyone to agree on some premises and ground truth, but it cannot solve them. (IMO) They are not science.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

eric said: Chip Poirot said: I think that by contemporary standards of good scientific inquiry, Creationism and/or ID are pseudo-science or science badly done-and done consistently badly. In applying the Lemon Test to whether or not YEC, ID, or inaccurate criticisms of contemporary Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory may be taught as science in U.S. K-12 curricula, I do not think that it serves a secular purpose. The Lemon Test allows one to test for motivation. And the motivation is clear: people want to introduce psuedo-science because it contradicts religious beliefs.
I think you are wrong about the Lemon Test (I'll check on this). My understanding of the Lemon Test is that if there is a religious motive to what is being done, it is Constitutionally impermissable, even if you can articulate a secular purpose. But regardless, it certainly would be appropriate in the context of a discussion on the history of evolutionary thought to discuss how much of The Origin of Species and Descent of Man are directed at countering the prevailing natural theology interpretations of Darwin's era.
Eric Said: Here is the problem: science classes discuss old, bad science all the time. Doing so certainly does have a secular purpose. How many of us remember the plum putting model of the atom from HS chemistry class? And Lemon only requires an activity have a secular purpose. If a teacher has a religious purpose in introducing ID but can show there's a secular reason for doing so, it passes. So I think your definition of science allows creationism to be taught. And as I said, the only way out of this result is to invoke a No True Scotsman argument, to state that Creationism just doesn't count even if it fulfills the critical thinking requirement. In my opinion this is intellectually unappealing, and legally weak.
See what I said above about the Lemon Test. But you are correct, if there is really a valid secular purpose to introducing discredited science, it can be done. But let's be clear about my definition of science, Ruse's definition in McClean , and the current generally accepted definition of science used by most courts. My definition of science is that science is a method for reducing subjective error and bias. Science searches for causal mechanisms by systematically applying reason and experience. My definition of science defines at least methodological naturalism as central to science but I do so a posteriori rather than a priori . Science IMO uses an evolutionary method-by systematically applying the method of reason and experience, science increases the stock of warranted claims to knowledge and rules other claims to warranted knowledge out. Replicability, quantification, better measurement are all important to science. But our ability to do these things is continuously reflected over many areas of inquiry. Some areas of inquiry permit more precise, exact claims and other areas due to the nature of the evidence involved lead to less exact, precise claims. In addition to naturalism, "Testability" is important to my view of science but I agree with many modern secular philosophers that there is no deductive logic of falsification . Theories have to be tested over the very long haul and there are often many obstacles to decisive tests. But this is never an excuse to disregard evidence. It simply means there is no escape from the problem of induction. Science also has to rely on background knowledge and tacit knowledge. In addition, there are specific sciences. Biology, Physics and other natural sciences often lead to very precise claims. Economics, Cultural Anthropology and Sociology less so. But the social sciences can and still should be done scientifically. I suppose in my initial and subsequent phrasing I should have been more precise in my wording. I agree there are some areas of inquiry that lie outside the domain of science, but no areas of inquiry where we are justified in resorting to dogmatic a priori assertions, claims to revealed truth, or suspending our critical faculties. I also insist that knowledge should be continuous-our knowledge in the Humanities should not be inconsistent with our knowledge in the natural sciences. The Humanities does have to address subjective meaning, but this does not justify flights to relativism in the Humanities. My definition of Science or of scientific method can be clearly distinguished from many other approaches to knowledge: e.g. a priori claims to truth, claims to revealed truth, etc. I call Creationism and ID pseudo-sciences because they study the natural world and **claim** to apply the above method(s), but they do so in a way that is effectively a sham. In contrast, the natural theologians made many errors, but for their time and place, were actually genuine scientists and in fact, moved science forward. Now, contrast my definition with Ruse's definition which is actually Popper's definition. According to Popper, a theory is scientific just in the case that it can make a falsifiable prediction. In several places Popper seems to mix this criterion up with the attitude of the specific epistemic community. So it's not even always clear whether Popper's criterion demarcates theories, epistemic communities, or both. For example, biogeography is a theory that makes predictions. Let's say that in my studies I develop a theory from bio-geography that predicts no black swans will exist (the sentence "no black swans exist" is not a theory sentence). If I find a black swan, then the observation sentence "Lo a black swan" contradicts my theory/hypothesis and I must immediately reject my whole theory and start over again. If I don't find a black swan then the most I can say is my theory might be closer to the truth. It has the property of verisimilitude. But Science for Popper has nothing to do with truth or falsehood. Marxism, Freudianism, Young Earth Creationism can all be used to generate predictions. In fact, YEC makes many predictions. So by Popperian criteria YEC should in fact be counted as science. In fact, many sentences that are normally considered not to be science such as "there are green men on Mars" is scientific, because it can be tested. What Popper really demarcates IMO is the **attitude** of epistemic communities committed to genuine inquiry from the epistemic **attitude** of communities of true believers. But his reliance on falsification (which is very different from testability) makes it inapplicable and leads to paradoxical results. Ruse knew this and knows this when he relied on Popper to articulate his demarcation criterion in McClean . Trying to define "Science" is an important legal question and not just because of issues about K-12 science curricula. Courts rely on definitions of "Science" in many areas-including the social sciences-to make many decisions about what counts as expert testimony and how to make sentencing decisions. The Courts have consistently come up with shifting criteria-the current one now relies primarily on peer review-which is at least an improvement over Popper. But "peer review" raises problems of its own. I have no firm understanding btw, what your definition of Science is. But it seems to me you want to demarcate subject areas whereas I want to demarcate epistemic practices.
The sentence "Led Zeppelin Rocks" is in fact subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, if we agree on the definition of "rocks". I think that "rocks" has a pretty clear meaning to speakers of the English language who live in the late 20th century U.S. So yes, the sentence "Led Zeppelin rocks" is true as is the sentence, "Abba was a mediocre band that did some mildly entertaining pop schlock" or the sentence" "Abba was a mediocre band with some occasionally interesting harmonies."
Everyone can agree on the meaning of "rocks" and yet disagree significantly over whether one band or another does so. If everyone agrees on the meaning of "meter," you will find no major disagreement about my height. And that is the difference. It comes back to reproducibility. Scientists want each other's experiments to be reproducible. If you publish an experiment and tell me how to do it, I should get the same result. If I don't, that's a signal that one of us did something wrong. But this type of reproducibility is simply not the case for many other fields. Lawyers spend a lot of time and effort on jury selection because not every group of 12 people will arrive at the same conclusion from the same facts. When they don't, the law does not necessarily consider the difference to be an "error." We elect our politicians because if you give rational, mature, intelligent people the exact same facts about a situation, they can legitimately come to different conclusions about the best public policy. X tons of CO2 will increase the temperature of the earth by Y degrees. It is worth Z dollars to prevent this increase. Get 5 honest, smart, critically thinking people in a room, give them all the exact same numbers for X and Y, and they will arrive at dramatically different values for Z. That is why law is not scientific. That is why public policy is not scientific. Or art, or musical taste, or any number of important, worthy and noble subjects. Science can inform them. It may clarify them by getting everyone to agree on some premises and ground truth, but it cannot solve them. (IMO) They are not science.
I think on balance you underestimate the difficulties raised by induction and the role of background beliefs in testing propositions in the natural sciences and yet underestimate the potential for consistent application of scientific method to reduce subjectivity in other areas. Be that as it may, some of our differences may be purely semantic. As I have said over and over and over again: we can certainly distinguish between biology and stamp collecting. But there isn't any reason why a stamp collector could not use methods similar to those of biologists in at least some respects to improve the practice of stamp collecting. And let's go back to the original claim and context of discussion. What I am really aiming at is NOMA. Whether or not it was the original intention of the person who first made the statement "many areas of my life are outside of science" to justify NOMA, in my experience exactly that kind of reasoning is often used to justify NOMA. It is also used to justify similar flights to appeals to emotion, a priorism, revelation, dogmatism and many other areas. If it makes you feel better, I will amend my statement to say that no areas should be exempt from the scrutiny of scientific methods. Finally, I might note that it seems to me that at least some people on PT (and as far as I can judge you appear to be one of them) want to subordinate the entire discussion to "how do we keep YEC and ID out of public schools." In contrast, I am starting by asking the question "what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge". I too think that contemporary YEC and ID should be kept out of the K-12 Science classrooms, though under some limited circumstances I could see discussions of natural theology being appropriate when the curriculum addresses the history of science. But I see this as an a posteriori conclusion, not an a priori conclusion. And I'm not willing to subordinate everything else to this one issue.

eric · 7 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: As I have said over and over and over again: we can certainly distinguish between biology and stamp collecting. But there isn't any reason why a stamp collector could not use methods similar to those of biologists in at least some respects to improve the practice of stamp collecting.
I don't disagree, but I would not then call stamp collecting "science." A stamp collector could, for instance, publish a paper that reviews the last auction price of similar stamps, how many currently exist, trend data in the value of stamps, and then conclude that the stamp in question is worth $X. Peers could review it and find his reasoning good. It could be published in a stamp collecting journal. But...a different collector can simply say "I disagree, its not worth that to me" and guess what? He's got a legitimate point. Compare this to mainstream science. You can't simply say "I disagree, to me eric isn't 5'8" tall" or "I disagree, to me the half-life of U-235 is 10 seconds" and have that opinion be considered legitimate.
Finally, I might note that it seems to me that at least some people on PT (and as far as I can judge you appear to be one of them) want to subordinate the entire discussion to "how do we keep YEC and ID out of public schools." In contrast, I am starting by asking the question "what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge".
That is an interesting question, but creationists don't want to claim that creationism is a valid claim to knowledge. They want to claim its science. Thus it should not be a surprise to you that people here are somewhat focused on what gets classified as science, not what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge.
I too think that contemporary YEC and ID should be kept out of the K-12 Science classrooms, though under some limited circumstances I could see discussions of natural theology being appropriate when the curriculum addresses the history of science. But I see this as an a posteriori conclusion, not an a priori conclusion.
It is only a posteriori under your broader definition of science. If science is limited to the study of objective, empirical, and reproducible phenomena, that problem disappears. Because creationist dogma is not reproducible but it can include critical analysis. You have, in some respects, created the problem you are trying to solve.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

eric said: A stamp collector could, for instance, publish a paper that reviews the last auction price of similar stamps, how many currently exist, trend data in the value of stamps, and then conclude that the stamp in question is worth $X. Peers could review it and find his reasoning good. It could be published in a stamp collecting journal. But...a different collector can simply say "I disagree, its not worth that to me" and guess what? He's got a legitimate point. Compare this to mainstream science. You can't simply say "I disagree, to me eric isn't 5'8" tall" or "I disagree, to me the half-life of U-235 is 10 seconds" and have that opinion be considered legitimate.
Well, this is a good paragraph to nicely illustrate the kinds of questions you are begging and where you misunderstand some basic issues. Sentences like "the half life of uranium is X years" "Eric is not 5'8" tall" "the estimated fair market value of commodity X on date Y is $Z" are all observation sentences. The stamp collector saying "that stamp is not worth X to me" does not falsify the published article. All the stamp collector in this instance is saying is that as an individual market participant, he assigns a different valuation. Any market valuation (well, OK most market valuations)that attempt to estimate market value rely on statistical estimation techniques and market data. So one would expect not only for individual collectors to vary, one would even expect individual collectors to be outliers. The stamp collector in this case could not say "the conclusions of this article are wrong." The stamp collector could go out and collect additional data, evaluate the assumptions and parameters used in estimating market values and so on and either publish an article supporting the original article or undermining the original article. The stamp collector might say "I recognize the fair market value of this stamp but I don't like it"-in which case the stamp collector is making a statement about the aesthetics of stamps. If this guy is a dealer, he is free to disregard the market value, but objectively, he will lose business. I don't see how this differs for example from what might get published in a biology journal about whether or not population Y is in Hardy Castle Weinberg equilibrium. In fact, natural and physical scientists dispute all the time. Your example of uranium depends on agreed upon background knowledge. It just happens that after many, many, many experiments, no one reasonably now disputes half lifes of elements. But people do reasonably dispute the dates of fossils in paleology, physical anthropology and archaeology. Your definition of Science pretty much limits us to observation sentences. But what is interesting about Science is the bigger picture: the theory sentences and the ontological sentences. And then matters get dicier because trying to distinguish an observation sentence from an ontological proposition becomes very, very tricky. Practically, I think you can distinguish levels of generality. Metaphysically, you can't really distinguish observation sentences from ontologies. The sentence "luminiferous ether does not exist" is a consequence of many, many observations and theoretical progress, but it is also an ontological statement-and a very important one.
Finally, I might note that it seems to me that at least some people on PT (and as far as I can judge you appear to be one of them) want to subordinate the entire discussion to "how do we keep YEC and ID out of public schools." In contrast, I am starting by asking the question "what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge".
eric said: That is an interesting question, but creationists don't want to claim that creationism is a valid claim to knowledge. They want to claim its science. Thus it should not be a surprise to you that people here are somewhat focused on what gets classified as science, not what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge.
They want to claim it is both. If Creationists said "it is written in the Bible that the earth is 10,000 yo m/l and I believe the earth is 10,000 yo m/l because it is written in the Bible. I believe the Bible is true because I believe in the revelation of God" then that statement is outside of science as I define it because it rests on revelation rather than reason and experience. What Creationists want to say is "by applying the method of reason and experience, I can independently justify the truth of the Bible. Therefore, Science does not undermine the Bible, but supports it. So I am justified by Science in believing the earth is 10,000 yo m/l." The latter statement is pseudo-science. It just so happens that their motivation is religious. They want to jerry rig science so it does not undermine religion. Now, what I am saying is at least two things: 1. The method of reason and experience is the best way to make truth claims; 2. When you apply the method of reason and experience, it becomes cognitively irrational to believe in a literal interpretation of Genesis. NOMA advocates would say OK, but this doesn't affect my justification for believing in original sin and the resurrection of Jesus. And that is where I disagree. If Genesis is not literally true, then much else in the Bible becomes cognitively irrational to believe.
I too think that contemporary YEC and ID should be kept out of the K-12 Science classrooms, though under some limited circumstances I could see discussions of natural theology being appropriate when the curriculum addresses the history of science. But I see this as an a posteriori conclusion, not an a priori conclusion.
It is only a posteriori under your broader definition of science. If science is limited to the study of objective, empirical, and reproducible phenomena, that problem disappears. Because creationist dogma is not reproducible but it can include critical analysis. You have, in some respects, created the problem you are trying to solve.
ID'ers are in fact claiming that they can come up with objective, empirical and reproducible phenomena to justify their belief in special Creation. By your definition, we would have to throw out much of The Origin of Species and much of The Descent of Man . A lot of ideas in evolutionary biology only became really fully testable after the advances in genetics in the second half of the 20th century. We would also have to throw out all the social sciences-including much of psychology, significant portions of ethology and entire promising research programs like Ev Psych. We would have to throw out sciences like Astronomy that often deal in unique events. Note how in many ways your actual argument parallels some of the YEC claims. Some of the earlier YEC'ers used to in fact make the claim that strictly speaking, **neither** YEC or Evolution were "science" precisely because they were addressing historical problems. And finally, you still miss the point. McClean was decided on the grounds of Popperian falsifiability-not on your definition.

eric · 7 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: The stamp collector saying "that stamp is not worth X to me" does not falsify the published article. All the stamp collector in this instance is saying is that as an individual market participant, he assigns a different valuation.
Yes. And the world accepts a different valuation of a stamp as a sane and legitimate practice, because value is a subjective quantity. No one accepts a different valuation of height. Or half-life. You aren't claiming that the value of a stamp is the same type of property as its weight, or my height, or a half-life, are you?
Your definition of Science pretty much limits us to observation sentences.
No, it doesn't. My definition describes a practical limit on what is considered evidence. It does no limit what one can do with that evidence.
ID'ers are in fact claiming that they can come up with objective, empirical and reproducible phenomena to justify their belief in special Creation.
Yes but that claim is easy to refute. Lets go to the literature and...nope, no publications. No observations. No descriptions of experiments. Even if we consider their books, nowhere in Behe's or Demski's discussion of SCI is there a description of how an independent scientist could collect evidence about a new structure, perform a calculation, and determine whether it fits the definition of SCI. There is no "there" there. Again, as long as you subscribe to a fairly reasonable, work-a-day definition of science as requiring reproducible results, and limiting evidence to objective phenomena, creationism is eliminated. It is only when you expand science to include any rational/critical analysis of any subject, and start to include subjective phenomena (such as the price I would put on a stamp) as evidence, that you get in trouble.
By your definition, we would have to throw out much of The Origin of Species and much of The Descent of Man .
Darwin presented his work in shortened form to the Royal Society. So yes, he did what we would call scientific publication in addition to writing several books. But beyond that, there is certainly room in science for publishing hypotheses that have yet to be proved. But that is not what creationists are doing. They do not claim to have an interesting but untested idea. They claim to have done the tests. Behe did not say the immune system might be designed, he said he did the calculation and it is.
And finally, you still miss the point. McClean was decided on the grounds of Popperian falsifiability-not on your definition.
Falsifiability was one criteria among many. But that's a quibble.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

eric said:
Chip Poirot said: The stamp collector saying "that stamp is not worth X to me" does not falsify the published article. All the stamp collector in this instance is saying is that as an individual market participant, he assigns a different valuation.
Yes. And the world accepts a different valuation of a stamp as a sane and legitimate practice, because value is a subjective quantity. No one accepts a different valuation of height. Or half-life. You aren't claiming that the value of a stamp is the same type of property as its weight, or my height, or a half-life, are you?
Nope. If the fair market value of the stamp collection can be shown to be reliable, the insurance company is obligated to pay the fair market value of the stamp collection. But anyway, I fail to see the distinction you are making. What is the difference between saying "the fair market value of this stamp collection is X dollars" and "the weight of this stamp collection is X grams". "grams" and "dollars" are just going conventions we agree on to make life easier for all of us.
Your definition of Science pretty much limits us to observation sentences.
No, it doesn't. My definition describes a practical limit on what is considered evidence. It does no limit what one can do with that evidence.
What you are really saying IMO is that Scientific knowledge is limited to areas where the parameters can be strictly set. All you are doing is equating "scientific knowledge" with "precise knowledge." But you still ignore the whole range of background assumptions and cumulative evidence that gets us to a point of being able to say with some degree of precision that the half life of Uranium is X years. We still have to agree on the measurement instruments. We can't wait around 25,000 years and count up the micrograms of Uranium, and then do it again for another 25,000 years. So a sentence like "Fossil X is 100,000 yo" really means-the dial on my piece of equipment points to value Y, and when I chug some equations, this value Y gives me warrant to believe the fossil is 100,000 yo. We all accept this because we all agree on the background assumptions and accept the accuracy of the instrument. But a conclusion like "this fossil belongs in the Australopithecus genus instead of the genus homo" very often winds up provoking a fight among physical anthropologists as do sentences like "the evidence indicates H. Neanderthal was capable of culture."
ID'ers are in fact claiming that they can come up with objective, empirical and reproducible phenomena to justify their belief in special Creation.
Yes but that claim is easy to refute. Lets go to the literature and...nope, no publications. No observations. No descriptions of experiments. Even if we consider their books, nowhere in Behe's or Demski's discussion of SCI is there a description of how an independent scientist could collect evidence about a new structure, perform a calculation, and determine whether it fits the definition of SCI. There is no "there" there.
Right-which is why it is a pseudo-science. There isn't any a priori reason why they could not do these things, though we have pretty good reason to guess what the outcome would be.
Again, as long as you subscribe to a fairly reasonable, work-a-day definition of science as requiring reproducible results, and limiting evidence to objective phenomena, creationism is eliminated. It is only when you expand science to include any rational/critical analysis of any subject, and start to include subjective phenomena (such as the price I would put on a stamp) as evidence, that you get in trouble.
Price is observable. Go to the grocery store. What price do they put on 90% lean ground chuck? You are free to express the opinion you do not like ground chuck and will not pay that price, but you are not free to say to me that the price is different from what is on the package. Suppose I go to www.bls.gov and I say "the BLS reports that the unemployment rate is 9.2%". You can tell me that that number excludes categories X and Y and that the BLS should report a different number. But you cannot deny what is on the BLS webpage-unless you want to resort to some kind of evil demon or brain in a vat theory.
By your definition, we would have to throw out much of The Origin of Species and much of The Descent of Man .
Darwin presented his work in shortened form to the Royal Society. So yes, he did what we would call scientific publication in addition to writing several books.
I think you missed the point. Now you seem to be shifting to a "peer review" standard for Science. I'm talking about Darwin's actual evidence, very little of which depended on precise, quantifiable experiments. The structure of both Origins and Descent is one long argument (as Ernst Mayr puts it). In addition, much of Darwin's evidence in Descent is simply, unequivocally wrong as his generalizations from the anthropological record rest on entirely inaccurate views about non-Europeans.
But beyond that, there is certainly room in science for publishing hypotheses that have yet to be proved. But that is not what creationists are doing. They do not claim to have an interesting but untested idea. They claim to have done the tests. Behe did not say the immune system might be designed, he said he did the calculation and it is.
Which is exactly what makes his work bogus and pseudo-scientific.

eric · 7 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: What is the difference between saying "the fair market value of this stamp collection is X dollars" and "the weight of this stamp collection is X grams".
The latter has meaning independent of human opinion, the former doesn't.
What you are really saying IMO is that Scientific knowledge is limited to areas where the parameters can be strictly set. All you are doing is equating "scientific knowledge" with "precise knowledge."
I am saying that scientific knowledge is limited to considering objective evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. Look, I really don't think I'm being particularly revolutionary here. Transistors work and planes fly because the factors involved do not depend on human opinion. Artistic merit, musical quality, legal verdicts, the "best" public policy decision, and a host of other things, do. They have no independent existence in the way that electrical charge and the physical properties of a wing do. Science is concerned with those things that are independent of human opinion. If you want to say the difference is a matter of degree, of precision of the measurement, well, I think you're wrong. But I'm not going to argue with you about it further because I've made my case about as strongly as I know how, and its obviously failed. I think we are going in circles here. It is clear that we're not going to agree on several things. As far as I can tell: -I think there's a qualitative difference between subjective and objective types of evidence. Between, for instance, the market price of fish and electric charge. You think this is a matter of degree (of precision). Or maybe you think there is a qualitative difference but that "science" can also include the study of the former. If it does, then science includes creationism, with its subjective evaluation of the likelihood of some feature being designed. -I think there's a qualitative difference between pseudo-science and bad science. I think its the same difference as between fraud and incompetence. You think this is also a matter of degree, with sufficiently bad science being the same as pseudoscience. If you are right, then creationism is science, just very very bad science. And very very bad science can be taught. If that accurately describes our differences, I think I have nothing further to argue.

Ichthyic · 7 June 2009

There isn't any a priori reason why they could not do these things

that's just like saying there is no a-priori reason to think we couldn't investigate the ecological significance of unicorns.

fact is, there is simply no way to formulate a hypothesis regarding whether a particular object was designed without knowing how any putative designer interacts with the world itself.

This is why ID simply cannot ever BE science.

it's a ridiculous exercise to say they "could" formulate a testable hypothesis.

comparing the overall concept of ID, to what Behe has done with his argument for "irreducible complexity", IMO is a great case example of comparing pseudoscience to bad science.

What Behe did was make calculations based on erroneous assumptions, and thus drew erroneous conclusions. That's simply bad (REALLY BAD) science.

when we get to the level of formulating a hypothesis for design based on things that don't even exist?

that's pseudoscience.

and this:

But you still ignore the whole range of background assumptions and cumulative evidence that gets us to a point of being able to say with some degree of precision that the half life of Uranium is X years.

Ignore? this is just utter bullshit, Chip.

You really need to study how radiometric dating works sometime.

I'm sure you can google up some good articles on it, or check the talkorigins archive.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

Chip said: But you still ignore the whole range of background assumptions and cumulative evidence that gets us to a point of being able to say with some degree of precision that the half life of Uranium is X years.
Ignore? this is just utter bullshit, Chip. You really need to study how radiometric dating works sometime. I'm sure you can google up some good articles on it, or check the talkorigins archive.
What is "utter bullshit"? Are you saying that radiometric testing does not involve a whole host of background assumptions? Are you saying I don't have to rely on the validity of instruments? Sheesh! Even Popper knew better than that.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

eric said: Eric Said: The latter has meaning independent of human opinion, the former doesn't.
That is simply not true. Price and grams are both measurement concepts.
What you are really saying IMO is that Scientific knowledge is limited to areas where the parameters can be strictly set. All you are doing is equating "scientific knowledge" with "precise knowledge."
I am saying that scientific knowledge is limited to considering objective evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn from it.
I deny that pure "objectivity" in the sense you seem to be defining is possible. Objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity is possible. There are some things that it is perverse to deny. But you can never evade the problem of human perception and how humans interact with the environment. You are confusing what humans know with the object they try to know.
Look, I really don't think I'm being particularly revolutionary here. Transistors work and planes fly because the factors involved do not depend on human opinion. Artistic merit, musical quality, legal verdicts, the "best" public policy decision, and a host of other things, do. They have no independent existence in the way that electrical charge and the physical properties of a wing do.
So in essence what you are saying is that any humans actually do cannot be studied scientifically. So that rules out all the social sciences as scientific. Great, go right ahead and do your deep breathing exercises. Many features of human society may depend on continued agreement among human actors (in contrast to things like atoms and molecules) but those agreements and how they work have an objective existence regardless of whether you, I or anyone else accepts their opinion. You can't change an economic or social structure by changing your theory. But your theory can be tested and evaluated against evidence. But notice how you bait and switch me (again) and how you impute to me stances I don't take (again)-after we had just clarified. Simply put, you refuse to engage in any kind of good faith discussion. I already said that I had not chosen my words carefully enough and explained the context. And yet, after clarifying you continue to misrepresent. And you wonder why I respond hostiely to you?
Science is concerned with those things that are independent of human opinion. If you want to say the difference is a matter of degree, of precision of the measurement, well, I think you're wrong. But I'm not going to argue with you about it further because I've made my case about as strongly as I know how, and its obviously failed.
You have made no case beyond spewing out a bit of warmed over logical positivist trash and confusing it with Popper.
-I think there's a qualitative difference between subjective and objective types of evidence. Between, for instance, the market price of fish and electric charge. You think this is a matter of degree (of precision). Or maybe you think there is a qualitative difference but that "science" can also include the study of the former. If it does, then science includes creationism, with its subjective evaluation of the likelihood of some feature being designed.
Go down to the fish market. Tell me what the price of a pound of flounder is. That price you report to me exists independently of your individual opinion about whether you like flounder or not or whether or not you want to pay it. Go to the BLS website (www.bls.gov ) tell me what the unemployment rate is. Now tell me whether you think the unemployment rate has really gone up in this country in the last few months, or if we can just define unemployment away. Maybe unemployed people don't exist. Or for some reason I can't count people. While you claim to be an apostle of objective knowledge, you are actually giving aid and comfort to, and repeating the trash of varieties of epistemological relativists in the social sciences and humanities.
-I think there's a qualitative difference between pseudo-science and bad science. I think its the same difference as between fraud and incompetence. You think this is also a matter of degree, with sufficiently bad science being the same as pseudoscience. If you are right, then creationism is science, just very very bad science. And very very bad science can be taught.
Ridiculous. I never said any such thing. Yet you continue to use bait and switch and YEC tactics like quote mining and misrepresentation against me. But you are absolutely ignorant of what has transpired in the philosophy of biology for quite some time now.
If that accurately describes our differences, I think I have nothing further to argue.
Yes well-its good to know that Eric has decided on the criterion for science by rehashing Hopper and Pempel and declaring that anyone who disagrees with his stew is just a YEC stooge.

Ichthyic · 7 June 2009

Are you saying that radiometric testing does not involve a whole host of background assumptions?

I'm saying your implication that those aren't well tested "assumptions" is bullshit.

Are you saying I don't have to rely on the validity of instruments?

I dunno, do you rely often on untested assumptions yourself?

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

Ichthyic said: Are you saying that radiometric testing does not involve a whole host of background assumptions? I'm saying your implication that those aren't well tested "assumptions" is bullshit. Are you saying I don't have to rely on the validity of instruments? I dunno, do you rely often on untested assumptions yourself?
And I'm saying you can't bother to actually read a thread because if you did, you would know that what you just said was a misrepresentation. I never said background assumptions could not be tested. To the contrary. But you seem to be saying that you reject the conclusions of cognitive psychology and evolutionary psychology, in addition to the collective contributions of a whole host of secular philosophers of science.

eric · 7 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: I deny that pure "objectivity" in the sense you seem to be defining is possible.
Lets be clear. Are you saying our measurement of "mass" can never be purely objective (i.e. our knowledge always has some subjectivity), or that the property "mass" itself is not objective? I might agree with the former, but I think the latter is hairbrained.
Look, I really don't think I'm being particularly revolutionary here. Transistors work and planes fly because the factors involved do not depend on human opinion. Artistic merit, musical quality, legal verdicts, the "best" public policy decision, and a host of other things, do. They have no independent existence in the way that electrical charge and the physical properties of a wing do.
So in essence what you are saying is that any humans actually do cannot be studied scientifically.
No...I'm saying, over and over again, that science concerns objective variables. If you want to measure the decibel level of a rock concert, you can do that scientifically. If you want to measure the Awesomeness level of the same concert, you can't do that scientifically. You CAN apply reason, experience, and critical thought to it. But critical thought applied to purely subjective evidence is not science.
While you claim to be an apostle of objective knowledge, you are actually giving aid and comfort to, and repeating the trash of varieties of epistemological relativists in the social sciences and humanities.
I'll simply quote you and let the PT readers decide who and who is not the relativist. Here's what you said about objectivity, in whole paragraph form, lest you accuse me of quote mining:
I deny that pure “objectivity” in the sense you seem to be defining is possible. Objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity is possible. There are some things that it is perverse to deny. But you can never evade the problem of human perception and how humans interact with the environment. You are confusing what humans know with the object they try to know.
So, Chip denies pure objectivity and instead thinks the world is intersubjective. And calls me 'relativist.'
Yes well-its good to know that Eric has decided on the criterion for science by rehashing Hopper and Pempel and declaring that anyone who disagrees with his stew is just a YEC stooge.
Okay jerk, demonstrate some of that vaunted critical analysis you believe in and quote one thing from one post of mine in this thread where I call you anything like a "YEC stooge." I'm waiting.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

Okay jerk, demonstrate some of that vaunted critical analysis you believe in and quote one thing from one post of mine in this thread where I call you anything like a "YEC stooge." I'm waiting.
OK asshole. You've misrepresented virtually everything I have said. It was one thing when it began: I could attribute it to careless wording on my part or just plain misunderstanding. This is what you said:
-I think there’s a qualitative difference between pseudo-science and bad science. I think its the same difference as between fraud and incompetence. You think this is also a matter of degree, with sufficiently bad science being the same as pseudoscience. If you are right, then creationism is science, just very very bad science. And very very bad science can be taught. If that accurately describes our differences, I think I have nothing further to argue.
Now this implication that I am saying YEC can or should be taught in a K-12 Science class as Science flies in the face of all my previous statements. So the implication is clear: you imply I am a YEC stooge advocating for teaching YEC. It's just like earlier where you first smeared Larry Laudan by implying that Larry Laudan said Creationism could be taught as Science. Then you backed off when I showed you how your own quote undermined what you said. After that, you mellowed out a little and clarified. I had clarified several things as well. Now you go back to putting words in my mouth and twisting what I write.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

Eric said:
Lets be clear. Are you saying our measurement of “mass” can never be purely objective (i.e. our knowledge always has some subjectivity), or that the property “mass” itself is not objective? I might agree with the former, but I think the latter is hairbrained.
Of course: imply I'm saying something hairbraned when everything I've said in this whole entire thread from beginning to end clearly indicates what I mean. For the record: the property of "mass" exists independently of human observation and perception. Our measurement concepts are created by humans. Science is a human endeavor and because humans are fallible, limited creatures they can never have a God's eye view of the Universe. Their entire perception is limited to their cognitive capacities and humans have to interpret evidence from a human perspective. You keep rehashing discredited logical positivist crap that even Carnap eventually admitted could not be sustained. The whole effort by logical positivists to clearly distinguish between analytic sentences and synthetic sentences was to try and find a means where they could define a starting point **by convention**. You might try reading Hilbert's views of mathematics some time: Hilbert argued that mathematics was just a manipulable set of conventions we humans agreed upon. It just happened to be very powerful and had a lot of applications. If you bothered, you might try reading Tarski and Godel and you would understand how the paradox problem led to an understanding that you could not in fact have a complete and coherent system. And then you might try reading Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and move on to his Pursuit of Truth . I'm not endorsing everything Quine ever said by a long stretch. But if you had ever bothered to even attempt an understanding of contemporary analytical philosophy and/or Classical Pragmatism, you would understand that the view that Science is continuous and that philosophy should not be separated from Science has been a fundamental component of many pro-science philosophers. But saying that objectivity is intersubjectivity is not relativism. Quite the contrary. Again, you write in complete, total, absolute ignorance not only of contemporary philosophy of science but also of cognitive and evolutionary psychology. And then you misrepresent what I say and you have the nerve to call me a jerk.

Dean Wentworth · 7 June 2009

Chip,

I have no dog in this fight between you and eric, which seems to have degenerated into mutual insults.

One observation, your comments do tend to be somewhat verbose. If you don't want to be misrepresented, as you contend, maybe being more concise would help.

Chip Poirot · 7 June 2009

Dean Wentworth said: Chip, I have no dog in this fight between you and eric, which seems to have degenerated into mutual insults. One observation, your comments do tend to be somewhat verbose. If you don't want to be misrepresented, as you contend, maybe being more concise would help.
Well, if you read the thread you will see that Eric brings up very complex issues which require unpacking. I've tried to unpack issues for Eric. It's one thing when people ask you to clarify. It's another thing when you clarify repeatedly, and then clarify again, and people then twist your words. There is also a history here. At the close of our last conversation Eric implied that I had no standing to comment on Court rulings because I am not a lawyer. And its not the first time people have resorted to implying I am pro-ID or pro-YEC, or some kind of useful idiot for them-despite a long history of posting on PT to the contrary.

Dean Wentworth · 7 June 2009

Chip, For what it's worth, I do agree with the following excepts from your comments:
People like Ken Miller have done a lot of good and I respect him individually. But Miller seems to think that he can fly to mysticism and separate his science from his religion. I think NOMA is a copout.
What I am really aiming at is NOMA. Whether or not it was the original intention of the person who first made the statement “many areas of my life are outside of science” to justify NOMA, in my experience exactly that kind of reasoning is often used to justify NOMA.
My difficulty in understanding the finer points of your arguments is no doubt exacerbated by my ignorance of philosophy.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: This is what you said:
-I think there’s a qualitative difference between pseudo-science and bad science. I think its the same difference as between fraud and incompetence. You think this is also a matter of degree, with sufficiently bad science being the same as pseudoscience. If you are right, then creationism is science, just very very bad science. And very very bad science can be taught.
Now this implication that I am saying YEC can or should be taught in a K-12 Science class as Science flies in the face of all my previous statements. So the implication is clear: you imply I am a YEC stooge advocating for teaching YEC.
I do think you are advocating that creationism is very very bad science. You have stated many times that you think "scientific" is the equivalent of critical thinking, and thus investigations of any field may qualify as scientific if they are done in a critical and rational way. Secondly, I do think that the courts have stated that very very bad science can be taught. But no, these statements do not imply "stooge." I've never said or implied that you are willfully supporting them. I've never said or implied that that you are stealthily pushing their agenda. What I have ACTUALLY done, (vs what you claim I have done) is bent over backwards here to say - twice in one post, with the words "just to be clear" added - the exact opposite of what you attribute to me. Its the same with the relativism argument, and with Popper. You claimed here that I confused warmed-over positivist trash with Popper. But with the exception of a one-line quibble, I've never even mentioned the man, so you are arguing I'm confusing positivism with a theory I've never mentioned. None of my posts mention falsifiability. I've never supported a relativist or postmodernist metaphysics - in fact you accuse me of putting forward a (bad) positivist argument, and positivists aren't relativists! Chip, whomever you're arguing with, it isn't me. You're tilting at a strawman of your own invention. I've not brought up Popper. I've not supported a relativist metaphysics. I've not accused you of being a stooge. I've not said that you have no standing to comment on a court case because you aren't a lawyer. (Where the heck did that come from, BTW? I guess here where I say "Lemon only requires an activity have a secular purpose." Somehow you interpreted this stament as meaning 'Chip has no standing to comment.' It clearly doesn't.)

John Kwok · 8 June 2009

Chip and Dean,

You may find worthy of your attention the February 25th and 27th posts from philosopher and evolutionary biologist Massimo Pigliucci's Rationally Speaking blog, in which he recounts real-time and online dialogues he had with Ken Miller (Originally as part of a roundtable discussion on evolution at Brown University, in which Ken served as the moderator):

http://www.rationallyspeaking.org/

In this discussion, Ken agrees with Massimo that he doesn't agree with Steve Gould's NOMA concept.

What I find most useful is Massimo's assessment of Ken's embrace of the anthropic principle, and here I must agree with Massimo's criticism (Incidentally, Massimo has concluded that Ken seems to favor a weak version of the anthropic principle).

Regards,

John

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

eric said: I do think you are advocating that creationism is very very bad science. You have stated many times that you think "scientific" is the equivalent of critical thinking, and thus investigations of any field may qualify as scientific if they are done in a critical and rational way. Secondly, I do think that the courts have stated that very very bad science can be taught.
This came up previously and I addressed it in several ways. You have simply never responded to my arguments. 1. I previously clarified what I meant by "bad science". I specifically said I did not think that "bad science" meant just one single mistake made in good faith, or even a series of mistakes made in bad faith. I said that pseudo-science is a consistent and pervasive failure to apply the normal rules of scientific inquiry and to then claim that one has done science as it is normally practiced. 2. There is no Constitutional barrier to teching pseudo-science, bad science, or any other deceptive claim to knowledge in K-12 or elsewhere. There is in fact no **Constitutional** barrier to teaching outright falsehoods. A school district could-and in fact quite unfortunately some have done so-open a charter school organized around Afro-centrism. As I pointed out to you one of the prongs of the Lemon Test is what the purpose of teaching a particular topic or subject is. And you don't have to violate all prongs of the Lemon Test-you only have to violate one. YEC and ID are being promoted out of religiuos motives. So if the motive to introduce pseudo-science is religious, the Courts will rule it out of bounds. In addition, YEC and ID are themselves religiuosly motivated research programs. Now, if you want to argue about the Lemon Test, go look up the precedents.
Its the same with the relativism argument, and with Popper. You claimed here that I confused warmed-over positivist trash with Popper. But with the exception of a one-line quibble, I've never even mentioned the man, so you are arguing I'm confusing positivism with a theory I've never mentioned. None of my posts mention falsifiability. I've never supported a relativist or postmodernist metaphysics - in fact you accuse me of putting forward a (bad) positivist argument, and positivists aren't relativists!
Popper came up when you substantively misrepresented Larry Laudan's critique of Ruse's testimony in McClean . In addition, your argument about "Objective Knowledge" reaks of Popper's arguments through and through. But you are right: you have never addressed falsification or for that matter verification. In fact, you haven't addressed a single epistemological or ontological point at all. You have simply pounded the table that scientific knowledge must be equal to precise knowledge (that's where the logical posiivism comes in). And then you equate knowledge outside of science with subjective knowledge-which as far as I can tell you don't think is knowledge at all. There are ways, ironically, that Positivism leads us into relativism-among other things by turning science into a language game and insisting that knoweldge can be purely objective and that if something is not objective, it must be subjective. This opens the door for the Post-Modernist critique. But you in essence take the same position about the social sciences that many relativists do.
Chip, whomever you're arguing with, it isn't me.
Correct: Now that I think about it, you remind me of what Keynes said about people who claim the irrelevance of economic theory to policy making: they always turn out to be channeling the "wisdom" of some defunct economist. So let's paraphrase: whenever I hear people saying that Science can be completely separated from Philosophy and other areas of inquiry, it always turns out they are in fact channeling the "wisdom" of some defunct philosopher. Of course someone who actually took the time to understand the position they are implying, would have addressed the substantive points I made.
You're tilting at a strawman of your own invention. I've not brought up Popper.
I'm just trying to make sense of your argument.
I've not supported a relativist metaphysics.
By implying that we cannnot investigate the social sciences scientifically, you have indeed at least implied a relativist metaphysics, and given aid and comfort to those who attack the efforts to apply good scientific methods to the social sciences.
I've not said that you have no standing to comment on a court case because you aren't a lawyer. (Where the heck did that come from, BTW?
This comes from our last discussion (not this one). That was in effect part of the last comment you made to me.
I guess here where I say "Lemon only requires an activity have a secular purpose." Somehow you interpreted this stament as meaning 'Chip has no standing to comment.' It clearly doesn't.)
Clearly, you do not understand Lemon.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: As I pointed out to you one of the prongs of the Lemon Test is what the purpose of teaching a particular topic or subject is. And you don’t have to violate all prongs of the Lemon Test-you only have to violate one. YEC and ID are being promoted out of religiuos motives. So if the motive to introduce pseudo-science is religious, the Courts will rule it out of bounds.
You're simply wrong about the purpose prong. Freiler vs Tangipahoa, 1999:
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that challenged state action have a secular purpose. See Lemon , 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. Lemon 's first prong does not require that challenged state action have been enacted in furtherance of exclusively, or even predominately, secular objectives. See Wallace v. Jaffree , 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985) (explaining that a statute motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy Lemon 's purpose prong). In order for state activity to pass muster under Lemon 's first criterion a sincere secular purpose for the contested state action must exist; even if that secular purpose is but one in a sea of religious purposes. See id. at 56, 105 S. Ct. at 2489.
As for all the other stuff, I will try and rein it back to what I think is our main point of difference. You said:
2. There is no Constitutional barrier to teching pseudo-science, bad science, or any other deceptive claim to knowledge in K-12 or elsewhere. There is in fact no **Constitutional** barrier to teaching outright falsehoods. A school district could-and in fact quite unfortunately some have done so-open a charter school organized around Afro-centrism.
For you, does Creationism count as pseudo-science? Do you therefore see no constitutional barrier to teaching it?

eric · 8 June 2009

Just a quick addendum because I think I understand where Chip might have got the idea that having a religious motive is enough to dismiss creationism on the purpose prong.

A single religious motive is enough to fail creationism on the purpose prong as long as creationism is considered religion and not science. Because there can be no valid secular purpose for teaching religion as science. This is, for instance, exactly how Judge Jones ruled in Kitzmiller. (1) There can only be a secular purpose if its science; (2) it isn't science; (3) therefore no secular purpose; (4) therefore a single religious motive is enough to fail the purpose prong.

(2) is integral to this reasoning. Without it, a single (sincere) secular purpose amongst a 'sea of religious purposes' is enough to pass the purpose prong.

Dean Wentworth · 8 June 2009

John,

Thanks for the link. Among other things, it was an eye-opener to learn that Miller doesn't endorse NOMA either.

Naturally (no pun intended) I found Pigliucci's reasoning the more convincing of the two. To say any more on that would be beating a dead horse.

Their ability to take each other to task while remaining friendly is praiseworthy. It would be interesting to read Miller response to Pigliucci's later post, if he makes one.

John Kwok · 8 June 2009

Dean, You're quite welcome. Though Ken is a friend, I have to agree with Massimo's assessment as one that does make a lot more sense (which I suppose may come as a revelation to others posting elsewhere online who regard me as Ken's "pet" or "number one fanboy"):
Dean Wentworth said: John, Thanks for the link. Among other things, it was an eye-opener to learn that Miller doesn't endorse NOMA either. Naturally (no pun intended) I found Pigliucci's reasoning the more convincing of the two. To say any more on that would be beating a dead horse. Their ability to take each other to task while remaining friendly is praiseworthy. It would be interesting to read Miller response to Pigliucci's later post, if he makes one.
I was surprised too that Ken rejects NOMA, because I thought that had been one of the underlying themes of his "Finding Darwin's God". I've spoken to Massimo personally - and we've also corresponded via e-mail - and have him to be as thoughtful and considerate in person as he is online. Regards, John

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

This is how both the Lemon and Endorsement Test were applied in Dover http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf:
After a searching review of Supreme Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, it is apparent to this Court that both the endorsement test and the Lemon test should be employed in this case to analyze the constitutionality of the ID Policy under the Establishment Clause, for the reasons that follow. (p.10)
And then later, in discussing how members of the public would perceive the actions the Court noted:
First, the Board brought the public into the debate over whether to include Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ Document 342 Filed 12/20/2005 Page 51 of 139 52 ID in the curriculum as it proposed, advocated, and ultimately approved the ID Policy in public school board meetings. These meetings were such that members of the public not only attended them, but also had the opportunity to offer public comment on the proposal. In those Board meetings, open to the public at large, several Dover School Board members advocated for the ID Policy in expressly religious terms, with their comments reported extensively in the local newspapers, as will be discussed in detail below. Second, at least two Board members, William Buckingham and Heather Geesey, defended the proposed curriculum change in the media in expressly religious terms (p. 51 and 52).
So the issue was not whether it was simply very, very bad Science or pseudo-Science, the issue was the religious motivation. And in addition, the Court spent significant time and gave extensive weight to the specific history of ID and YEC and their connection to religious fundamentalism.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Eric Asked
For you, does Creationism count as pseudo-science? Do you therefore see no constitutional barrier to teaching it?
Now look Eric, if you are going to ask me "have you stopped beating your wife yet" questions, don't express surprise when I respond hostilely to you. I agree with the Court's ruling in Dover. I agree with **most**- but not all - of what Larry Laudan said in his critique of Ruse's testimony. Popper's falsification criterion of demarcation does not do the work that Ruse argued it did in his testimony. And Ruse knew that at the time. Popper's falsification criterion is not necessary to understand the religious motivations and pseudo-scientific practices of the Creationist/ID movement. I've also made it clear on multple occasins that my definition of Science includes naturalism, but that I arrive at that a posteriori rather than a priori. My disagreement with Laudan is that he argues you can't demarcate Science from non-Science, but goes on to demarcate bogus from valid claims to knowledge. But in doing so, he sneaks in a demarcation of Science from non-Science in through the back door. Susan Haack addresses many of these issues in several places. Haack and Laudan are two of the most prominent **Classical** Pragmatists writing on Law and Science. I agree with Susan Haack's definition of the natural sciences as "more so" and the Social Sciences as "the same, only different." Part of this non-debate is purely semantic. I originally said that strictly speaking, nothing lies outside of Science. I have since clarified my meaning and intent several times. I did not say you could not demarcate,. In fact, I specifically distinguished a scientific approach to a knowleddge claim from other types of knowledge claims-and did so repeatedly. What i am saying is that there is no area of inquiry where we are justified in applying some method other than that of the systematic appplication of the method of reason and experience. But you are bound and determined to constantly put the silliest possible interpretation on my words.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: So the issue was not whether it was simply very, very bad Science or pseudo-Science, the issue was the religious motivation. And in addition, the Court spent significant time and gave extensive weight to the specific history of ID and YEC and their connection to religious fundamentalism.
Let's resolve one argument before moving on to the others. You said "if the motive to introduce pseudo-science is religious, the Courts will rule it out of bounds." In an earlier post you also said: "My understanding of the Lemon Test is that if there is a religious motive to what is being done, it is Constitutionally impermissable, even if you can articulate a secular purpose." Your understanding is incorrect. The key to the purpose prong rules is whether a subject has a valid secular purpose. If it does, it can have a religious motivation too. Whether a subject has a religious motivation is not dispositive. Now, I am fully aware that there are two other prongs and the establishment clause that can do the job. However, the reason I am banging so hard on this is because if creationism is considered a form of science - even bad science - then it can pass the purpose prong. Because, as I think we have both agreed, there can be valid secular purposes for teaching bad science (both "good" purposes such as using it as a historical example, or "bad" purposes such as thinking it represents good science.)

Mike Elzinga · 8 June 2009

If it leads step-by-step to a more detailed understanding of the natural world along with an increased ability to predict and manipulate the natural world, it’s science.

If it leads step-by-step to exegesis, hermeneutics, etymology, word games, and an ever-diverging bush of warring sectarians or “philosophers”, it’s not science.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Eric,

The issue is **valid** secular purpose. Though again, perhaps I should have been a little more specific. And in addition, the test is also what does a reasonable, objective (note the use of that word by the Courts) observer (student and/or member of the public) conclude by the activity/display.

Suppose a high school wants to erect a display on the multiple sources that have influenced modern Western Law. It includes Hammurabi's Code, English Common Law, Roman Law and in **addition** incorporates the 10 commandments. That is probably OK under most circumstances. The 10 commandments are religiuos, but this exhibit really does serve a valid secular purpose: The Old Testament did in fact have an influence on the development of modern Law.

On the other hand, you can't just make up a pretext of a secular purpose.

My position on YEC and ID is very clear and I have stated it again and again: It is religiously motivated pseudo-science. I have told you before that pseudo-science is an effort to claim valid knowledge by the methods of science, and yet consistently abusing those methods. Now if you want to try and parse that for some kind of hidden agenda, have at.

It would not be unconstitutional to discuss Paley's natural theology during a section on the history of biology. It would be unconstitutional to single out the theory of evolution for specific scrutiny in an effort to discredit by a whole series of religiously motivated bogus criticisms.

Calling something pseudo-science does not mean that it cannot also be religious or an effort to teach religion or to protect religious doctrine.

I suppose that it might be constitutional to teach that aliens built Macchu Picchu if you really could discern a valid secular purpose to doing so. But if you wanted to do that to support Scientology, that would be Unconstitutional.

Your only and sole driving purpose in life seems to be to insure that you have an unequivocal means to keep ID and YEC out of K-12 science curricula. I agree with the goal.

However,I don't start out from an abstract position of how can I demarcate to arrive at conclusion X. I ask how can we demarcate to make relevant distinctions. Then you apply relevant distinctions to concrete instances.

But regardless, your demarcation criterion doesn't do the work you want it to do anyway-among other reasons because it is incoherent.

How we distinguish valid claims to knowledge from bogus claims to knowledge is an incredibly important legal question that goes far, far, far beyond this one issue.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Mike Elzinga said: If it leads step-by-step to a more detailed understanding of the natural world along with an increased ability to predict and manipulate the natural world, it’s science.
But why stop at the "natural world"? This leaves the social sciences entirely out of science. On the other hand, you could argue that human societies are part of the natural world.

Mike Elzinga · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: But why stop at the "natural world"? This leaves the social sciences entirely out of science. On the other hand, you could argue that human societies are part of the natural world.
Perhaps some forms of “social science” should be left out of science, especially if they attempt to take the creatures they purport to study out of the context of the natural world.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: The issue is **valid** secular purpose.
Your claim in multiple prior posts, as late as 8:49am today, was that the purpose prong was decided based on the presence of religious motivation. I am gladdened to know that you've since changed your mind. Even better, if for the sake of argument I use your definition of science as critical thinking, I can even say that you've made a scientific advancement :)
How we distinguish valid claims to knowledge from bogus claims to knowledge is an incredibly important legal question that goes far, far, far beyond this one issue.
That is the problem with your posts, Chip. You are trying to solve the big issue of what constitutes knowledge. I'm only really concerned about what constitutes science, and because I don't agree with your broad view of what science is, I don't necessarily see that they are the same problem. But rather than rehash everything again, I'll simply reply to your second post, from many days ago:
But is science just a subject area (the study of the physical and natural world)? If so, then obviously, the common sense distinction of studying plants and deciding who is going to take the Vet or do the cooking or how to arrange the family finances is pretty clear. Or, is science a general approach to knowledge and if so, how do we distinguish that approach from other approaches?
IMO its both. One can be doing non-science if (a) one follows a different approach or (b) one applies it to a non-science subject. If you apply the general approach to arranging the family finances, you are not doing science, you are doing finance.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

So this rules all the social sciences out of Science and confines Science to only the natural and physical sciences.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Mike Elzinga said:
Chip Poirot said: But why stop at the "natural world"? This leaves the social sciences entirely out of science. On the other hand, you could argue that human societies are part of the natural world.
Perhaps some forms of “social science” should be left out of science, especially if they attempt to take the creatures they purport to study out of the context of the natural world.
Right there are scientific ways of doing social sciences and non-scientific ways of doing social science.

Mike Elzinga · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Right there are scientific ways of doing social sciences and non-scientific ways of doing social science.
Right there are scientific ways of doing social sciences and non-scientific ways of doing "social science".

Rilke's Granddaughter · 8 June 2009

No, actually it doesn't - unless you're claiming what humans and their 'social' activities are somehow unnatural. But anything based purely on subjective opinion (the beauty or lack thereof of a painting, f'r example) is not amenable to scientific examination. In the aggregate, one can analyze the opinions, but not an opinion itself. Science is more than just disciplined thinking.
Chip Poirot said:
Mike Elzinga said: If it leads step-by-step to a more detailed understanding of the natural world along with an increased ability to predict and manipulate the natural world, it’s science.
But why stop at the "natural world"? This leaves the social sciences entirely out of science. On the other hand, you could argue that human societies are part of the natural world.

Rilke's Granddaughter · 8 June 2009

Chip said, "What i am saying is that there is no area of inquiry where we are justified in applying some method other than that of the systematic appplication of the method of reason and experience."

But this is, in fact, wrong. YOU are making a value judgement that not everyone shares; a very devout religious person might claim that we are always justified in applying some other method - revelation, for example - to an area of inquiry.

You are mixing your personal preferences up with absolute statements about what people SHOULD do.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: So this rules all the social sciences out of Science and confines Science to only the natural and physical sciences.
I wouldn't go that far, because some social scientists study the natural and physical world, even if what they do is called by some other name. I know economists who study the effect of oxytocin levels on people's decisions in two-player economic games. Its biology. Its economics. Its psychology. But I can see the train running down the tracks here. You'll probably start arguing that because there is a fuzzy boundary and there are some tough calls, we should dispense with the science-as-subject altogether. Before you bother: I disagree with that notion. In general, as one of my grad student friends used to say: disciplines that feel the need to put "science" in their name are like countries that feel the need to put "democratic" in their name. They usually aren't.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Rilke's Granddaughter said: Chip said, "What i am saying is that there is no area of inquiry where we are justified in applying some method other than that of the systematic appplication of the method of reason and experience." But this is, in fact, wrong. YOU are making a value judgement that not everyone shares; a very devout religious person might claim that we are always justified in applying some other method - revelation, for example - to an area of inquiry. You are mixing your personal preferences up with absolute statements about what people SHOULD do.
Well, I guess it depends on one's goal. My goal is to arrive at truth. Admittedly, seeking truth is a value, which is why Science can never be value free as long as it prioritizes the search for truth. To say that something is true is to say that things are as we say they are and to say that something is false is to say that things are not as it is claimed. If I say "it is snowing" and the sun is shining and it is 80 degrees, then I have spoken falsely. If I say it is snowing and there is in fact snow falling from the sky, then I have spoken the truth. Admittedly, sometimes truth is hard to discern. We always have to communicate it through language and despite our best efforts to find a purely neutral ground to communicate, it cannot be done. But just because claims to truth must be communicated through language does not make truth relative to language. So then the issue is what is the most reliable way to arrive at truth? I say it is through the method of reason and experience. Now, granted, this depends on a few assumptions such as "there are no evil demons tricking me" and "I am not a brain in a vat." So, if **YOU** wish to argue to me that you are perfectly justified in believing you are a brain in a vat and that my insistence that that is an incoherent argument imposes a value judgement on you, then too bad. When people stake a claim to miracles I apply Hume's test. First, I define a miracle as a suspension or violation of known natural law (e.g. A perfectly combustible log put in a hot fire does not burn). If you claim to have witnessed a miracle then I will only believe you if not believing you takes a greater leap than believing you. If claims to miracles worked out, then I would accept that. But so far, the application of the method of reason and experience has invalidated claims to miracles. So again, anybody can make any claim they want to any other source of authority. But so what?

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

Eric,

Now you are claiming that game theory is science if I incorporate studies of oxytocin?

But you betray amazing ignorance of both the history of the natural and social sciences.

The social sciences, like the natural sciences, grew out of the Enlightenment. This was especially true in Scotland. The whole point was to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the study of the social world.

But you prefer deep breathing exercises and game theory. Game theory is not an empirical science. It is mathematical masturbation.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Eric, Now you are claiming that game theory is science if I incorporate studies of oxytocin? But you betray amazing ignorance of both the history of the natural and social sciences.
It must be my amazing ignorance, but I consider some studies to be "interdisciplinary," and thus qualify as both a social and natural science at the same time! I know, I'm squaring the circle.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

eric said:
Chip Poirot said: Eric, Now you are claiming that game theory is science if I incorporate studies of oxytocin? But you betray amazing ignorance of both the history of the natural and social sciences.
It must be my amazing ignorance, but I consider some studies to be "interdisciplinary," and thus qualify as both a social and natural science at the same time! I know, I'm squaring the circle.
You missed the point-again. You think that throwing in something about oxytocin and decision making transforms game theory into precise, objective, replicable results and thus makes it science. Now, if you want to say that it is a mathematical science, maybe-but then what does oxytocin levels do for you? I'm not against interdisciplinarity-to the contrary. But just putting lipstick on a pig doesn't turn the pig into a fashion model.

eric · 8 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: You missed the point-again. You think that throwing in something about oxytocin and decision making transforms game theory into precise, objective, replicable results and thus makes it science.
I was using it as an example of interdisciplinary research that refutes your notion that viewing science as a subject "rules all the social sciences out of Science." If you don't like it, pick your own example of interdisciplinary research. Your point is still refuted.

Chip Poirot · 8 June 2009

You haven't refuted a thing. When it gets right down to it, you really have no position and no argument at all.

First you say that Science is limited only to very precise, quantifiable knowledge. This rules out significant fields of inquiry even in the natural sciences. But you refuse to address this question.

Then you criticize Laudan (inaccurately as it turns out) for criticizing Ruse's reliance on Popper, but then deny you are a Popperian.

Then you imply the social sciences are not science.

Then to suggest that some aspects of the social sciences could be studied scientifically, you invent some example that verges on pseudo-science.

Rilke's Granddaughter · 9 June 2009

Chip,
So, if **YOU** wish to argue to me that you are perfectly justified in believing you are a brain in a vat and that my insistence that that is an incoherent argument imposes a value judgement on you, then too bad.
I didn't. Try to discuss what people are actually saying, rather than inventing something. It's more interesting.
When people stake a claim to miracles I apply Hume’s test. First, I define a miracle as a suspension or violation of known natural law (e.g. A perfectly combustible log put in a hot fire does not burn). If you claim to have witnessed a miracle then I will only believe you if not believing you takes a greater leap than believing you.
Good for you. Your OPINION (note that word) is duly noted. I know folks who claim to have witnessed miracles. It doesn't matter what my opinion of those folks is, it matters to THEM that THEY believe on that basis. They would find your ignorance and disbelief silly. And you can't prove them wrong.
If claims to miracles worked out, then I would accept that. But so far, the application of the method of reason and experience has invalidated claims to miracles.
Not in the slightest. Apparently you need to reread Hume. Hume merely discusses whether it is 'rational' to accept claims of miracles. But reason and experience have not INVALIDATED claims to miracles. Sorry.
So again, anybody can make any claim they want to any other source of authority. But so what?
So what? You claimed
What i am saying is that there is no area of inquiry where we are justified in applying some method other than that of the systematic appplication of the method of reason and experience.
I am merely pointing out that you are wrong. You are merely showing that your PERSONAL OPINION is that we're not justified in applying something other than your rather peculiar and highly limiting definition of science. To use your own format, who cares what your personal opinion about how to get to 'truth' is? Religious folks know you're wrong.

Chip Poirot · 9 June 2009

The only thing you have demonstrated is that there are no arguments to refute either skeptics or true believers.

That does not mean that claims to knowledge or claims to how arrive at reliable knowledge is a matter of arbitrary, subjective, opinion. What the word "opinion" means and does not mean has been a matter of some dispute in these discussions.

I would argue that the way people mean "personal opinion" is on the level of "I prefer chocolate to vanilla", thus implying de gustabus non disputandum . So you argue that one's choice of epistemology is a matter of opinion. Eric argues that if we can't have pure, objective, quantifiable precise knowledge, then we have opinion (though in fairness to Eric he does acknowledge that there are opinions that are based on some degree of reasonableness and evidence vs. purely arbitrary claims). But both of you in a sense are making an argument for some degree of relativism-you much more so than Eric.

You label my definition of Science as both "peculiar" and "limiting". But my definition of Science draws on most of the major figures in philosophy of Science, and in particular Larry Laudan and Susan Haack. Now granted, that doesn't make me infallible or necessarily right-but my definition of science as the method of reason and experience systematically applied in the search for truth is in actuality a fairly common one. My definition of Science acknowledges that there are specific sciences. Some specific sciences, like physics and molecular biology give us incredibly, precise, quantifiable knowledge. Others, like evolutionary biology are not so precise. The social sciences are less precise still. But I see it as a continnum rather than a sharp break. My position is one that advocates the **unity** of science: a position which incidentally has been a long staple of most people who are on the "pro-science" side. I also deny a sharp break between the Huhmanities and the Social Sciences. My position on this is actually not very different from that of biologist E.O. Wilson-though I wouldn't go as far as he does.

So, while you may think me wrong, I am neither peculiar nor limited.

The only way my view of science could be called limited, is that I do rule out a posteriori "poof" or "mystical" or "supernatural" explanations as well as vitalism and teleology.

What is your definition of Science?

I have a simple test for the epistemological relativists. Climb up a very, very high building. Go out on the balcony. Now, I will give you a choice. You can demonstrate to me your belief in miracles and the supernatural (no parachutes or anything else that will break your fall) or you can climb down the stairs and go out the front door.

eric · 9 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Eric argues that if we can't have pure, objective, quantifiable precise knowledge, then we have opinion
Mischaracterization and projection. I say science concerns objective quantities, you add the rest. Word search the posts on this thread and you will find the only one of us who insists science be "pure" or "precise" is Chip. Chip, feel free to continue your conversation with Rilke's Granddaughter, but I ask as a point of courtesy that you not mischaracterize me as your straw man.

Chip Poirot · 10 June 2009

eric said:
Chip Poirot said: Eric argues that if we can't have pure, objective, quantifiable precise knowledge, then we have opinion
Mischaracterization and projection. I say science concerns objective quantities, you add the rest. Word search the posts on this thread and you will find the only one of us who insists science be "pure" or "precise" is Chip. Chip, feel free to continue your conversation with Rilke's Granddaughter, but I ask as a point of courtesy that you not mischaracterize me as your straw man.
Well Eric, believe it or not I thought I was accurately stating your view. Rather than writing out another lengthy post, I will simply ask you to explain how I have misunderstood you. Even when you have come up with examples where people could do systematic studies in the social sciences, such as extensive data on determination of fair market values, you insisted that such knowledge would still be opinion. You contrasted this with the objective knowledge that is possible in the natural sciences. You have also indicated support for Michael Ruse's testimony in Mclean , which relied on Popper's demarcation criterion of falsification. Adjectives like "pure" and "precise" seem to characterize the above position fairly to me. The word pure indicates that something is uncontaminated and not comingled with something else. Since you drew the contrast between objective knowledge and opinion, your view of objective knowledge would seem to rest on a concept of purity (objective knowledge uncontaminated by opinion). And your insistence on replicable, objective experiments would also seem to fit the word "precise". My whole point has been that science is a very powerful method to reduce subjective bias and systematic error-and it is one that can and should be applied broadly. But humans being what they are, science remains a human enterprise, and hence imperfect. Since my approach emphasizes the importance of cognitive framing to all knowledge-including the natural science-and depends on "degrees of warrant", then I don't see why you would intepret me as insisting on being "pure" and "precise". I might hold out "pure" and "precise" as absolute goals-much like say one might hold out a germ free operating room as a goal. But regardless of how much one scrubs, there are probably always some germs in an operating room. That doesn't mean I want to operated on in a pile of horse manure. Similarly, just because I can't have pure objectivity and 100% precision doesn't mean I can't distinguish degrees of objectivity and precision. It's even stranger that you would interpret my position as arguing for "purity" when my view is that there is a third position between logical positivism and relativism: Pragmatism as it has been articulated by philosophers such as Larry Laudan and Susan Haack. I have agreed with you on many occasions that some areas of knowledge such as interpretations of literature or judgements of aesthetic qualities do not reduce to controlled, replicable tests. But I also insist that relativism in these areas is not justified. There are still good and bad interpretations of a text, and we can still gain greater knowledge by applying the method of reason and experience to a text, than by deconstructing it. So why don't you explain how I have misinterpreted you and why it is you have interpreted me to be arguing for purity and precision?

eric · 10 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: And your insistence on replicable, objective experiments would also seem to fit the word “precise”.
Precision is a measure of the extent to which a set of data points agree with each other. It has nothing whatsoever to do with replicability or objectivity. If I measure the force of gravity at the earth's surface three times using the same methodology and get values of 6.8m/s^2, 9.8m/s^2, and 12.8m/s^2 that is lousy precision. But my experiment is still measuring an objective quantity, and, IMO, its science. My results may or may not be replicable; if my very poor precision is the result of a random error or shoddy execution, it likely won't be replicable. If its a result of some systemic error in my methodology, it will be. In contrast, if I go to a Jonas' Brothers concert and ask three teen girls to rate the Jonas' brothers music on a scale of 1 (horrible) to 10 (best music ever written), and the answers I get are 10, 10, and 10, I have achieved excellent precision in my measurement of a subjective quantity. But this precision does not make it science. For someone who claims to understand the nature of science, you have a terrible misunderstanding of the basic scientific concept of precision.

Chip poirot · 10 June 2009

eric said:
Chip Poirot said: And your insistence on replicable, objective experiments would also seem to fit the word “precise”.
For someone who claims to understand the nature of science, you have a terrible misunderstanding of the basic scientific concept of precision.
Precision can also be a measure of statistical variance and also of lack of ambiguity. The sentence: "It is a beautiful day" is imprecise, vague and subjective. In contrast, the sentence: "The thermometer records 30 degrees on the fahrenheit scale and the humidity is 30%" communicates precise, objective information. For some purposes I might want a more precise instrument that makes it easy to read fractions of degrees. A thermometer that registers only whole degrees is less precise than a thermometer that registers fractions of degrees. The precision also improves the objectivity: It removes the guesswork of estimating whether the red stuff has moved halfway between 30 and 31, or 48% between 30 and 31. Or, in making predictions, for example, about how fast a radioactive isotope will decay, I can be very precise. I can go farther and date an object found w/precision. So, for example, potassium/argon dating is often more precise than carbon dating. In this case as well precision improves my objectivity. Or consider a medical diagnosis of something like fibromyalgia as opposed to cancer. There's a precise diagnostic criterion for fibromyalgia. And the reason is to distinguish fibromyalgia from other possible ailments. So an objective observer can examine the data, apply the criteria, and agree that the data fit the definition of fibromyalgia. This objective observer may still express skepticism about the scale. In contrast, if you test someone's blood sugar, the diagnosis of diabetes is much more precise and objective. Greater precision generally does yield greater objectivity. Another example is in Anthropology: In the 19th century, anthropologists relied on traveler's and missionary reports of other cultures. These were neither precise nor objective. In contrast, beginning in the 20th century, Franz Boas, who had been trained as a physicist sought to apply rigor of observation to anthropology in an effort to reduce bias. His method was to train people in participant observation. The ethnography you get from a well designed participant observation will yield both less precise and less objective conclusions than a thermometer reading. But the report from the participant observation is much more precise and objective than a traveler's or missionary report. So again-objectivity and precision are matters of degree. If I misinterpreted your interpretation of objectivity it was at least an honest misunderstanding-not an effort to mischaracterize you or set up a straw man. And it certainly wasn't an exercise in projection. I find it curious though that you would resort to psuedo-scientific characterizations based on pop psychology.

Chip poirot · 10 June 2009

Eric said: In contrast, if I go to a Jonas’ Brothers concert and ask three teen girls to rate the Jonas’ brothers music on a scale of 1 (horrible) to 10 (best music ever written), and the answers I get are 10, 10, and 10, I have achieved excellent precision in my measurement of a subjective quantity. But this precision does not make it science.
If you do this properly you are doing sociology: you are measuring teen age girls opinions of the Jonas Brothers. The question of which pop artist is better is not one I would place in science per se-but would argue is still amenable to cognitively rational discussions. But the question of social attitudes is independent of the observer. So by being precise: X percentage of teenage girls rated Jonas Brothers on a 10 given a scale of Y-is precise, objective, replicable and in effect, constitutes science. But because it is social science it cannot be as precise, objective and replicable as a study in physics. But that is not an excuse to abandon good scientific methods when doing sociology. Nor is it an excuse to throw up one's hands and say "anything goes" in the study of art and literature.

eric · 10 June 2009

Chip poirot said: Precision can also be a measure of statistical variance and also of lack of ambiguity.
Look, you can define precision any way you want when you're talking about your own opinion. But if you're going to represent my position on the concept of precision, you might first want to get my opinion, rather than simply making it up. Objective measurement does not require or imply precise measurement, the way scientists use the concept of precision. Maybe objectivity requires Chip-precision; if it does, then...[shrug].
Or, in making predictions, for example, about how fast a radioactive isotope will decay, I can be very precise. I can go farther and date an object found w/precision. So, for example, potassium/argon dating is often more precise than carbon dating. In this case as well precision improves my objectivity.
This is not even wrong, its just insensible. You seem to start off talking about measuring nuclear lifetime, but then switch halfway through the sentence to talking about measuring the age of something - a technique which treats half-life as a constant, not a variable to be measured. The statement about K-40 being more precise than C-14 appears to confuse their absolute half-life (a bit over one billion vs a bit less than 6 thousand years, respectively) with the concept of margin of error in measurement. And I don't even know what "precision improves my objectivity" means in this context. The only thing I can say about this statement is it appears you attempted to use an example of a physical process about which you know very little, resulting in a GIGO problem.

Chip Poirot · 10 June 2009

And I don't even know what "precision improves my objectivity" means in this context. The only thing I can say about this statement is it appears you attempted to use an example of a physical process about which you know very little, resulting in a GIGO problem.
No- gave you an example that is actually critical to paleontology, physical anthropology and archaeology. Dating in these disciplines depends critically on the established levels of precision of different tests of age. I am giving you an applied example. Other experiments establish relative rates of decay as welll as the relative accuracy of different kinds of tests. Carbon dating yields imprecise dates past a certain point while Potassium-Argon dating becomes more precise and reliable past those dates. Therefore, the use of Potassium Argon dating rather than Carbon dating for many examples improves both precision and objectivity. Do you deny this? I'm at least making an effot to de-escalate the rhetoric and clarify. But you seem determined to be as nasty as possible even when the point is simple and well established. Now you claim that there is a "scientific" use of the word precision, which seems to somehow differ from how I am using the word "precision". This is the definiton of precision I got from the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary:
Main Entry: 1pre·ci·sion Pronunciation: \pri-ˈsi-zhən\ Function: noun Date: 1740 1: the quality or state of being precise : exactness 2 a: the degree of refinement with which an operation is performed or a measurement stated — compare accuracy 2b b: the accuracy (as in binary or decimal places) with which a number can be represented usually expressed in terms of the number of computer words available for representation precision arithmetic permits the representation of an expression by two computer words>
I'm saying that greater accuracy and exactness as well as the degree of refinement of an operation makes for greater objectivity. Do we really disagree on this? Now I'll be among the first to recognize that disciplines develop specialized vocabularies, so sometimes a simple dictionary definition doesn't do justice to how terms are used in a discipline. If you ask me to distinguish between how a definition of a word like "Investment" is used by most people in common speech, and what economists mean by "Investment" I can quickly send you to multiple sources to explain and justify the difference. Every single economist will immediately explain to you what the difference is. OK-so why don't you do the same? Why don't you tell me what your source of authority is for what you call the "scientific" definition of precision and explain how it differs from the "Chip Poirot definition" which is the same as the Merriam Webster dictionary. Then when you are done, explain to me how inexact and imprecise theories can be meaningfully tested. Then explain to me how inexact and imprecise measurement concepts can lead to reliable measurements. Then explain to me how an inexact and imprecise measuring instrument is going to lead to enhanced objectivity. I've tried to explain to you how more precise definitions of hypotheses, definitions, measurement terms and more precise instruments enhance objectivity. My point actually seems simple enough: Again, let's go back to your example. Actually, your example of just asking three girls on a scale of 1-10 to rate a musician is not precise. When i said it was sociology i actually made an error. It's more like TV hype which is conducted non-scientifically. In contrast, a well organized study in Sociology would aim at both greater precision and objectivity. If I want to study social attitudes I first carefully define what aspect of social attitudes I want to study. Then I define an hypothesis and set out a research strategy. I develop a well worded questionaire and a reliable scale. Then I find a way to get a large unbiased sample. By being more precise in this fashion I improve my objectivity. My answer doesn't depend on who I think is the best rock musician or whether or not I think teenage girls tend to be shallow. The question I want to answer is "what are the social attitudes of teenage girls' or "what factors influence changing tastes in music among teenage girls". That's not a matter of personal opinion. It's a conclusion supported by a well designed study. It is both more precise and more objective. I'm not trying to answer the question who is the best-I'm trying to answer the question "who does the population defined in my study think is the best". Then I am being both more precise and more objective. IT comes back to my earlier point: The sentence "it is a beautiful day" is imprecise and non-objective because beuatiful could mean many different things. The sentence "it is sunny, 80 degrees on the fahrenheit scale and the humidity is 30%" is both more precise and objective. How is this not so?

eric · 10 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Other experiments establish relative rates of decay as welll as the relative accuracy of different kinds of tests. Carbon dating yields imprecise dates past a certain point while Potassium-Argon dating becomes more precise and reliable past those dates. Therefore, the use of Potassium Argon dating rather than Carbon dating for many examples improves both precision and objectivity. Do you deny this?
C-14 is inaccurate after certain dates, because the signal is too low and thus anything older than about 100,000 years looks the same. It is not imprecise at all. You can take tens, hundreds of C-14 measurements on a million year old petrified tree and you will get a highly precise set of beta decay counts: all 0. You are confusing precision with accuracy. I appreciate your effort to de-escalate the tension so I will try and do the same. As to objectivity: I think, but I'm not sure, that what you are trying to say is our confidence in the value of the date is improving. With each independent measurement of age that agrees, our certainty grows. Another possible way you could be using the term is to denote a reduction of bias: with more independent measurements agreeing, the chances that the measured age is a result of bias is reduced. Those are both reasonable uses of the term objective, and yes, using them, our objectivity has improved. But that is not what I meant way back when, when I said that science concerns objective quantities. When I compare mass to musical taste and say the former is objective, the latter subjective, I'm making a claim about the property being measured (mass, musical quality), not our knowledge of that property. I'm claiming that mass is an objective property of an object whether we know it very very well or very very poorly. Musical quality is subjective whether we know it with very high confidence or very low confidence. I would claim that "age" is an objective quantity similar to mass. The rock's age after we measure it is still just as objective as it was before we measured it, no more, no less. So yes, the way I have been using the term objective the entire time we've been arguing, I deny that our objectivity has improved. On defining precision: I assumed you were using a scientific definition because this entire multi-day conversation is on a science blog and is about science. If we were on a website devoted to finance, and you were arguing with a financial Ph.D., would you assume they were using the Webster's definition of "investment" or the trade one? And if someone suddenly started throwing the Webster's definition around, what do you think the financial guys would think of that person's understanding of investment? And you've never been through the bulls' eye example? Its simplistic but it does the trick. Many darts together but off center = precise but not accurate, etc...? I'm not being snide, I'm really curious. I thought it was practically viral at this point.
Then when you are done, explain to me how inexact and imprecise theories can be meaningfully tested.
I concede your point. "Imprecise theory" only makes sense using the webster's version. Just to keep us grounded though, the conversation was never about imprecise theories. It was about whether limiting science to objective phenomena necessarily entailed that all scientific knowledge had to be precice. This is not true because one can have imprecise knowledge of an objective phenomena such as mass.
Then explain to me how inexact and imprecise measurement concepts can lead to reliable measurements.
See above; we never argued about "imprecise measurement concepts"
Then explain to me how an inexact and imprecise measuring instrument is going to lead to enhanced objectivity.
The way I'm using the term "objective," no measurement - precise or imprecise - changes the objectiveness of a quantity such as mass. The way you use the term objective to denote something like "more confidence in our knowledge," this is extremely easy. Random measurement errors cancel out over time, so taking many imprecise measurement will, over time, provide you with high confidence that the value you've measured is accurate (i.e. "objective" in your sense???). Let's say I have a scale that randomly adds a number of pounds between -100 and +100. If I step on it once, there's no way I can know if the value is even close to right. You might say that my knowledge of my weight is subjective at this time. If I step on it 1,000 times, the average of all those measurements is going to be very very close to my actual weight. Voila! That is how an imprecise instrument can lead to enhanced confidence in our knowledge of the true value of eric's weight. I know you wrote more, but I think that's plenty for now.

Chip Poirot · 10 June 2009

Eric, I think we are at least understanding each other's position better now. You are correct: when I say "objective" I mean that I can show my results to someone else and someone else can apply the same criteria and arrive at the same conclusion. Objective is a property of knowledge. I'm making an epistemological point. You are making an ontological point and I think it is confused. Things like truth and objectivity are properties of knowledge-not of objects. It isn't the objects that are "objective" per se. What I interpret you to be saying is that some kinds entities (planets, electrons, chemical isotopes) as well as their properties (mass, weight, etc.) exist independently of our definitions and perceptions of them. In other words, you are arguing for external world realism and if that is so, we agree-to a point. I agree that it is easier to have objective knowledge about some kinds of objects than others. I think we agree that entities that humans do not create are easier to have objective knowledge about. If I understand you correctly, you limit Science to those entities. I am not willing to limit Science to those entities nor am I willing to limit external world realism to entities that humans don't make. I agree that the problem of objective knowledge becomes increasingly difficult as we move from studying electrons to studying human fossils and then human artifacts. And it gets more difficult when I want to study things like deviance and market price and then increasingly so when I move on to literature. Now let's go way, way back to the beginning. I was very clear that I was talking about not leaving things outside of scientific methods. When I said "if we define science as a method, then strictly speaking, nothing lies outside of science" was very clear in the context: there isn't ever any reason to abandon the use of good scientific methods. Let's go back to your example of sampling people at a rock concert. That's a bad method. It doesn't yield objective knowledge. It's not a scientific method. And as I have said over and over and over again, if you want to answer vague questions like "who is the best rock band ever" those kinds of questions do reduce to subjective bias. But that isn't a good way to organize a study. A better question might be "which rock band was the most popular". Then you could create a scale which measured popularity by several indices (records sold, concert attendance, and so on). The actions that people take on an ongoing sustained basis exist independently of my perceptions and definitions. I can't change the level of economic activity for example, by changing a variable in a mathematical equation. I may be able to develop a better theory by changing a variable. But my better theory doesn't change the level of economic activity. The only way my theory can effect the world is if people act on it. If that action produces the result my theory said it would, then my confidence in my theory is increased. So in the end, I can have objective knowledge about humans because at least some of the things humans do have properties that permit for us to have objective knowledge. And I still don't see how your use of precise differs from the normal sense of precise as "exact". You wrote this:
If I step on it 1,000 times, the average of all those measurements is going to be very very close to my actual weight. Voila! That is how an imprecise instrument can lead to enhanced confidence in our knowledge of the true value of eric’s weight.
Right-in some instances any one measurement is imprecise or inexact. And it is also unreliable. Through repeated replication and sampling, we reduce error and become more precise. That is why you don't sample three girls at a rock concert. It doesn't matter how "exact" or "precise" your scale is, because your sample size is not meaningful. Sure, you can say I have exactly a "10" on my scale, but you have an imprecise measure of public opinion. If you want a precise measure of how teenage girls think about rock bands, you need a well designed survey and a large, random sample. Then your results become more "exact" and your instrument is more "exact" as well.

eric · 10 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: And as I have said over and over and over again, if you want to answer vague questions like "who is the best rock band ever" those kinds of questions do reduce to subjective bias. But that isn't a good way to organize a study. A better question might be "which rock band was the most popular"
That would indeed be an easier way to organize a study. But you are not now measuring the quantity I said was subjective (bestness), you're measuring a proxy. You have, without knowing it, done exactly what you claimed you weren't doing: you have limited science to objective entities such as the number of tickets exchanged for money or the number of people showing up at a certain place at a certain time. Philosophically you're not going to convince me that the scientific method can be applied to subjective property A by demonstrating that you can successfully measure proxy value B (unless you can draw a deductive or mathematical relationship between A and B).

eric · 10 June 2009

oops that should read "quantities" not "entities."

Chip Poirot · 10 June 2009

eric said Philosophically you’re not going to convince me that the scientific method can be applied to subjective property A by demonstrating that you can successfully measure proxy value B (unless you can draw a deductive or mathematical relationship between A and B).
Like I said at the very beginning, the scientific method can and should be applied as broadly as possible. I don't see science as dealing with the idiosyncratic or personal. The sentence: "Cabernet is better than Merlot" is not the kind of thing that one would seek to study "scientifically". If you misunderstood me to mean that any and all questions could be studied scientifically, then I apologize for imprecise use of language. What I have been trying to persuade you of is the view that many things that people leave "outside of science" really should not be. There are areas where answers cannot be definitive. But that doesn't mean we just throw up our hands and walk away or resort to "anything goes". At least many aspects of the social sciences do have objective properties as you are using the term "objective". Even some aspects of the humanities are objective. Sentences like "Blake is a better poet than Shakespeare" is not a scientific sentence. Nor would I try to quantify Blake or Shakespeare or eliminate emotion, value and meaning from Shakespeare. But if I want to understand Shakespeare better I can approach the study of Shakespeare scientifically by doing things like actually reading Shakespeare, learning about Victorian England, and so on. I can understand Blake better by understanding how he responded to the Industrial Revolution. I can study how he uses metaphor and imagery to make a point. I'm not even sure saying Blake is better than Shakespeare has meaning. But even in the Humanities I can still test my interpretations against evidence. There are good interpretations of texts and bad interpretations of texts. Going back to the original example of someone saying that marriage is outside of science. Well, yes and no. Certainly my love for my wife is not something that is really scientific. On the other hand, suppose a couple is having marital issues. I'm not advocating people abandon emotion and passion. But certainly making an effort to be objective could be helpful. So could a third party who doesn't have a stake in the conflict. So if a couple goes to a marriage counselor, that couple would be better off going to a marriage counselor who was evidence driven rather than agenda driven.

eric · 11 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: The sentence: "Cabernet is better than Merlot" is not the kind of thing that one would seek to study "scientifically".... ...Sentences like "Blake is a better poet than Shakespeare" is not a scientific sentence. ...Certainly my love for my wife is not something that is really scientific.
Great! We seem to be in agreement. Chip, I do not think any scientist, anywhere, will dispute that the scientific method can be applied to inexact problems or areas where our knowledge is poor - where our knowledge is subjective the way you use the term. I think the only dispute comes when someone claims that science can be used to study "subjective quantities" like poetic quality, love, good/evil, aesthetics, etc... At best, one can take a scientific approach to studying objective (in my terms) phenomena that serve as proxies of those things, but science and the scientific method can't get at those things directly. Now, there's two ways to respond to this observation (that science can't get at things like artistic quality directly). One can say that knowledge of artistic quality is unscientific. Or one can say that we can't truly "know" anything about artistic quality, because knowledge only comes about through the scientific method. When you make statements like this:
I'm not even sure saying Blake is better than Shakespeare has meaning.
You are articulating to the latter view. Now philosophers have been arguing about what constitutes knowledge for millennia. I think its fair to say that while you may have your idea about what knowledge is and I may have mine, neither one of us has come up with THE answer. If we had, we'd be on the front of various magazines. But, what I would argue is that one can gain practically useful information about concepts such as "love" or "artistic quality" through study, and so from a practical standpoint it makes sense to talk about unscientific knowledge. The arts and humanities are valuable and wonderful things. They don't lose all value simply because the understanding they provide cannot be shoehorned into the methodology of science.

Chip Poirot · 11 June 2009

Eric,

Let's suppose a Humanities Professor wants to attempt to resolve a disputed area on Shakespeare studies.

Should this Humanities Professor:

1. Read Shakespeare and relevant secondary sources on Shakespeare;
2. Investigate Shakespeare's time period and understand the context in which Shakespeare wrote;
3. Arrive at a conclusion based on the evidence and judicious application of reason-
4. Try to publish the results in a peer reviewed journal on Shakespeare and subject his or her work to critical scrutiny:

Or, should this Humanities Professor:

1. Simply say Shakespeare is so sublime that it would be destroying art and beauty to attempt to subject Shakespeare to a critical investigation?

The first strategy is in many ways similar to what natural scientists do. The object of study may not be so precise and of course you can't do a controlled experiment. The data will be more fragmented. And thus the conclusion more tenuous.

But if Humanities Professors were to keep at it and really endeavored to arrive at the truth,it would be possible to increase their confidence in their views on Shakespeare.

Or let's take another example:

A Historian wants to test competing hypotheses about the Nazi regime. There is a historical consensus that the Nazi's systematically murdered about 9-12 million people. But historians disagree about when and how this policy emerged.

How should the historian try to settle this question? Should the historian just declare Nazism to be evil and deem the question inappropriate-or should the historian actually go and read documents, review evidence, compare differing interpretations, publish the results, etc?

You say that people have been arguing about what constitutes good knowledge for quite some time, and then seem to imply that because they argue about it, we should give up on it.

That seems to go against your own stated preference-your own view of objective knowledge bears a faint family resemblance to the early Wittgenstein.

In essence, you seem to be suggesting we should just give up on the fields of epistemology and ontology.

I disagree and while my conclusion may be an opinion (e.g. a conclusion or inference based on evidence) it is an opinion that is shared by many.

In many ways, the physical and natural sciences have been a tremendous epistemological success and at least some of the time a tremendous social success (other times not so much). I think its worth studying the evolution of knowledge in the natural sciences to understand how and why, and to compare other fields to see what is the same, and what is different. The roots of the success lay in Enlightenment philosophy. Given this success, why should we abandon the Enlightenment project?

Areas like ethics may not reduce to mathematical equations. But they are amenable to practical experience and cognitively rational discussion.

Kevin B · 11 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: Or let's take another example: A Historian wants to test competing hypotheses about the Nazi regime. There is a historical consensus that the Nazi's systematically murdered about 9-12 million people. But historians disagree about when and how this policy emerged. How should the historian try to settle this question? Should the historian just declare Nazism to be evil and deem the question inappropriate-or should the historian actually go and read documents, review evidence, compare differing interpretations, publish the results, etc?
This counterexample is sufficiently irrelevant to Eric's argument as to support the hypothesis that you haven't really understood Eric's position. Your example has a single, unambiguous, objectively correct answer (even though the evidence might not exist to actually prove the conclusion.) Eric is concerned with questions that don't derive from objective facts. Consider the (less than entirely serious question)
Is Hitler's moustache funnier than Churchill's cigar?
This question simply does not have an objective answer. You might, however, get an objective correlation if you were to ask the question of many people as part of a questionnaire on political views.

eric · 11 June 2009

Chip Poirot said: In essence, you seem to be suggesting we should just give up on the fields of epistemology and ontology.
Not at all. I might suggest, however, that a singular focus on 'knowledge' or 'truth' sometimes results in ignoring 'useful.' Don't make perfection the enemy of good. Avoid the "philosopher in the headlights" syndrome of thinking that we must stop and fix a kludgy, incomplete, inelegant theorem before we proceed; that is not how science generally works. As the saying goes: ALL models are wrong...some are useful. If you want to know my opinion on why science has been so successful, that is one of the keys. We let theologists worry about Truth and focus instead on useful. I sometimes suspect that philosophers would prefer everyone use relativistic calculations to calculate how much gas a car uses going to and from the grocery store. That would be closer to Truth, but it wouldn't be useful.

eric · 11 June 2009

P.S. using Nazis as an example is generally NOT something one does if one really wants to "de-escalate tension."

Chip Poirot · 11 June 2009

eric said: P.S. using Nazis as an example is generally NOT something one does if one really wants to "de-escalate tension."
You misunderstood the example. I'm not calling people Nazis or implying that anyone is a sympathizer with holocaust revisionism. I'm taking a very real existing problem in historical interpretation: functionalists vs. intentionalists and using it to show how a coherent research strategy can lead to objective truth, or at least more objective truth. I also use it because I have done recent reading on historical interpretations of the Nazi era so it is fresh in my mind. So I assure you, no insults were or are intended at all. So here we have an event X in history: the holocaust. Why should we accept it? I think we should accept because it is so overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. What historians do argue about in this instance is the interpretation of the evidence. So I think my question is fair. If I want to understand the Nazi regime how do I go about doing so? And if my use of the Nazi regime as a problem in historical investigation and interpretation is too sensitive, then pick another historical problem: the Norman Conquest, Imperialism, Manifest Destiny, the rise and fall of great powers, the industrial revolution. There are basically two overarching approaches to historical interpretation. One approach is that historical events, personalities and events are inherently subjective in nature and hence all we can do is write competing narratives. In principle, any narrative is as good as any other. You could following this principle, even deny the holocaust as fact (though many of the proponents of this view would not do so) and simply argue that our interpretations of the holocaust are just a construction. After all, the allies were biased too. The other approach is that there really was a history and that through systematic investigation we can actually arrive at better historical interpretations by following basice rules such as evidence, etc. We can then test our interpretations against the evidence and against counterarguments based on counter evidence. Through truth seeking and systematic investigation, we winnow out bias and selectivity and at least get closer to the truth, and perhaps, even to the truth itself. There are variations on these views but these are the two big ones. I think the latter is an adaptation of the scientific method and is how we should approach the social sciences and history. There is no need to get offended by my use of the Nazi era as an example here. And no-I am not making the perfect the enemy of the good. To the contrary, I entirely recognize that our knowledge of the social sciences and history is fragmented and in fact corrupted by bad practice, and worsened by epistemological relativism. But just because we don't have the "perfect" and may not get it, is no reason to accept the bad. I'll happily settle for the good.

Chip Poirot · 11 June 2009

We let theologists worry about Truth and focus instead on useful. I sometimes suspect that philosophers would prefer everyone use relativistic calculations to calculate how much gas a car uses going to and from the grocery store. That would be closer to Truth, but it wouldn’t be useful.
Even if I accepted your epistemology of constructive empiricism (which I do not) that still would not justify using bad methods in the social sciences (though lord knows it has been done-all you have to do is read Paul Samuelson's Nobel Prize address). Constructive empiricism still relies on appraising theories against evidence. A theory or model must still be testable and it must be operationalizable and make useful predictions-even if some parts of it are oversimplified or even false. Constructive empiricism seeks more powerful and more reliable models-i.e. models that are more and more consistent with the evidence and which explain more evidence. Constructive empiricists still would prefer a more realistic model over a less realistic model, all other things held equal. If you constantly improve your model so that your model incorporates more and more realistic assumptions, and makes more and more useful predictions, you eventually get a very, very reliable model for which you have a very strong warrant of belief to act on. If I say that the world conforms to P, and that P is reliable, and that I am willing to act on P, then I am saying that P is true. If you want, you can restrict a theory like Newton's to a specific domain (it is extremely reliable for day to day activities) so that Newton's theory is true just under conditions x, y and z. I prefer Einstein's theory because it is true under more empirical cases-it is more general. So, long story short: I accept constructive empiricism as a place holder. But the goal is truth.

Chip Poirot · 11 June 2009

Kevin B wrote: Your example has a single, unambiguous, objectively correct answer (even though the evidence might not exist to actually prove the conclusion.) Eric is concerned with questions that don’t derive from objective facts.
And that is my point: many issues in history and the social sciences can in fact be settled by the use of scientific methods-or if you prefer, adaptations of the scientific method. I am in fact arguing that many facets of human experience do not reduce to mere opinion-but can be settled, or at least better understood by using good research methods. It might help if I repeat the origin of this thread: Someone said that many areas of their lives were outside of science and proceeded to give several examples like committee meetings and marriage. I may have opened myself to criticism by using a somewhat hyperbolic statement such as "when we see science as a method, strictly speaking, nothing is exempt from science". I say may have, because if you back and read the posts in context, it is pretty clear that my point was that many areas that people assume they can just throw up their hands and declare the matter one of opinion, are not. They yield to systematic investigation because they do have properties that exist outside of my perception or thoughts about them. I didn't mean that science tried to investigage idiosyncratic issues like who has a funnier mustache. You could however investigate the effectiveness of humor. The sentence "9-12 million people were systematically murdered by the Nazis" is a conclusion drawn from many documents. As I noted above, this conclusion is not in dispute. What is in dispute is when, where, how and why the policy emerged. And that question too should not be left to opinion, but to systematic investigation.