Marc Hauser: Moral Grammar

1. Christians who argue that atheists have no principled foundations for their morality and ethics need to take another look at their Bible which contradicts their claims.

One problem with this idea is that there is almost no behaviour which has not been acceptable, or even compulsory, in some society. Human sacrifice? almost everybody, so that must be one of the "unconscious and inaccessible principles that are operative in our moral judgments". Sexual deviations? Don't ask- incest for Egyptians, temple prostitutes, pederasty- all have been 'holy' somewhere sometime. Gluttony and deep drinking was the correct way to demonstrate leadership in Germany right up to the 30 Years War. Slavery, murder, and the forcible extraction of the widow's mite were mainstream Christianity up to the nineteenth century.

Hauser's 'Moral Instinct Theory" parallels that of the Symonds 'Mega Motivation Theory' : "We are motivated by those Values of which we can conceive of nothing greater" :

Beauty
Freedom
Happiness
Life
love
Peace
Truth

Richard W. Symonds
England

There seem to be rather more moral aphasics than such a theory would allow.

When neuroscientists prove that we have any generative grammar built in, we need to discuss how they evolved. Meanwhile, we have proof that symbol-like processing such as underlies grammars or other models of abstract thinking doesn't need to be built in but can be learned by neural networks that work sufficiently like a real brain:

"Cognitive modeling with neural networks is sometimes criticized for failing to show generalization. That is, neural networks are thought to be extremely dependent on their training (which is particularly true if they are "overtrained" on the input training set). Furthermore, they do not explicitly perform any "symbolic" processing, which some believe to be very important for abstract thinking involved in reasoning, mathematics, and even language.

However, recent advances in neural network modeling have rendered this criticism largely obsolete. In this article from the Proceedings of the National Academy, Rougier et al. demonstrate how a specific network architecture - modeled loosely on what is known about dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area and the basal ganglia to prefrontal cortex - can capture both generalization and symbol-like processing, simply by incorporating biologically-plausible simulations of neural computation." ( http://develintel.blogspot.com/2006/10/generalization-and-symbolic-processing.html )

Unfortunately, the bible also contradicts its own claims. Old testament laws are at odds with both Hauser's results, and the new testament. An "eye for an eye" vs "do as you are done by".

One problem with this idea is that there is almost no behaviour which has not been acceptable, or even compulsory, in some society.

— Paul Burke

That's not a problem, it merely shows that these rules of the moral grammar are shaped by culture, religion etc into moral laws. What Hauser is pointing out that there exist some (abstract) concepts which appear to be unique amongst cultures.

Then how is it possible to falsify the "moral grammar" theory? If it can explain both incest-as-religious-imperative and incest-as-deepest-taboo, if it is supposed to cover the human sacrifice of the Aztecs and pacifism of the Amish, then what is it actually purporting to explain? And what specifically is it predicting?

There is plenty of empirical evidence for some sort of universal structuring of human grammar. What is the evidence that such exists for moral reasoning?

Then how is it possible to falsify the "moral grammar" theory? If it can explain both incest-as-religious-imperative and incest-as-deepest-taboo, if it is supposed to cover the human sacrifice of the Aztecs and pacifism of the Amish, then what is it actually purporting to explain? And what specifically is it predicting? There is plenty of empirical evidence for some sort of universal structuring of human grammar. What is the evidence that such exists for moral reasoning?

Hauser begins the book with a bold theoretical claim: "we evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action." Of course, the author does not believe that we are born with specific moral rules (e.g., "do not cheat on your spouse"), because this would not explain why different cultures have created different moral systems. Rather, his theory draws from an analogy to linguistics. In the 1950s, the MIT linguist Noam Chomsky began developing the view that humans possess a "language organ" that contains a universal grammar. This grammar, in Chomsky's explanation, consists of universal syntactical rules and parameters that encode differences among languages. Learning the syntax of a specific language mainly involves setting the parameters of the universal grammar to the language-specific values. Using this theory as a blueprint for his own account, Hauser argues that we are endowed with an abstract universal moral grammar with parameters that encode cultural differences. [This argument has also been developed by John Mikhail in his doctoral dissertation (1) and a forthcoming book (2).] The moral grammar along with a variety of cognitive competencies underlies our morality.

Regardless of how convincing Hauser's theory eventually proves, its boldness turns reading Moral Minds into a suspenseful experience. Near the end, Hauser reveals that he does not expect a definitive resolution soon and that he considers his theory a framework for future research rather than a summary of a finished project: "By leaning on the linguistic analogy, however, we open the door to these questions, and wait for the relevant theoretical insights and observations."

Then how is it possible to falsify the "moral grammar" theory? If it can explain both incest-as-religious-imperative and incest-as-deepest-taboo, if it is supposed to cover the human sacrifice of the Aztecs and pacifism of the Amish, then what is it actually purporting to explain? And what specifically is it predicting?

I am confused why people are making such a big deal about the theory presented by Hauser, it provides for an exciting outline as to how we may start to begin thinking about how to tie together these often disparate findings. How does one show an innate foundation for morality? For instance via 'experiments' with children, and as some have stated, by comparing what is the commonality amongst cultures and other animals.

I am confused why people are making such a big deal about the theory presented by Hauser, ...

How does one show an innate foundation for morality?

What jeffw, Paul Burke and Zarquon seem to object to is your attempt to turn this into some sort of Christian apologetic where Biblical morality is written on atheist hearts.

That's a good question, but it potentially carries hidden assumptions about what is innate. Which is certainly the case if you try to drag one specific religion into the picture ignoring all others.

Is it possible all morality is relative and culurally determined, shaped only by the necessity of keeping groups of human beings work together?

Is there really anything innate about what we normally call morality? There probably is something innate, but I wouldn't imagine you could find that in religion which overlays a lot of other things into the mix.

Actually, I am arguing that Christians have no cause to state that Atheists lack a principled foundation of morality and I am arguing that Hauser gives a reason why atheists and Christians share similar moralities...

... I am arguing that Hauser's findings should be exciting to Christians and Atheists alike.

I am limiting myself to Christianity because it seems to argue in favor of an innate morality...

... and I am most familiar with Christianity.

Is it possible all morality is relative and culurally determined, shaped only by the necessity of keeping groups of human beings work together?

There probably is something innate, but I wouldn't imagine you could find that in religion which overlays a lot of other things into the mix.

I am confused why people are making such a big deal about the theory presented by Hauser, it provides for an exciting outline as to how we may start to begin thinking about how to tie together these often disparate findings.

First remember that the grammar does not explain actual moral behavior and laws, it merely argues that there exists a universal foundation of 'rules' which get applied. What it explains is the almost universal set of rules of morality while accepting that cultures make variation of said rules. Same applies to languages, while a linguistic grammar may exist which is innate to us, languages are still shaped by society, time, etc.

What jeffw, Paul Burke and Zarquon seem to object to is your attempt to turn this into some sort of Christian apologetic where Biblical morality is written on atheist hearts.

2. Of course both Christians and atheists can take these new scientific findings, one accepting that these rules were Created by God, while the other can avoid such conclusions by observing how these rules would have arisen via evolutionary processes.

I am arguing that Hauser's findings should be exciting to Christians and Atheists alike.

I am arguing that Hauser gives a reason why atheists and Christians share similar moralities...

2. Of course both Christians and atheists can take these new scientific findings, one accepting that these rules were Created by God, while the other can avoid such conclusions by observing how these rules would have arisen via evolutionary processes. because AFAICT, these two statements are mutually exclusive.

If Hauser has any findings, they are not in evidence.

And if I had any excitement about this, it wouldn't be because I'm an atheist.

There are two underlying reasons that many Christians claim that morality comes from God: one is so that they can argue that, since there is a shared morality, there must be a God. The other is so they can state their own moral pronouncements as absolutes, rather than merely their opinion, on the pretense that they are just stating what God has decreed.

Hauser seems to have some kind of coherent idea here, or at least the basis for one, indicating a direction for future study into how moral systems arise and how they act.

Is purpose the absence of purposelessness?

Oh whoa that is so deep

If there is an argument from shared morality, how do you interpret Collins' stance that it is that very morality that isolates humans as "special creations"?

It seems to me, that if the argument of shared morality was a pervasive one, that Collins would argue the exact opposite of that

With regard to PvM's original question for this thread, I suggest looking into the anthropological literature about hunter-gatherer societies. These, especially if not modified by being close to agriculturists, best resemble the way humans have lived for all but the last 11,000 years or so. This means that almost all genetic development had occur ed before agriculture.

Who knows? Arguing is fun, I suppose, but there seems little content in the entire thread for lack of facts.
(The main and important exception is Torbjeorn's post regarding neural nets. That will actually be useful to me...)

If there is an argument from shared morality, how do you interpret Collins' stance that it is that very morality that isolates humans as "special creations"?

It seems to me, that if the argument of shared morality was a pervasive one, that Collins would argue the exact opposite of that

animals documented to have morals equivalent to humans would support the idea of shared morality, yes?

I'm not aware of any such documentation, and that's way beyond Hauser's claim.

But far worse is that PvM's insertion of the atheist/Christian element gets everything wrong.

— Popper

There are two underlying reasons that many Christians claim that morality comes from God: one is so that they can argue that, since there is a shared morality, there must be a God. The other is so they can state their own moral pronouncements as absolutes, rather than merely their opinion, on the pretense that they are just stating what God has decreed. The notion that God implanted us with "rules" that manifest as our moral judgments not only undermines these applications, but goes against Christian doctrines of free will and original sin.

— Popper

God told Adam and Eve not to eat the apple, they had the choice as to whether to obey, and they chose not to, out of their autonomous free will, not because God's implanted rules failed to function. If this parable suggests anything innate, it's inquisitiveness and resistance to authority --- which are to be punished. As Bertrand Russell said, "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the will to find out, which is the exact opposite", and "So far as I can remember, there is not one word in the Gospels in praise of intelligence".

Let me amend that a little. If Hauser's work panned out and, as PvM seems to suggest, it led Christians to reevaluate their beliefs about the source of morality, such that they no longer claimed that atheists can't be moral, then I would be ... not excited, but glad of the consequence. However, I would glad of that consequence no matter how it came to be, and I have no reason to think that Hauser will have any more influence over self-serving Christian BS than any other science or reason has had.

— Popper

To be explicit, the theory that I have developed in Moral Minds is a descriptive theory of morality. It describes the unconscious and inaccessible principles that are operative in our moral judgments. It does not provide an account of what people ought to do. It is not, therefore, a prescriptive theory of morality.

— Hauser

Hauser aside, you, meanwhile, seem to be shrugging off a scientific approach to this while pushing some kind of philosophical ideas instead, and using Hauser's proposed objective framework as a wedge to promote some subjective ideas you have about morality even though Hauser's work seems to be much too tentative to support something like that. This is not an appropriate use of science.

I answer that, Man has free will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free will.

Popper may not have thought the following through when he wrote that

sorry, i guess it's a bit tangential, but I didn't find Hauser's postulations to be particularly interesting

the fact that we can point to the very behaviors that Collins thinks "special" to humans in other animals undermines the morality-as-indicator argument

In other words, the idea that God 'implanted' us with a moral grammar neither undermines the notion of free will nor the Christian doctrines on such

As to Collins' position, these words by Aquinas may be helpful, which also addresses free will but argues that while animals have instinctual behavior humans have the capability of reason and as such can make a judgement or choice. It's this ability to chose which gives man free will and thus free man from being bound to instinctual responses. Note that I am not agreeing or disagreeing with this, just attempting to find out how Collins' builds his argument. It seems time to get his book and read it.

One could waste a lifetime shoving logical and factual counterarguments into the black hole of religious apologetics.

STJ,

Having now read your second link, I see that Collins uses an argument very similar to the one I said many Christians use, so it seems we had a miscommunication, apparently because you took my "shared morality" to mean shared between humans and other animals, whereas I meant shared among humans. I see how you would think that in the context of Hauser; sorry for not being clear. Collins argues that humans, as distinct from other animals, have a "Moral Law", shared among all humans (as allegedly evidenced by being professed by all faiths). And he claims that evolution can't explain it (argumentum ad ignorantiam) because it's "selfless altruism", and therefore it must have come from God (false dichotomy). The altruism claim is quite absurd -- group sanctions against oppression, murder, treachery, falsehood, partiality, and dishonesty are obviously in the interests of potential victims of these acts, and don't require true altruism for explanation. It's hardly surprising that not only do we punish people for violations, but we use various forms of indoctrination to inculcate internalization of these principles in children and others, and that sort of induced "altruism" is no more inexplicable than the fact that some parasites cause their hosts to act in the parasite's interest and not the host's. And "almsgiving", while not as transparently self-interested, reduces theft and other sorts of social disorder, and also provides a "safety net" to potential victims of society. It seems that Collins, like so-called social "conservatives", can't recognize his own interests and thus thinks that his "Moral Law" is irrational and therefore (?) must be God-given. As you say, he ignores "entire fields in biology and psychology". As for "how he could", it's just (heh heh) a matter of having a certain brain state. Illogic seems to come quite easily to humans, especially when logic is competing with powerful memes like the religion complex (and Gorthof demonstrates at length just how incredibly shoddy and illogical Collins is on this matter). Symbolic and sentential reasoning is a rather late development, enabled by language; it doesn't seem as though evolution had a chance to prepare us well for it. I think it's more surprising that Collins or any of us can do it as well as we do (but I don't conclude that, therefore, we must have received logic from God).

and also provides a "safety net" to potential victims of society

Gorthof

I don't see how you can decouple a "moral grammar" from its implementation. The analogy with languages doesn't hold, because language is born of the need (and ability) to communicate memes. And "deep structures" don't show anything more than the possibility that the language meme has a single origin.

Similarly, if the moral grammar shows nothing more than a propensity to create a sets of rules which appear to give advantage to the group, that is no more a necessity for any social animal. The interesting meme is that which suggests that individual members of a group can gain advantage by cheating on the accepted rules. So rather than a universal moral grammar, we now have an ecosystem of competing memes, and it is the balance between group and individual advantage (and its detailed history) that results in what we call that group's morality.

And "almsgiving", while not as transparently self-interested, reduces theft and other sorts of social disorder

As for "how he could", it's just (heh heh) a matter of having a certain brain state. Illogic seems to come quite easily to humans, especially when logic is competing with powerful memes like the religion complex (and Gorthof demonstrates at length just how incredibly shoddy and illogical Collins is on this matter).

for example, ID is an entirely vacuous concept from the get-go, and while we (all?) disagreed with Pim in that rather LONG thread that there was any scientific grounding to construct an ID hypothesis, the attempt by MacNeill in his course, and Pim here, to explore it as if there were, and THEN showing how even if we accepted some faulty assumptions, ID still is not conducive to testing or prediction, did seem to manage to convert at least some fencesitters who thought that dismissing the concept of ID out of hand was not valid.

well, it's 2am here, so my brain is shutting down for the night.

this is turning into an interesting thread.

I really would like to take what Korthoff started in his anlaysis, and run it all the way out to explore the finer points, utilizing Collins as a perfect example of a very well educated individual who still espouses some apparently very ignorant conceptualizations.

that said, there is of course the flip side which interests me as a biologist, which is the discussion of the evolution of social systems that arises out of the analysis of behavior and morality put forward by people like Collins.

I didn't note this earlier:

"Of course both Christians and atheists can take these new scientific findings, one accepting that these rules were Created by God, while the other can avoid such conclusions by observing how these rules would have arisen via evolutionary processes."

Mutual exclusive choices, and above all false dichotomy. If neuroscientists prove that we have any generative grammar built in, scientists need to find out how they evolved.

Also, atheism has nothing to do with morality or vice versa. That religions concerns themselves with moral claims doesn't mean atheism does. Another false dichotomy.

"Chomsky's work in this area is still fundamentally crucial to math peoples and computer scientists, but it is less clear whether it still entirely holds in linguistics."

Is this so? My vague recollection is that generative grammars gives too many errors in software when translating speech between languages or extract meaning, so statistical methods are used instead. But perhaps I misunderstand the reference.

"The interesting meme is that which suggests that individual members of a group can gain advantage by cheating on the accepted rules."

AFAIK cheating only works then interactions aren't repeatable or cheating infer nonlinear advantage. It is interesting that one (the only AFAIK) strategy found that beats tit-for-tat with slight forgiveness is cheating by groups, where some members are sacrificial lambs.

"What we did have, in that thread, in this thread, and from Collins, is people putting forth unjustified claims and then foisting the burden of proof onto those who --- rationally and reasonably --- don't accept the claims."

Exactly!

Also, atheism has nothing to do with morality or vice versa.

That sounds like an interesting project, but it seems like you would need Collins's cooperation, otherwise it gets close to Frist diagnosing Schiavo.

What I believe we can say at present is that animals have some of the key components that enter into our moral faculty. That is, they have some of the building blocks that make moral judgments possible in humans. What is missing, with the strong caveat that no one has really looked, is evidence that animals make moral judgments of others, assigning functional labels such as "right," "wrong," "good," "bad" and so on to either actions or individuals.

What I believe we can say at present is that animals have some of the key components that enter into our moral faculty. That is, they have some of the building blocks that make moral judgments possible in humans. What is missing, with the strong caveat that no one has really looked, is evidence that animals make moral judgments of others, assigning functional labels such as "right," "wrong," "good," "bad" and so on to either actions or individuals.

As far as Collins goes, wtf? Did I hear the words Sky Daddy in there somewhere?? How's a smart guy have anything to do with an organized religion or a personified godhead?

Blah blah blah God . . . Blah blah blah No God . . . blah blah blah . . . God . . . blah blah blah No God . . . . . God . . . No God . . . God . . . No God . . .

ZZZZZZZZzzzzzzzzzzzzz . . . . . . . . . . .

yes, lenny everyone is aware of your objections to debate on these issues.

I take it, since Pim hasn't contributed to this thread in a couple of days now, that he has lost interest in detailing his argument further?

On the contrary, my next installment is on its way. But I do have to deal with other things than PandasThumb

Dawkins's own attempt at a natural history is Darwinian, but not in the way you might expect. He is skeptical that religion has any survival value, contending that its cost in blood and guilt outweighs any conceivable benefits.

— Dawkins

Religious beliefs, on this view, benefit neither us nor our genes; they benefit themselves.

But the objectivity of ethics is undermined by Dawkins's logic just as surely as religion is. The evolutionary biologist E. O. Wilson, in a 1985 paper written with the philosopher Michael Ruse, put the point starkly: ethics "is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate," and "the way our biology enforces its ends is by making us think that there is an objective higher code to which we are all subject." In reducing ideas to "memes" that propagate by various kinds of "misfiring," Dawkins is, willy-nilly, courting what some have called Darwinian nihilism. He is also hasty in dismissing the practical benefits of religion. Surveys have shown that religious people live longer (probably because they have healthier lifestyles) and feel happier (perhaps owing to the social support they get from church). Judging from birthrate patterns in the United States and Europe, they also seem to be outbreeding secular types, a definite Darwinian advantage. On the other hand, Dawkins is probably right when he says that believers are no better than atheists when it comes to behaving ethically. One classic study showed that "Jesus people" were just as likely to cheat on tests as atheists and no more likely to do altruistic volunteer work. Oddly, Dawkins does not bother to cite such empirical evidence; instead, he relies, rather unscientifically, on his intuition. "I'm inclined to suspect," he writes, "that there are very few atheists in prison." (Even fewer Unitarians, I'd wager.)

A good interview with Hauser where he addresses questions like

Q: Youve written that the human sense of right and wrong has evolved. If we have a moral instinct, why did it evolve? What are the advantages?

Q: But there is a difference between a social hierarchy and morality. Right?

Q: So the ramifications here are enormous, for parenting, school, religion.
Isn't that where most people think they get their sense of right and wrong from?

Q: Youve spent a lot of time studying animals. In terms of "mental toolkits" what are a few things we have in common? What are some of the most striking differences?

Q: If our moral instinct, and guilt along with it, are inherited, do you foresee a way in the future to pinpoint that this gene does this, or this gene does that?

Q: Are we still evolving? If so, is our moral instinct evolving as well?

Q: Some think we're not evolving anymore, that natural selection requires isolation. You don't share that view?

Q: Let's talk about evolution in the United States. If you don't accept evolution, how can you learn biology? Or genetics? How do you see the issue of evolution and education?

I read your last 3 posts, but have yet to see the point you are trying to make with them.

where, exactly, are you taking us here, Pim?

as to Dawkins/hauser...

Hauser, based on the interviews, seems to advocate the old non-overlapping magisteria conceptualization.

Dawkins, along with many others (including myself), think that is basically horsecrap, and glosses over the claims religion attempts to make as a way of "knowing". It goes far beyond the analysis of religion's social impacts, and back to the basic philosophical arguments waged even before Gould.

so in my mind, it is hardly surprising Dawkins would find a support of such to not be interesting.

Just to be clear, Pim, are you attempting to use Hauser to support the idea of non-overlapping magisteria?

Dawkins wrote: Dawkins's own attempt at...

He is skeptical that religion has any survival value, contending that its cost in blood and guilt outweighs any conceivable benefits.

But the objectivity of ethics is undermined by Dawkins's logic just as surely as religion is.

Dawkins refers to himself as Dawkins?

Just to be clear, Pim, are you attempting to use Hauser to support the idea of non-overlapping magisteria?

No, it's not. Not as long as we value our lives and our civilization. When we do that we can reason out what needs to be done to preserve and enhance what we value.

There does not have to be an objective higher code to which we are all subject. Instead, our morals are relative to things we value and because of that, bound to come into conflict.

There may be no objective way to resolve the conflicts, but that is not the same as having no ethics.

I read your last 3 posts, but have yet to see the point you are trying to make with them. where, exactly, are you taking us here, Pim?

Is reason sufficient...

...and is what is reasonable to one, reasonable or acceptable to others?

For moral ethics to work, they need to be accepted by the group.

Are there other aspects which facilitate our moral choices?

... inherent rules as argued by Hauser?

I am not convinced that reason can be argued to be sufficient a foundation for ethics.

I understand the argument but I find it to have little force.

If there are no objective higher code then how can we come to agree?

... there is lacking foundation for said ethics.

For instance kinship selection and reciprocal altruism capture a notion that self preservation and preservation of those 'closely' related can be relevant objective concepts.

In fact, interestingly these concepts also overlap with what evolutionary processes would preserve/select for.

PvM wrote: Is reason sufficient... Only when people have similar values. And since we're all built on a similar genetic plan we should inherit very similar values.

...and is what is reasonable to one, reasonable or acceptable to others? Not always, and religion is one of the big dividers on what people find valuable.

For moral ethics to work, they need to be accepted by the group. That's why they can't be based on religion unless a certain religion is shared by the group.

Are there other aspects which facilitate our moral choices? Yes, there's art. Mark Twain and his Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn novels probably did more define our particular American morality than the Bible ever did.

... inherent rules as argued by Hauser? Maybe. Hauser's ideas are too premature. Science cannot yet back them up or test them.

I am not convinced that reason can be argued to be sufficient a foundation for ethics. Not alone. But with values, yes. And with help from artists.

I understand the argument but I find it to have little force. Is that all you've got, a subjective sense of lack of force?

If there are no objective higher code then how can we come to agree?

Because reason should, one hopes, work as precisely with our shared values as mathematics works with numbers.

... there is lacking foundation for said ethics. You want a foundation beyond reason and shared human values?

For instance kinship selection and reciprocal altruism capture a notion that self preservation and preservation of those 'closely' related can be relevant objective concepts. And you're using scientific reason to figure that out?

In fact, interestingly these concepts also overlap with what evolutionary processes would preserve/select for. At best that might lead to moral and ethical instincts, but moral and ethical instincts are not always best, and they really don't have any more foundation than reason and values. They're just feelings and unconscious decisions

Some good sites on the topic of morals, ethics and values

"Atheism Provides No Basis for Ethics" From SkepticWiki

Wikipedia

Categorical Imperatives

Atheism

Guide to Ethics & Morality: Principles, Problems, and Questions

If there are no objective higher code then how can we come to agree?

I think we can all agree that morality is shaped by society, and reason certainly play a role in shaping morality but is reason alone sufficient? So what about 'values', a somewhat vague concept which again refers to the outcome of the process of reason.

Hauser aside, you, meanwhile, seem to be shrugging off a scientific approach to this while pushing some kind of philosophical ideas instead, and using Hauser's proposed objective framework as a wedge to promote some subjective ideas you have about morality even though Hauser's work seems to be much too tentative to support something like that. This is not an appropriate use of science.

On the contrary, I am using it as that which combines us all, christian and atheist alike. Of course, this is appropriate use of science, like Dawkins' statement that Darwin made it possible to be a fulfilled atheist (I paraphrase) for instance.

Similarly, your use of a tenuous connection to Hauser's valid (as far as I can tell, at least, valid) developing scientific proto-theory to browbeat people into accepting your ideas about what the things that combine "us all, christian and atheist alike", is a terrible use of science. You have repeatedly used this subject to contrive attacks on Dawkins, but your behavior on the way to doing so makes you as bad as or worse than Dawkins in this regard.

The fifth problem: Collins implicitly makes animals morally inferior because only humans received the Moral Law (from God). Animals did not receive the Moral Law (12). Otherwise, humans would not be unique in that respect. This is an inescapable logical conclusion from Collins view of the origin of the Moral Law.

Another implication of his view would be that animals behave immorally.

Research of animal behaviour shows there is continuity between animals (primates) and humans. Animals do show altruistic behaviour and cooperation (12). This should not surprise Collins, because he knows that continuity exists at the genetic level between humans and other species. Amazingly, Collins problems with the Moral Law arise out of a failure to accept that humans are an evolved species including their behaviour characteristics. For me this animals-are-inferior-view is another rational and emotional reason to reject the Christian point of view (13).

In fact, I believe that religion may be one of the strongest when it comes to common values.

So they can be based on religion after all, while understanding that not all people share the religious foundations?

Group acceptance does not necessarily mean that all accept the religion, just that the group accepts the ethics that are the outcome of religion and other cultural contributions.

And yes, the argument is a philosophical one based upon Hauser's theory of moral grammar. If, as you say, people are unfamiliar with Hauser's position, then perhaps it would help to follow some of the links I provided to become better informed.

If human morality truly operated entirely on the basis of calculations and rational decisions, without much emotional involvement, we would come close to being psychopaths, who indeed do not mean to be kind when they act kindly. Most of us hope to be slightly better than psychopaths; hence the widespread aversion to my black-and-white contrast between Veneer Theory and the other school, which seeks to ground morality in human nature.

The central ideas of what I propose to call the elegant machine view of moral psychology are the three theses I have just sketched. 1. Our moral capacity is subserved by an integrated set of rules or principles which, like the rules of grammar, are designed to work smoothly together. 2. Important features of those rules or principles are innate, and deep differences in moral opinion are to be explained by the fact that some of the innate moral universals are disjunctive. 3. The existence of those innate moral universals has an adaptive explanation. In depicting the elegant machine view I have, of course, been painting with a very broad brush. Nonetheless, I think (1) --- (3) do provide at least a rough sketch of an important position in empirical moral psychology, a position which attracts many people, though some theorists who are broadly sympathetic would emphasize some features of the elegant machine view and downplay others. 3

Interestingly enough deWaal also shows, as Korthof describes in his review of Collins, how Huxley's position that natural selection could not producing anything but nasty organisms, may have held back evolutionary biology when studying morality.

The Homo homini lupusview of our species is recognizable in an influential school of biology, founded by Thomas Henry Huxley, which holds that we are born nasty and selfish.

Art facilitates our moral choices? How? Sure, books and oral transmission are important factors, but how do they facilitate morality?

'nasty' is a subjective interpretation of the term "selfish", and is quite innacurrate when looking at the implications of animal behavior studies for humans.

An atheist before Darwin could have said, following Hume: "I have no explanation for complex biological design. All I know is that God isn't a good explanation, so we must wait and hope that somebody comes up with a better one." I can't help feeling that such a position, though logically sound, would have left one feeling pretty unsatisfied, and that although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.

It is obvious from reading The God Delusion that Dawkins frequents this site, and related sites. It is obvious he refines his ideas while discussing with others, perhaps online. Internet discussion would be a great way for authors to get a sense of what questions need to be answered in the next book, and which issues need to be clarified, what great feedback! In addition, if he is mis-quoted, or otherwise mis-understood, it seems reasonable to assume that he would defend his ideas online.

I should add that before I read the God Delusion I defended religion even if I failed to believe in the specific details. Now I see no reason to keep doing so, nor to continue to hide my true feelings from myself or others. So Richard Dawkins, if you're paying attention at all to this thread, which I realize is at least a possibility, I am glad you speak plainly, that you don't pay your respects to superstition because it is the norm to do so, and I am glad you raised my awareness.

You too, Popper's Ghost.

It is obvious from reading The God Delusion that Dawkins frequents this site,...

It is obvious he refines his ideas while discussing with others, perhaps online.

It's getting to be absolute torture to post here, and I'm about ready to throw in the towel.

; this does not at all say that evolution necessitates atheism.

I think it's more likely a lot of us read Dawkins. I think if Dawkins read this site his arguments would have improved. He actually goofed his last argument on HuffPo: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-dawkins/why-there-almost-certainl_b_32164.html He was too generous with the theological interpretation of the anthropic principle. We talked about that here awhile back and the theists can't really say no stars would form with altered constants.

Natural selection is not just an alternative to chance. It is the only ultimate alternative ever suggested. Design is a workable explanation for organized complexity only in the short term. It is not an ultimate explanation, because designers themselves demand an explanation. If, as Francis Crick and Leslie Orgel once playfully speculated, life on this planet was deliberately seeded by a payload of bacteria in the nose cone of a rocket, we still need an explanation for the intelligent aliens who dispatched the rocket. Ultimately they must have evolved by gradual degrees from simpler beginnings. Only evolution, or some kind of gradualistic 'crane' (to use Daniel Dennett's neat term), is capable of terminating the regress. Natural selection is an anti-chance process, which gradually builds up complexity, step by tiny step. The end product of this ratcheting process is an eye, or a heart, or a brain - a device whose improbable complexity is utterly baffling until you spot the gentle ramp that leads up to it.

PvM wrote: Is reason sufficient... Only when people have similar values. And since we're all built on a similar genetic plan we should inherit very similar values. Interesting, so you seem to accept Hauser's findings. It's hardly self evident that values are inherited.

For moral ethics to work, they need to be accepted by the group. That's why they can't be based on religion unless a certain religion is shared by the group. So they can be based on religion after all, while understanding that not all people share the religious foundations? Group acceptance does not necessarily mean that all accept the religion, just that the group accepts the ethics that are the outcome of religion and other cultural contributions.

Are there other aspects which facilitate our moral choices? Yes, there's art. Mark Twain and his Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn novels probably did more define our particular American morality than the Bible ever did. Art facilitates our moral choices? How? Sure, books and oral transmission are important factors, but how do they facilitate morality? They shape morality. as to your claim about Mark Twain versus the bible, I'd love to see some factual data.

If there are no objective higher code then how can we come to agree? Because there may be an objective 'higher code'? But we are now moving from ethics to 'agreement' which are very different concepts

Because reason should, one hopes, work as precisely with our shared values as mathematics works with numbers. Begging the question

... there is lacking foundation for said ethics. You want a foundation beyond reason and shared human values? It's not what I necessarily want. It's what both science tells us and what reason leads us to conclude. I do not see reason and shared human values as a very coherent argument.

So let's look at some examples, such as altruism and other 'ethical' behaviors found in animals. Do we still consider reason and art to be relevant foundations for their behavior? Or is it more instinctual as empirical data are suggesting?

For that matter, I can't remember seeing Lenny's Pizza Guy

Ah, c'mon, boss, you know you're still getting your propers on pizza--otherwise you probably would've starved to death, with the way you cook (not!) or at least expired of food poisoning.

It's just too much of a pain to comment here in my, um, limited spare minutes.

Not too mention the dearth of entertaining trolls.

Who woulda thunk we'd ever look back on the days of crazy Larry FarFromSane with nostalgia?

And no, it is not correct to say that we inherit "similar values" genetically.

Ah, c'mon, boss, you know you're still getting your propers on pizza---otherwise you probably would've starved to death, with the way you cook (not!) or at least expired of food poisoning.

Why not? Are you sure we don't? Aside from childhood training and culture, where else are they going to come from? Okay, there is that old nature versus nurture debate to be had but twin studies show signs of a lot of personality traits and attitudes (which I think would ultimately have to include values) looking to have a more genetic basis than once assumed: www.personalityresearch.org/papers/haimow... The similar desires and emotions we inherit are in a sense also part of the basic values we inherit just as we inherit blue eyes and brown eyes and ten fingers. There do seem to be limits to how much you can alter a persons values through culture.

The concept of "value" is a social construct, and as such is defined by the culture using the concept. Yet we can gain some insights into modern patterns of exchange, value, and wealth by examining previous societies.

continuing from above:

I agree that there is an inherited component (probably large, as per the twin studies) to values formation in humans. I simply was agreeing with Pim on what "value" generally means in, say, the typical academic discussion. Semantics, primarily, but it can trip up the conversation.

Again, I don't think we have any truly fundamental differences in outlook in this matter, only differing in the view of values as being socially constructed and developed (one could, I think, argue that babies do have values in some sense---but it wouldn't be the conventional sense).

Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/b8ykm

I don't think that we're in any fundamental disagreement about this. "Human values" themselves are generally understood to be the result of human development, to be constructed out of our emotions, attitudes, inherited personality traits, and interaction with our environment.

Insight into how children learn cultural values:
http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/2006/11/insight_into_how_children_lear.php

normdoering:
Sorry for late commenting. Life imposed.

"Our reality maps do effect our moral choices."
Agreed. I was discussing atheism as such, secular vs morality. That religion as a phenomena and perhaps also as a non-secular set of ideas on the other hand is about morality isn't usually contested.

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